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Abstract 
 
China’s role as a global security actor has increased dramatically over the last decade 
and the country is now projecting its power and promoting its agenda well beyond 
Asia. In particular, peace and security have come to be at the centre of China’s Africa 
strategy and are now a major factor affecting not only China’s relations with African 
countries, but also its global image. Studying China through its engagement with the 
continent’s security regime allows us to see the global actor the PRC is becoming. 
 
In order to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the topic, I advance an argument 
that is both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, I argue that the concept of 
normative power, understood as the power to shape the ‘normal’ in international 
affairs, gives us insights into China’s preferred norms and practices and into the 
mechanisms through which it is promoting its vision of world order. 
 
Empirically, I claim that not only is China being socialised into the international system, 
but it also contributes to shaping it. Its norms-making attempts become more evident 
if we look at its engagement with Africa’s security environment. I thus make two related 
claims. First, China increasingly acts as a security norms-shaper in the continent thanks 
to a stable discourse articulating China and African countries as fellow members of the 
Global South. Second, as China-Africa security cooperation develops mostly through 
multilateral institutions, I argue that its normative power potential varies depending 
on the contingent institution. 
 
After mapping China’s Africa discourse on security across the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation, the African Union, and the United Nations Security Council in the 
period 2000-2018, I argue that it is especially through creating dedicated forums 
responding to its interests and priorities, that China is becoming a normative power. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 

c}	<~x|
Better to go home and weave a net  
than to stand by the pond longing for fish 
(The Book of Han, Volume 56) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Chinese domestic and foreign policy (FP) has been quite eventful in the last few 
years. From the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), from the militarisation of the South China Sea to 
the opening of the first military base abroad in Djibouti, the country’s rise as a global 
power under the rule of Xi Jinping is indeed one of the defining features of 
international relations (IR) and contemporary politics. In response to these 
developments, many in the community of China-experts have been debating which 
direction will the country take with President Xi and his China Dream. Whether one 
wants to think this is the beginning of an Asian century or not, it is undeniable that 
China’s reach has considerably expanded in a relatively short period of time. There is 
hardly somewhere in the world where Chinese investments or infrastructure projects 
have not proliferated; where Confucius Institutes have not opened; where Chinese 
sharing bicycles cannot be spotted in the streets; where Chinese workers and migrants 
have not settled. Yet, there is a region in particular that has attracted a lot of attention: 
Africa. Browse any newspaper or magazine these days and there will be stories of 
Chinese in Africa or Africans in China. Search among China- and international 
politics-focused journals and there will be articles discussing China’s engagement in 
the continent. Though China-Africa relations are all but a new phenomenon, they 
have gained in popularity in the last two decades. In this thesis, I look at both topics—
China’s rise and China-in-Africa—as two sides of the same coin. Analyses of the rise 
of China as a responsible global power would be incomplete without looking at its 
engagement with Africa; similarly, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) role in 
promoting development and stability in the continent is inevitably tied to its role as a 
major actor in global politics. Moreover, preconceptions about the nature of the 
country’s rise tend to shape the ways in which China’s engagement with the Global 
South is received and understood. 
Therefore, what China does in Africa matters; it matters both for Africa and for 
China’s global image and credibility. In particular, by reading China through its 
discourse on peace and security and its relations with Africa one begins to see the global 
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actor that China is, or aspires to, becoming. What China does globally also matters; it 
matters both for the world and for its Africa policies, because it sets the tone for its 
interactions with Africa’s elites and peoples. 
The success of China’s relations with the continent is due not only to attractive 
economic incentives, but also, and most importantly, to its skilful use of multilateralism 
and soft power and to a stable and coherent discourse articulating China and African 
countries as fellow members of the Global South, united in the struggle against 
Western hegemony. While relations so far have mostly been based on economic and 
trade interactions, the extraction of resources, and the promotion of development 
through infrastructure building, recent years have seen a surge in peace and security-
related activities. This dissertation explores China’s Africa discourse and its main 
representations and explains how Chinese leaders have gradually introduced and 
legitimised increased engagement with peace and security. The discourse is examined 
across the three main multilateral platforms where China-Africa security policies are 
discussed and negotiated, namely the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
the African Union (AU), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). I then 
analyse the findings of the empirical chapters through the lens of normative power: 
Thanks to the stability of the discourse depicting them as friends, brothers, and 
partners, China has gained the necessary respect and recognition to be considered a 
normative power in the continent and, increasingly, beyond. In this chapter, I first 
present the empirical puzzle that motivated this thesis and outline the research 
questions that guide the analysis. Second, I sketch my argument and the main claims 
I make throughout the dissertation. Third, I deal with the ontological and 
epistemological commitments that underlie the analysis, and I explain my choice of 
the case study, the methods utilised, and the limitations of this research. I conclude 
with an overview of the dissertation. 
 
1.2 The empirical puzzle 
On the one hand, the rise of China is at the heart of many debates within the 
discipline of IR. Yet, as the next chapter argues in more detail, these debates tend to 
revolve around a series of nested dichotomies (i.e. revisionist versus status quo, engage 
versus deter); these, however, do not reveal much of the modalities of its rise. Moreover, 
for the most part ongoing discussions stem from anxieties within the Western and the 
American community of scholars in particular, who worry that a rising China will 
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constitute a threat to the existing rule-based international system.1 While for many 
years academics have debated whether China’s participation in international 
organisations would lead to norms-taking or norms-making, to system-maintaining or 
system-reforming attitudes, more recently China declared itself an advocate of 
multilateralism and a champion of globalisation and international cooperation. The 
AIIB, the BRI, and its active participation in, and contributions to, UN peacekeeping 
are only a few among many examples of its international activities in this sense. It is 
thus imperative that we gain a better understanding of the rise of China and its 
characteristics, since they have wider implications for international politics. On the 
other hand, China-Africa ties have gained steam in the last two decades and now 
constitute a large field at the intersection of many disciplines, including IR, political 
economy, anthropology, and development studies. As part of a growing presence in 
the continent, as well as China’s global ambitions, peace and security, which once 
occupied only a marginal role, now feature prominently in all exchanges. Yet, most 
works tend to focus on either bilateral relations with specific countries, or areas such 
as resources extraction, migration, infrastructure building, agriculture projects, 
migration, and the media. There are only a few comprehensive studies that tackle the 
opportunities and challenges of engaging China in the African peace and security 
architecture. By and large, the work on Sino-African ties has remained “under-
theorised and fragmented, and mostly driven by events of the day.”2 Furthermore, 
some of the literature and media reports, still tend to characterise the PRC as either a 
neo-colonialist or not, thus missing the nuances of what are much more complex 
relations.3 
                                               
1 See one of the latest policy-oriented reports in this sense: Michael J. Mazarr, Timothy R. Heath, and 
Astrid Stuth Cevallos, “China and the International Order,” Rand Corporation, 2018, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2423.html; See also: A. Feigenbaum, “Reluctant 
Stakeholder: Why China’s Highly Strategic Brand of Revisionism Is More Challenging Than 
Washington Thinks,” MacroPolo, April 27, 2018, https://macropolo.org/reluctant-stakeholder-chinas-
highly-strategic-brand-revisionism-challenging-washington-thinks/. 
2 Chris Alden and Daniel Large, eds., New Directions in Africa-China Studies (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2019), xv. 
3 See for instance: Adama Gaye, Chine - Afrique: Le Dragon et l’autruche, Études Africaines (L’Harmattan, 
2006); “Online Debate: Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa?,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 
20, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinese-investment-good-africa/p12622; Juan Pablo Cardenal 
and Heriberto Araújo, China’s Silent Army: The Pioneers, Traders, Fixers and Workers Who Are Remaking the 
World in Beijing’s Image (Allen Lane, 2013); Howard W. French, China’s Second Continent: How a Million 
Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014); Nick Van Mead, “China 
in Africa: Win-Win Development, or a New Colonialism?,” The Guardian, July 31, 2018, sec. Cities, 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jul/31/china-in-africa-win-win-development-or-a-new-
colonialism; To be sure, more recent studies have attempted to push the debate beyond such 
oversimplifications and called for more attention to the complexity of China-Africa. See for exmaple: 
Chris Alden, “In Search of Gravity’s Rainbow. Theoretical Approaches and China-Africa Scholarship” 
(Making sense of the China-Africa Relationship: Theoretical Approaches and the Politics of Knowledge, 
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Hence, enquiring into both topics has value for IR and for the field of China-
Africa studies. This thesis contributes to the former in a number of ways. First, it maps 
the emergence of China as security/development norms-setter in Africa and 
establishes a link between its regional engagement and its global role and aspirations. 
Second, it contributes to debates on China’s rise by providing a more accurate and 
nuanced analysis of its rise as a global security actor. Third, and related, it contributes 
to enriching the debate on China’s participation in international institutions by looking 
not so much at the material and strategic components of advancing its interests— 
aspects which the literature has dealt with in detail—but also by bringing both 
discourse and practice back in. While some have referred to China’s foreign policy as 
a “discursively enacted normative ideal”4, to the best of my knowledge, no study so far 
has provided an accurate analysis of such a discourse, which is needed to seriously 
investigate how the material and the discursive inform each other. In turn, this will 
contribute to a long overdue debate on how to engage IR theory in the study of China’s 
rise in a way that contributes to theory itself, rather than only to the empirical or 
methodological realms.5 Fourth, it addresses China’s use of soft vs hard/economic 
power in formulating foreign policy towards the continent and argues against common 
perception of Chinese soft power being ‘weak’. Instead, it will be argued that China’s 
normative power in Africa rests upon being recognised as such thanks to a successful 
use of soft power alongside economic incentives. Fifth, it contributes with empirical 
material to support explanations of the normative power of China’s foreign policy, and 
thus simultaneously contributes to the growing literature enquiring into how emerging 
and rising powers participate in, shape, and change the international system.  
As regards the field of China-Africa studies, this thesis contributes to filling the 
gaps in the literature by providing a comprehensive study of the official discourse 
informing peace and security policies in the continent. Analysing the discursive basis 
upon which the PRC’s Africa policies rest and the changes and continuities in the 
official China’s Africa discourse, is essential to understand the future direction of such 
policies. In short, as mentioned above, the material and the discursive are both 
important and constitutive of the China-Africa story, which would not be as successful 
if one of the two were missing. This dissertation will therefore contribute both to the 
                                               
Yale University, 2013); Alden and Large, New Directions in Africa-China Studies; Deborah Bräutigam, Will 
Africa Feed China? (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
4 Chris Alden and Daniel Large, “China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of Delivering Difference 
in Africa,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2011): 26. 
5 Chengxin Pan and Emilian Kavalski, “Theorizing China’s Rise in and beyond International Relations,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18, no. 3 (2018): 293, doi:10.1093/irap/lcy018. 
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growing, yet still small body of works on China-Africa security cooperation and to 
studies of the discursive dimension of China’s engagement.  
 
1.2.1 The research questions 
I divide the research questions guiding this thesis into two separate but 
interrelated sets. The first set of questions addresses China’s contemporary 
engagement in the Africa and the changing policies towards its peace and security 
environment since the creation of the FOCAC in 2000. The second set of questions 
links its involvement in the continent with its global policies and explores the possibility 
of China becoming a norms-setter in the area of security, peacekeeping, and conflict 
management. These questions start from the premise that China is rising and it is 
especially rising as a security actor both globally and through its engagement in Africa 
(Chapter 3 will provide further background for these claims). While in the past China 
lacked the resources and confidence to ‘broker’ security abroad, it is now ready to 
expand both its soft and hard/military power beyond Asia.6 In other words, China is 
in a position to shape the way other countries think about security. Since much of 
China’s security activities abroad is happening in the continent and given the recent 
developments highlighted above, Africa occupies a central role in China’s strategy. 
Until recently, peace and security were only marginal in China’s Africa policies. 
However, since 2011-2012, we have witnessed increased attention to issues related to 
Africa’s security environment coupled with substantial funding to a range of security-
related activities, ranging from contributions to the AU, to peacekeeping missions and 
military training. We have thus witnessed a shift in China’s foreign policies towards 
the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which reflects a broader shift in 
the country’s general foreign policy behaviour. Yet, such a shift in China-Africa 
relations does not seem to be mirrored by changes in the official discourse. Thus, the 
first research questions ask: 
• How is China’s Africa discourse constructed and how have Chinese leaders gradually 
included increased engagement in peace and security within such discourse in the years 
2000-2018?  
• Is the shift in policies mirrored by a shift in the discourse?  
• How could Chinese leaders justify such growing involvement without infringing the 
principles of state sovereignty and non-interference? 
                                               
6 Mikko Huotari et al., “China’s Emergence as a Global Security Actor,” MERICS Papers on China 
(MERICS, July 2017). 
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• How has the China-Africa discourse contributed to build China’s image as a legitimate 
norms-maker in the continent? 
China has indeed showed its willingness to contribute to the international system not 
just by deploying more boots on the ground and building military bases in Africa or 
elsewhere, but also by contributing to (re)shaping global norms. This in turns begs the 
question of whether its Africa policy can be considered as part of a more coherent 
global (grand) strategy whereby China ‘pushes’ for the sinicization of world order and 
the spread of socialism with Chinese characteristics, rising as much within the existing 
system as by creating alternative normative platforms. If there is such a global strategy, 
it may be argued that it is the result of both the country being socialised into existing 
practices and organisations and the PRC increasingly socialising others (in this case, 
African leaders) into its developmental peace model. According to Callahan, 
paraphrasing Qin Yaqing, “at the heart of Chinese FP is not a realist security dilemma, 
but a constructivist identity dilemma: who is China, and how does it see the world? … 
Xi (and many public intellectuals) sees China as a normative power whose values 
should inform global governance in a world that is a ‘community of shared destiny’.”7 
As I clarify in the next Chapter, I understand normative power to mean being able to 
set the ‘normal’ in international relations. The questions in the second set provide a 
link between the specificity of China’s Africa discourse and its global image and 
credibility, and ask: 
• Can China be considered a normative power?  
• Can it shape norms on peace and security in Africa (and beyond)?  
• Does China’s security policy in Africa tell us something about what kind of international 
actor China is, or aspires to, becoming? 
Answering these questions requires three analytical steps. First, I map the main 
representations of the China-Africa story in China’s official policy discourse, as well as 
their persistence throughout the nearly two decades since the creation of the FOCAC. 
Second, I unpack how the discourse has slowly made space for a shift in China’s 
                                               
7 William A Callahan, “China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt Road Initiative and the New Regional Order,” 
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 227; Yaqing Qin, “Guoji Guanxi Lilun 
Zhongguo Pai Shengcheng de Keneng He Biran [A Chinese School of International Relations Theory: 
Possibility and Inevitability],” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [Wolrd Economics and Politics] 3 (2006): 7–13; 
Honghua Men, “Liangge Daju Shijiao Xia de Zhongguo Guojia Rentong Bianqian (1982–2012) 
[China’s National Identity in Transition: Domestic and International Perspectives (1982-2012)],” 
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, no. 2 (2014): 54–66; see also Pu and Wang for a study of the debate among Chinese 
scholars over strategic overstretch: Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang, “Rethinking China’s Rise: Chinese 
Scholars Debate Strategic Overstretch,” International Affairs 94, no. 5 (2018): 1019–35, 
doi:10.1093/ia/iiy140. 
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approach to security policies in the continent, although no major change in the basic 
discourse is detectable. Third, I trace how these representations have been maintained 
and cultivated across all levels of engagement with the continent, from the regional, 
through the continental, and to global, which involves tracing the discourse not only 
in FOCAC documents, but also in AU and UNSC texts. After comparing across the 
three fora, I finally explore the link between the discourse and the practice of security 
policies in Africa and link these with the country’s global ambitions as a rising security 
actor. By looking at how China asserts its normative power thanks to a logic of 
relationships that stresses equal partnership and mutual benefit, it is possible to identify 
a long-term vision where China is positioned at the centre stage of world affairs and 
international security. 
 
1.2.2 The argument 
In answering the research questions above, I advance an argument that is both 
theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, I argue that the concept of normative power, 
understood as the power to shape the ‘normal’ in international affairs, gives us insights 
into China’s preferred norms and practices and into the mechanisms through which it 
is promoting its vision of world order.  
On the one hand, existing approaches to China’s rise do not tell us much of the 
kind of actor China is becoming, besides unproductive dichotomies (i.e. peaceful versus 
threat, deter versus engage), and they see Chinese foreign policy in terms of its material 
and economic power. The literature on China-Africa relations similarly suffers from a 
number of flaws: It remains under-theorised and fragmented and it has not properly 
addressed security cooperation (with a few exceptions), nor it has given much attention 
to the discursive dimension of China’s engagement with Africa. On the other hand, 
given that such a coherent set of strategies, goals, and policies are actively being 
promoted by Chinese leaders as alternative norms to existing standards, the concept 
of normative power promises to reveal much more of China’s attempts to socialise 
others into its worldview. Normative power is power in context, meaning that is given 
by the contingent context of interactions between actors. Thus, an actor’s capacity to 
define the normal depends on the recognition of this agency by target states. In this 
case, as China applies a relationship logic to international affairs, aimed to optimising 
relations rather than transactions, it is thanks to years of intense and skilful ‘diplomacy 
of respect’ that China has improved relations with Africa and gained the respect and 
recognition that are necessary to become norms-shapers. In this sense, therefore, a 
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normative power is able to shape the normal only so long as the other actors involved 
in interactions recognise its agency as such. To be sure, China’s economic clout and 
its attractive investments are important components of its policies in Africa. However, 
it is important to also look at how the discourse has contributed to pave the way into 
Africa and building an image for China of a friendly and trustworthy ally. 
Empirically, I claim that not only is China being socialised into the international 
system and ‘uses’ liberal norms to its advantage, but it also contributes to shaping it. In 
particular, it acts as a security norms-shaper in Africa and does so by: 1) proposing new 
norms and concepts that are based on the country’s history and domestic experiences, 
or re-elaborating on existing norms and concepts by adding a Chinese ‘flavour’; 2) 
simultaneously acting inside and outside of typically Western-dominated arenas; 3) 
creating or co-constituting regional forums with other actors in the developing world; 
and 4) framing these efforts into a broader foreign policy strategy that acts at different 
levels, from the regional, through the continental, to the global. I thus make two related 
claims. First, China increasingly acts as a security norms-shaper in the continent thanks 
to a stable discourse articulating China and African countries as fellow members of the 
Global South. The stability and persistence of what I called the “South-South 
cooperation” discourse granted China the reputation of a trustworthy friend and 
partner, one that delivers on its promises and commitments and that acts in pursuit of 
win-win cooperation. This discourse consistently paints China and Africa as long-term 
friends united in an anti-hegemonic struggle against the domination of the ‘West’. The 
stability of these narratives has been maintained throughout a long period of 
engagement, mostly thanks to the positive response encountered from African elites, 
which have been hailed into China’s vision of world order, and to the security-
development nexus. As the concept entails a close link between the promotion of 
economic growth and social development and the achievement of stability and peace, 
growing security and military commitments appear legitimate and reasonable. By 
presenting itself as a reliable partner and by being acknowledged as such across Africa, 
the Chinese model represents an attractive alternative to Western modes of 
engagement. The discourse is structured into three layers, which gradually make space 
for peace and security. Starting from the basic “South-South cooperation” discourse, 
the second layer allows for a number of representations to develop, such as China and 
Africa as friends, brothers, and partners, and focuses on the developmental aspect of 
the security-development nexus, whereby development is considered a prerequisite for 
stability. The third layer introduces a new aspect of China’s engagement, namely the 
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securitisation of development, which understands the latter as necessarily premised on 
a peaceful and secure environment. This change produced a shift in policies, ranging 
from non-interference to growing military presence—which now align with the 
country’s broader grand strategy—but not a change in the first and second layers of 
discourse, which remains stable and coherent. 
The second claim is that, as China-Africa security cooperation develops mostly 
through multilateral institutions, its normative power potential varies depending on 
the contingent institution. China’s Africa discourse is organised horizontally across 
three multilateral platforms through which peace and security matters and the related 
policies are discussed, namely the FOCAC, the AU, and the UNSC. China promotes 
its vision of world order and its normative security agenda across all these platforms. 
In other words, not only has the country been socialised into the existing system, but it 
has also been an agent of socialisation and has expressed the desire to become a norms-
maker both inside and outside of Western-dominated institutions—what scholars have 
called a two-way socialisation. Such efforts have, in turn, encountered responses from 
regions of the Global South. This thesis’ focus on the three multilateral institutions 
aims to bridge across fora where power dynamics and processes are different, with the 
objective of contributing to our understanding of China’s rise as an active participant 
to international peace and security. While the coherency of dominant representations 
of China and Africa is maintained across the three organisations, it seems that China 
tends to conform to existing norms and maintaining the normative status quo when it 
operates within existing normative frameworks (the UN and the AU); and it shows a 
more active approach aimed to redesign selected norms when it operates within the 
framework of Chinese-led or co-constituted regional organisations (the FOCAC). 
However, as will be shown later, signs of the Chinese discourse and its diplomatic 
language are increasingly appearing and are becoming naturalised in the context of 
the UN as well. Depending on its position with each of these institutions, therefore, the 
potential for China to effectively promote its preferred security and development 
norms varies greatly. Therefore, analysing Chinese-led forums and agreements reveals 
more of the country’s preferred norms and practices than exclusively focusing on the 
country’s behaviour in already established institutions. 
The empirical chapters thus trace how China’s Africa discourse has been 
constructed around a set of recurring representations of China and Africa backed by 
political and historical narratives. I first show how China’s engagement with peace and 
security has been negotiated and co-constituted as part of the FOCAC, an exclusive 
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China-Africa platform launched in 2000 with the aim of negotiating, designing, and 
agreeing on common policies. The Forum also provides China with an opportunity to 
announce generous funding initiatives, thus also strengthening its soft power appeal. 
The platform can be considered the perfect example of China’s attempt to create 
Chinese-led alternative institutions with the objective of increasing its influence abroad. 
Second, the African Union, a continental organisation which was originally inspired 
by the desire to promote pan-Africanism and a common vision for the continent. The 
institution is heavily dependent on external funding to conduct its activities and China 
is still in the early phase of learning and familiarising itself with existing practices; in 
this sense, it lags behind other powers that have been interacting with the organisation 
for longer, most importantly the European Union (EU). This is the locus where China 
struggles the most to take the normative lead. Third, I look at ways in which China has 
been conforming to international norms without showing major signs of revisionism, 
with the exception of human rights, at the UNSC. The Council represents China’s 
global stage for advancing its preferred ideas on peace, security, and development and 
promoting the security-development nexus. While the PRC has been socialised into 
the existing institutional order, its own vision of peace and security—mostly in the form 
of developmental peace, preventive diplomacy, a soft approach to conflict resolution, 
and non-intervention—is gradually being promoted at the global level too. 
Through the analysis of such a coherent set of representations and the policies 
that the discourse enables, we begin to see the contours of a strategy that entails a 
number of elements, including a focus on the security-development nexus; continued 
assistance for developing countries in the fields of development, infrastructure building, 
trade, and investment, as well as increased militarisation and securitisation of foreign 
relations; and the promotion of Chinese preferred norms and practices via both 
existing organisations and new institutional arenas. In terms of the country’s specific 
peace and security strategy in Africa, this long-term vision includes an even bigger 
commitment to peacekeeping; growing contributions to both the UN and the AU; and 
an emphasis on political mediation and diplomacy as the primary means to resolving 
conflicts, although China is also ready to accept more robust intervention when needed.  
 
1.3 Methodology and methods 
As argued above, this thesis aims to understand how the shift in Chinese policies 
towards Africa’s security environment was constructed in the discourse and how such 
discourse has contributed to building China’s image as a legitimate partner in the 
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continent to the point that we can consider the PRC a normative power. Thus, from 
the outset, this thesis is committed to answering “how-possible” questions rather than 
“why-questions”. According to Doty, “[h]ow questions examine how meanings are 
produced and attached to various social subjects and objects, thus constituting 
particular interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and preclude others. 
How questions thus highlight an important aspect of power that why questions too 
often neglect: the way in which power works to constitute particular modes of subjectivity and 
interpretive dispositions.”8 In this section, I clarify the ontological and epistemological 
framework guiding the present work and I detail the reasons for the choice of discourse 
as the preferred ‘tool’ in analysing China’s Africa policies on peace and security. As 
Haugevik reminds us, “methodologies are distinctly different from methods. Whereas 
methodology may be understood as our position on how and in what ways knowledge 
is acquired, methods refer to the various research techniques employed in analysing 
empirical data.” 9  Thus, in the first part of this section, I clarify the thesis’ 
epistemological and ontological commitments, while in the second part I detail the 
‘tools’ utilised to gather empirical material.10  
As De Zutter underlines and as I further discuss in Chapter 2, the question of 
what normative power ‘is’ has often been confused with the question of what normative 
power ‘should be’; however, while 
Normative power is an identity attributed to a political entity that diffuses its norms in 
the international system … the norms that are diffused are not by definition universal. … 
neither universal norms nor a particular set of instruments can be considered as 
ontological necessities for normative power. This move enables us to overcome the 
force-for-good connotation inherent in much of the NPE literature. A normative power 
is not ‘good’ because it diffuses norms.11  
                                               
8 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 4; emphasis added. 
9 Kristin M. Haugevik, Special Relationships in World Politics: Inter-State Friendship and Diplomacy after the Second 
World War, New International Relations (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 54; 
emphasis in original. 
10 Jackson argues that the decisive issue in social sciences, more than our methdological choices, is 
internal validity, that is “whether, given our assumptiongs, out conclusions follow rigorously from the 
evidence and logical argumentation that we provide.” Which means that “even someone who rejects 
our values should be able to acknowledge the validity of our empirical results within the context of our 
perspective.” I have thus strived to be as clear and explicit as possible about my research design in order 
to ensure such internal validity. See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International 
Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics (Routledge, 2010), 22–23. 
11 Elisabeth De Zutter, “Normative Power Spotting: An Ontological and Methodological Appraisal,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 8 (2010): 1107. Thus, while Manners links action and universal 
norms with the identity of a norm-diffuser (an association which is constructed as ethical necessity), De 
Zutter distinguishes between an ethical and a normative power ontology. Unlike her, I do not consider 
the ethical dimension of China’s normative power, as I explain in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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In order to understand what power ‘is’, one needs to identify the material conditions 
(or power capacities) of a certain actor or state; the identity and role of such an actor 
(awareness of the capacities, construction of its own norms as universal, and willingness 
to project these norms); the relational dimension of normative power (the assessment 
of an actor’s image and how others perceive it); and the impact of such power on other 
actors’ practices. In other words, “[a] normative power’s identity needs confirmation 
by relevant others.”12 Therefore, because of its commitment to how-possible questions 
and its focus on the relationality of norms-diffusion and of social processes more in 
general, this thesis is positioned at the intersection of constructivist and post-
structuralist scholarships.13 On the one hand, according to Guzzini,  
Constructivism makes the epistemological claim that meaning, and hence knowledge, is socially 
constructed. … This knowledge is moreover socially or intersubjectively constructed. Concepts are 
part of language. Language can neither be reduced to something subjective nor 
objective. … Second, [it] makes the ontological claim that the social world is constructed. … Third, 
since constructivism distinguishes and problematises the relationship between the levels 
of observation and action, it is finally defined by stressing the reflexive relationship between the 
social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.14 
The claim that social knowledge and language are co-constitutive of reality is not 
unique to constructivism: Poststructuralists also argue that “it is not that nothing exists 
outside of discourse, but that in order to exist for us, phenomena have to be grasped through 
discourse.”15 Furthermore, frustrated by IR’s obsession to focus on either materialism or 
ideationalism, the structure or the agent, Jackson and Nexon recommend that 
attention should instead be given to the relational processes occurring between agents 
and structures.16 In order to explore the nature of social processes of interaction, post-
structuralist scholars draw on Foucault’s work on discourse and discursive 
representations.17 Discourse has been defined in a number of ways but can be best 
                                               
12 Ibid., 1117. 
13 For more background on the differences between rationalist and constructivist approaches, including 
“middle-ground” constructivism, see James D. Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. 
Constructivism: A Sceptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2002); For a discussion on the 
overdue dialogue between constructivism and post-structuralism, see Oliver Kessler, “The Contingency 
of Constructivism: On Norms, the Social, and the Third,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 45, 
no. 1 (2016): 46 (footnote 15). 
14 Stefano Guzzini, “The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 498-499; emphasis added. 
15 Kevin C. Dunn and Iver B. Neumann, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 2016), 9; emphasis added; see also Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: 
Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 22. 
16 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, “Relations Before States: Substance, Process and 
the Study of World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999): 291–332, 
doi:10.1177/1354066199005003002; Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the 
Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International 
Relations 3, no. 3 (1997): 365–92, doi:10.1177/1354066197003003004. 
17 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1982). 
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described as “a system producing a set of statements and practices that, by entering 
into institutions and appearing like normal, constructs the reality of its subjects and 
maintains a certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations. Or, more succinctly, 
discourses are systems of meaning-production that fix meaning, however temporarily, 
and enable actors to make sense of the world and to act within it.”18 Representations 
are defined by Dunn and Neumann as “things and phenomena as they appear to us, 
that is, not the things themselves but things filtered through the fabric existing between 
the world and ourselves: language, categories, and so on. The discourse analyst makes 
it her task to show how representations are constituted and prevail, and the span of 
different representations that at any given time constitutes a discourse.”19 Within a 
discourse, representations construct regimes of truth or knowledge; importantly, 
discursive representations do not only produce identities, but also foreign policies and 
their outcomes. As Hansen suggests, within specific discourses, certain paths of action 
become possible while others are made more unlikely or even unthinkable.20 While 
discursive representations precondition foreign policy, they are also “(re)produced 
through articulations of policy.” 21  Or, in the words of Wæver, “[f]inding and 
presenting in a systematic way patterns of thought in a specific country will always be 
helpful in making the debates and actions of that country more intelligible to other 
observers.”22 In other words, unpacking China’s normative power potential and its 
changing foreign policies towards Africa’s security (and the world’s) would be 
impossible without looking at how China’s Africa discourse is constructed in the first 
place. 
Therefore, a study of discourse implies the study of both language and practice. 
Indeed, Neumann calls for returning practice to the study of language: “the linguistic 
turn is not just a turn to narrative discourse and rhetoric, but to how politics is actually 
                                               
18 Dunn and Neumann, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research, 4; Doty, Imperial Encounters; David 
Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1992); Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. 
19 Dunn and Neumann, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research, 33–34; It should be noted that 
discursive representations do not mean the same thing to everyone. As Laclau and Mouffe explain, “[a]n 
earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and 
now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural 
phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ depends upon the structuring of a discursive field"; 
Laclau and Mouffe cited in Iver B. Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” in Qualitative Methods in International 
Relations. A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, Research Methods Series (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 74. 
20 Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 21. 
21 Hansen cited in Haugevik, Special Relationships in World Politics, 42. 
22  Ole Waever, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy 
Theory,” in European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, ed. Lene Hansen and 
Ole Wæver, The New International Relations Series (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 26. 
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effected. … Practices are discursive, both in the sense that some practices involve 
speech acts (acts which in themselves gesture outside of narrative), and in the sense that 
practice cannot be thought ‘outside of’ discourse.”23 Practices are defined by Barnes as 
“socially recognized forms of activity, done on the basis of what members learn from 
others, and capable of being done well or badly, correctly or incorrectly”24—in other 
words, while discourse refers to preconditions for action, practices are socialised 
patterns of action, and “[a]s long as people act in accordance with established practices, 
they confirm a given discourse.”25 Hence, for instance, Chinese authorities’ first visit 
abroad of the year to African countries has become a routine enactment of one of the 
main representations of China and Africa as good friends and, more recently, good 
brothers and good partners.26 It should be noted, however, that discourse “does not try 
to get to the thoughts and motives of the actors, their hidden intentions or secret 
plans. … What interests us is neither that individual decision makers really believe, nor 
what are shared beliefs among a population … but which codes are used when actors 
relate to each other.”27 
Not surprisingly, then, for Weldes and Saco discourse is a “structure of meaning-
in-use that is both intersubjective and, in part, linguistic. It is linguistic in that language 
is a central sign system that provides the resources out of which representations are 
constructed. It is intersubjective in that the language through which people construct 
meaning is necessarily shared.”28 In particular, in Weldes’ study of the construction of 
the national interest, she explains that such a construction takes place in three steps.29 
First, state officials create representations which serve to populate the world with 
‘objects’—including both the self and others—drawing on already available cultural 
                                               
23 Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” Millennium 
31, no. 3 (2002): 627–28. 
24 Barnes, cited in Neumann, ibid., 629–30. 
25 Ibid., 637. 
26 For a study of China based on an understanding of IR as a relational ontology, focusing on friendship 
through the study of guanxi relations, see Astrid H. M. Nordin and Graham M. Smith, “Reintroducing 
Friendship to International Relations: Relational Ontologies from China to the West,” International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18, no. 3 (2018): 369–96, doi:10.1093/irap/lcy011; Kavalski similarly uses the 
concept of guanxi to amplify the intrinsic relationality of IR; see Emilian Kavalski, “Guanxi or What Is 
the Chinese for Relational Theory of World Politics,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18, no. 3 
(2018): 397–420, doi:10.1093/irap/lcy008. 
27 He adds that “What is often presented as a weakness of discourse analysis – ‘how do you find out if 
they really mean what they say?’, ‘what if it is only rhetoric?’ – can be turned into a methodological 
strength, as soon as one is conscientious in sticking to discourse as discourse.” Waever, “Identity, 
Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,” 26–27; emphasis in 
original. 
28 Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, “Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive 
Construction of ‘The Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25, no. 2 
(1996): 373. 
29 Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, Controversies in Sociology ; 1 (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1975), 85. 
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and linguistic resources; importantly, an identity is given to each of these objects, based 
on more or less precise characteristics. Second, these representations postulate 
relations among the various objects; such relations often appear in the form of “quasi-
causal arguments”. Fay calls the “accounts of the ways in which certain configurations 
of conditions give rise to certain forms of action, rules, and common meanings” quasi-
causal instead of causal, because  
in these sorts of conditionship (sic) relations, consciousness functions as a mediator 
between the determining antecedent factors and the subsequent action; in other words, 
men act in terms of their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their external 
conditions, rather than being governed directly by them, and therefore these conditions 
must be understood not as causes but as warranting conditions which make a particular action 
or belief more ‘reasonable’, ‘justified’, or ‘appropriate’, given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of 
the actors. Nevertheless, such quasi-causal accounts are a legitimate explanatory device 
without which a social science would be radically impoverished.30 
Third, as these representations provide a vision of the world of international 
affairs, they have already defined the national interest. For instance, Weldes analyses the 
construction of the United States (US) national interest in the context of the Cuban 
missile crisis and proposes to look at how representations are produced and naturalised 
through the processes of articulation and interpellation. I especially draw on the latter 
when I briefly explore the acceptance of China’s Africa discourse among African 
leaders in Chapter 4 and I thus clarify its meaning here. Interpellation (or hailing) is 
discussed by Althusser as a mechanism that “‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it 
‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals … or ‘transforms’ the individuals into 
subjects”.31 Weldes further explains that it refers to a process whereby identities or 
subject-positions are created and simultaneously individuals are hailed into such 
identities; these individuals thus come to identify with a certain subject-position and 
with the representations in which they appear. These representations make sense to 
them because they have identified with a specific subject-position.32 As a result, the 
                                               
30 Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975), 85. 
31 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays, translated by B. Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), 174. 
32  Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 287; Hall defines articulation as “the form of the 
connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. … the so-called 
‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated 
in different ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness’.” Hence, uncovering process of 
articulation means trying to understand how ideological elements come to cohere together within a 
discourse, as well as how and under which conditions they become articulated. See Lawrence Grossberg, 
“On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall,” Journal of Communication Inquiry 
10, no. 2 (1986): 53; Weldes elaborates on this and describes it as the process through which “[m]eaning 
is created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic 
elements.” Importantly, such meanings already exist and make sense in a particular society; but they 
are (re)combined thus producing contingent and contextually specific representations. Thus, for instance, 
‘totalitarianism’ was often articulated by US foreign policy actors during the Cold War and came to 
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representations appear to be common sense, to reflect ‘the way the world really is’.”33 
Hence, all foreign policy makers have to do is to present foreign policies that seem 
legitimate to the relevant audiences. The construction of a link between policy and 
identity becomes the centre of political activity and it is what makes both parts appear 
coherent with each other.34 As foreign policy discourses are analytical constructions, 
they are identified through the reading of texts. After all, states are verbal entities that 
“communicate widely, both domestically and internationally, leaving very little foreign 
policy action that is entirely non-verbal.”35 However, equal importance is given to 
spoken discourse and I draw heavily on Chinese and African leaders’ speeches, as well 
as interviews with practitioners and diplomats, true to the poststructuralist mantra that 
“everything—gestures, monuments, films, dress, grave goods, and so on—can be read 
as text.”36 While showing how acceptance works is not the main purpose of the thesis, 
it is also possible to advance some preliminary conclusions on such mechanisms based 
on the analysis of the official documents and the fieldwork interviews. 
Therefore, because the relationship between discourse and politics is co-
constitutive, not only does discourse hold power over politicians and policymakers, but 
the latter can shape such discourse and use it to justify their preferred policies. In 
Wæver’s words, “overall policies in particular hold a definite relationship to discursive 
structures” since policy makers ought to be able to argue where a certain policy “takes 
us” and how it resonates with how the state views itself.37 As Hansen suggests building 
on Foucault, Butler, and others,  
Language’s structured yet inherently unstable nature brings to the fore the importance 
of political agency and the political production and reproduction of discourses and the 
identities constructed within them. Policy discourses construct … problems, objects, and 
subjects, but they are also simultaneously articulating policies to address them. Policies 
are thus particular directions for action, whereas the construction of identity in discourse 
is seen more broadly as a political practice. The conceptualization of foreign policy as a 
discursive practice implies that policy and identity are seen as ontologically interlinked: 
it is only through the discursive enactment of foreign policy, or in Judith Butler’s terms 
‘performances’, that identity comes into being, but this identity is at the same time 
constructed as the legitimization for the policy proposed. … Identities are thus 
articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted. But they are also (re)produced 
                                               
connote ‘expansion’ and ‘aggression’. As a result, when ‘totalitarianism’ was invoked, it also carried the 
meanings of ‘expansion’ and ‘aggression’. See Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 284. 
33 Ibid. In her case, the subjcet-position ‘the US’ brings with it a sense of belonging to an American 
national community. Through this representation, individuals are interpellated into the language of the 
national interest as members of the imagined American community.  
34 Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 28; For more on the question of what 
degree of freedom exists in the forging of articulations, see Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 
286–87. 
35 Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 23. 
36 Dunn and Neumann, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research, 39. 
37 Waever, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,” 
27; emphasis in original. 
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through these very policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and 
product.38 
Among the possible modes of discourse arranging information in a logical order, it is 
argued that narratives have been be important tools in China’s foreign policy in Africa, 
and the PRC’s official political rhetoric is rich in narratives recalling historical links 
between the Middle Kingdom and African countries. 39  Indeed, the main 
representations I identify in the thesis are backed up by powerful narratives. These can 
be defined as “linguistically mediated temporal syntheses”: 40  They are texts 
characterised by “a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way for 
a definite audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or people’s experiences 
of it.”41 They differ from other representations of historical reality, such as annals, and 
chronicles, in that they do not simply list events, but rather order them in a story.42 As 
Strauss points out, “[o]fficial rhetoric (seeking to persuade), historical narrative (the 
supporting stories about what has happened), the presumptive audience(s) the rhetoric 
seeks to persuade, and the politics and concerns of the time in which the rhetoric is 
propagated are deeply entwined; as audiences, topical concerns and political leaders 
themselves change, so too should the rhetoric and the narrative.”43 Also, as Somers 
suggests, “[i]f identities are fixed there can be no room to accommodate changing 
power relations—or history itself—as they are constituted and reconstituted over 
time.”44 In her article, Strauss asks why is there such a relatively uniformity of discourse 
on Africa, while the actual conditions of China-Africa ties have changed and are so 
multifaceted, even through periods when such ties were tenuous at best. To be sure, 
China’s rhetoric of its relations with Africa has not remained entirely unchanged, and 
large parts of it have been dropped at the leaders’ convenience. Rather, she suggests 
that rhetoric is not just “empty words”: 
In China as elsewhere, official and semi-official rhetoric provides the framework within 
which policy and initiatives are developed, explained and legitimated both domestically 
                                               
38 Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 21. Emphasis in original.  
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and internationally. Rhetoric is part of a complex of critical appeals between the state 
and significant audiences it wishes to attract, persuade, mobilize or consolidate support 
within. … reality in policy implementation often departs from stated ideals, but the 
grounding rhetoric continues to matter to a range of different audiences, both domestic 
and international. Official rhetoric is also significant as the framing within which policy 
is articulated. Hence it includes “givens” that Chinese policy makers and elites do not 
need to question, offers a shorthand for the limited knowledge about Africa the Chinese 
population at large encounters, and sets forth a set of legitimating claims about China’s 
intentions towards international actors, particularly in Africa itself.45 
Thus, no matter what a state’s principles and foreign policy rhetoric are, there 
always will be gaps between rhetoric and practice. After all, as White points out, “[i]n 
the historical narrative the systems of meaning production peculiar to a culture or 
society are tested against the capacity of any set of “real” events to yield to such 
systems”, suggesting that narrative discourse is all but a neutral medium for the 
representation of historical events.46 China’s Africa discourse is based on a set of logical 
supporting ideas, which ultimately “undergird a developmental model for Africa that 
is at least implicitly deemed both separate from and better than what the West (or in 
its time, the Soviet Union) has had to offer. … the consistency of China’s rhetoric on 
Africa makes it possible for it to make a credible claim to be Africa’s ‘all-weather friend’ 
and appeal broadly to African elites.”47 China’s attachment to this rhetoric continues 
to be attractive to core groups in China, Strauss suggests, even as audiences change 
and norms shift. I here build on some her conclusions by proposing a more 
theoretically grounded and methodologically accurate analysis of China’s Africa 
discourse and how it adapts to changes in both the international environment and the 
specificity of China-Africa ties, and I ascribe the longevity of the main representations 
to the successful layering of the discourse, which I further discuss in Chapter 4. 
A more sceptical view would further point to the character of political rhetoric. 
While conventional constructivist research has sought to demonstrate how persuasion 
is an essential process in norm building, others have suggested that language and 
rhetoric are instruments of coercion. On the one hand, constructivist scholarship 
focuses on communication, especially persuasive messages, as the central mechanisms 
for (re)constructing social facts.48 For instance, some argue that some ideas prevail 
because they ‘resonate’ with relevant audiences. In this context, frames “provide a 
singular interpretation of a particular situation and then indicate appropriate 
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behaviour for that context. … [they] are basic building blocks or the construction of 
broadly resonant norms and they thereby serve to legitimate normative orders.”49 On 
the other hand, however, the normative developments observed by constructivists are 
often the result of a coercive mechanism rather than genuine persuasion, as Payne 
suggests.50 Similarly, Krebs and Jackson maintain that although persuasion does occur 
in the political arena, it is rare and does not exhaust the ways through which rhetoric 
shapes political contest.51 Methodologically, they invite scholars to “avoid centering 
causal accounts on unanswerable questions about actors’ true motives and to focus 
instead on what actors say, in what contexts, and to what audiences”; theoretically, 
they argue for a move away “from constructivism with a liberal flavor, focused on the 
transformation of values, toward constructivism with coercive characteristics, focused 
on the exercise of power.” 52  Indeed, “[t]he acquisition and maintenance of rule 
ultimately hinge as much on legitimacy as on physical coercion, and such legitimacy 
can be established only through rhetorical action.”53 Hence, while the constructivist 
enquiry into public rhetorical interchange is much needed, Krebs and Jackson remind 
us that power and rank are omnipresent in the political sphere and actors do not 
employ language “unadulterated by earlier political contestation.”54 Similarly, Mattern 
suggests that reality is constructed not through evidence-based arguments, but through 
representational force, which she defines as  
a form of power that operates through the structure of a speaker’s narrative 
representation of ‘reality’. Specifically, a narrative expresses representational force when 
it is organised in such a way that it threatens the audience with unthinkable harm unless 
it submits, in word and in deed, to the terms of the speaker’s viewpoint. The unthinkable 
harm threatened, however, is not physical … Instead the harm promised is to the 
victim’s own ontological security – it is a threat that exploits the fragility of the 
sociolinguistic ‘realities’ that constitute the victim’s Self.55  
While this thesis does not apply Krebs and Jackson’s rhetorical coercion or Mattern’s 
representational force models—given that the purpose of the research is a different 
one—they should not be excluded as possible mechanisms at work behind the success 
of China’s discourse in Africa. After all, “it does not matter whether actors believe what 
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they say, whether they are motivated by crass material interests or sincere commitment. 
What is important is that they can be rhetorically maneuvered into a corner, trapped 
into publicly endorsing positions they may, or may not, find anathema.”56  
 
1.3.1 Case selection 
The choice of China’s engagement in African peace and security is motivated by 
a number of reasons. First, it was chosen in order to address the pitfalls of the bodies 
of literature on China’s rise on the one hand, and on China-Africa ties on the other 
hand. Examining Africa as a region instead of Asia allows me to go beyond China’s 
immediate neighbourhood, where the US has much influence and many interests, 
arguably more so than in Africa. In a way, therefore, this can be considered a single 
case study, one that emerges from an empirical puzzle where “[w]e see something that 
does not fit our expectations based on prevailing theories or conventional wisdom.”57 
Second, and related, this case study shifts the focus away from places where US-China 
competition is more pronounced, such as the Asia-Pacific—although as argued earlier, 
it is increasingly the case that both the media and some scholars see the African 
continent as a ‘testing ground’ for tensions between the two. European powers, 
especially France, the United Kingdom (UK), and Portugal, have traditionally not only 
engaged with the continent for longer than the US, but also have substantial political, 
economic, and security interests there. And yet, China’s ‘advance’ into Africa is 
perceived less as a competition by those powers than by the US; some of the concerns 
raised by former US secretary of state Rex Tillerson during his 2018 tour of five 
African countries are a good example of such perception. 58  Simultaneously, the 
continent is at the centre of most debates and resolutions at the UNSC, thus providing 
a good case for linking the regional with the global sphere. Finally, while China’s 
involvement has so far mostly focused on areas such as trade, investment, agriculture, 
infrastructure building, extraction of natural and mineral resources, and education, it 
is not until relatively recently that leaders in Beijing have expressed the desire to engage 
in peace and security areas in a more substantial way. Africa thus represents a unique 
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platform to ascertain China’s commitments to shifting norms on peace and security 
internationally. 
 
1.3.2 Conducting discourse analysis 
As the research questions revolve around the construction of China’s Africa 
discourse, how it has gradually incorporated more peace and security, and how the 
discourse has contributed to creating an image for China as a reliable partner and 
credible norms-maker, I apply discourse analysis to search for, and identify, the 
dominant representations of China-Africa—what Dunn and Neumann call an  
“inventory of representations”.59 I proceed in three analytical steps. First, I map the 
main representations of the China’s Africa discourse as it appears in official policy 
documents, as well as their persistence throughout the nearly two decades since the 
creation of the FOCAC in 2000. Second, by utilising the concept of layered discourse, 
I show how China’s Africa discourse is structured along three layers and how it has 
gradually accommodated narratives on the securitisation of development, producing a 
major shift in policies, but not in the basic discourse. Third, I trace how the discourse 
is maintained and cultivated across all levels of security engagement with the continent, 
namely regional, continental, and global, by analysing AU and UNSC sources. 
An essential element of a discourse analytical design is the selection of relevant 
texts, as suggested by Neumann. 60  As much as the textual material available is 
practically endless, time and space constraints demand a clear delimitation of sources, 
which means establishing when enough documents have been read. Because of the 
focus of the present project on China’s security policy towards Africa, the sources 
examined belong to the realm of official foreign policy discourse, which Hansen 
describes as “the discourse through which state action is legitimized, and thus under 
any circumstances crucial for understanding political and social relations within and 
beyond state boundaries.”61 She understands official discourse as situated in a large 
intertextual web tracing intertextual references to other texts. Following the first 
research model she proposes, I thus focus “on political leaders with official authority 
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to sanction the foreign policies pursued as well as those with central roles in executing 
these policies, for instance high-ranked military staff, senior civil servants (including 
diplomats and mediators), and heads of international institutions. [This model] 
identifies the texts produced by these actors, including speeches, political debates, 
interviews, articles, and books, as well as the texts which have had an inertextual 
influence on their discourse.”62 In particular, texts are selected based on three criteria, 
namely that “they are characterized by the clear articulation of identities and policies; 
they are widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a 
political position.”63 
Based on this model, my choice of texts includes official Chinese policy 
documents, white papers, and speeches by leading Chinese politicians and diplomats, 
especially in the context of international and bilateral Sino-African exchanges. These 
are sourced through a variety of official websites and, when relevant, official media 
outlets, such as Xinhua News and the People’s Daily. Given the primary role played 
by the FOCAC, output documents, declarations, and speeches from each meeting 
constitute an essential part of the discourse. In addition to Chinese foreign policy texts, 
I selected official policy documents issued by the African Union, speeches, and 
statements from African leaders, officials, and diplomats, who on the one hand are the 
targeted audience of China’s discourse, and on the other hand prove essential in 
shedding light on African responses to such discourse. Moreover, my sources include 
official documents, resolutions, and statements from the UNSC, especially from the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and from the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) when relevant, as well as from the Chinese diplomatic 
delegation to the UN. All the texts are selected starting from 2000 until today, since 
that is the year when the FOCAC was launched first, thus marking the 
institutionalisation of Sino-African relations. While I occasionally refer to the Chinese 
original of certain texts, mostly in the case of President Xi’s speeches, the majority of 
the documents under examination has been analysed in its English official translation. 
This is due to the nature of the documents, which, with the exception of those targeted 
at the Chinese domestic audience, are of an international nature. Output documents 
of FOCAC meetings are published in a mutually-agreed English version. Similarly, 
meetings between Chinese and African Union representatives are held in English 
(albeit sometimes with the help of translators) and the subsequent media reports are 
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published on the respective websites in several translations. Furthermore, while a thesis 
focusing exclusively on Chinese foreign policy would have benefitted from a greater 
use of primary sources in the original language, the nature of the project itself, which 
is interconnected and transnational, demands the analysis to focus on texts in the 
shared lingua franca. 
To be sure, Chinese politics presents researchers with unique challenges. 
Chinese government lingo is characterised by a particular vocabulary and language 
structure; as a matter of fact, one may say that two different languages exist in China, 
the official language and the ordinary language. Such a bifurcation became especially 
pronounced during the Mao era, when official language became “another kind of 
truth”: “[i]t could tell a person about policy, and policy was important to know about 
regardless of what one thought of it.”64 Moreover, “[a]s the bifurcation of language 
spread more and more widely through society, a second order of reality—an image of 
“the official version of things”—seemed to take on a life of its own whenever topics 
with political implications were being discussed. This second order of reality was not 
idle puffery. It could have real consequences in the world, and in that sense was itself 
very real.”65 Arguably, China’s discourse is imbued with a language that, according to 
Davies, “reflects not only the constraints of prolonged, ongoing state censorship but 
also a poetics of anxiety constitutive of the very discourse that seeks to articulate it.”66 
Furthermore, in the era of Xi Jinping, “[g]rowing centralization of Party power has 
come with a pronounced narrowing of the discourse spectrum.”67 Thus, as Callahan 
points out, while “[o]fficial Chinese discourse is often very vague, repetitious and 
unwieldy” and it is tempting “to dismiss official slogans (tifa) as propaganda, they are 
crucial in organizing thought and action in Chinese politics. …  Rather than simply 
search the texts for ‘facts,’ it is imperative to actively interpret Chinese foreign policy 
documents by paying close attention to how existing official slogans are employed, how 
new ones emerge, and how the usage of both old and new slogans changes over time.”68 
Doing so allows us to understand “how the text can be understood in terms of the 
hidden content it discloses.”69 In particular, looking for repetitions of representations is 
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useful to construct an inventory of such representations, which in turn contributes to 
mapping the discourse being analysed.70 
After having selected the texts to analyse, I proceed to the three analytical steps. 
First, is mapping representations, which entails detecting patterns of discursive 
representations in the selected texts, including both dominant and alternative 
representations.71 As mentioned earlier, narratives have been identified as important 
tools in China’s foreign policy in Africa and the PRC’s discourse is rich in narratives 
recalling historical links between the Middle Kingdom and African countries, which 
can thus be considered the main patterns of representations of China-Africa. In 
particular, I am concerned with the continuity and longevity of representations of 
China as a fellow member of the Global South and as a developing country; of China 
and Africa as friends, brothers, and partners; of China and Africa as united in the 
struggle against the imbalances of a system dominated by the developed North; and so 
on. In this sense, I follow a “plastic” approach to discourse, which focuses on “the 
identity of linguistic signs and tropes or the persistence of particular metaphorical 
schema”.72 This approach “seeks to uncover an organizing principle within a given 
discourse, often by using the technique of intertextuality (identifying connections of 
texts and meanings through reference to other texts).” To be sure, “a good discourse 
analyst should also be able to demonstrate that where the carriers of a position see 
continuity, there is almost always change.” 73  Thus, for instance, as I proceed 
chronologically, starting from the basic discourse representing China and Africa as 
fellow members of the Global South and then progressively focusing on the security-
related texts, I find that the security-development nexus has been a constant feature of 
official rhetoric, but that the securitisation of development only becomes prominent 
roughly starting from 2011-2012. 
The second step consists in layering the discourse, that is, demonstrating how the 
identified representations differ in historical depth, in variation, and in the degree of 
their dominance or marginalisation in the discourse.74 Expanding on the research 
questions presented earlier, how was it possible for Chinese leaders to incorporate 
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increasing engagement with peace and security and justify growing financial 
commitments, when such topics have been largely absent by, or only mentioned 
superficially in, relevant policy documents until 2012? How could they justify such 
growing involvement without infringing the principles of respect for state sovereignty 
and non-interference? How could such a major shift in policies not be reflected by a 
mirroring change in the narratives utilised? I will argue that rather than fabricating an 
entirely new discourse to legitimise China’s new security and military presence in the 
continent, they have instead built on the existing, basic discursive representations. I 
use Wæver’s concept of layered discourse, which can “specify change within continuity” 
by referring to “degrees of sedimentation: the deeper structures are more solidly 
sedimented and more difficult to politicise and change, but change is always in 
principle possible since all these structures are socially constituted.”75 Each layer of the 
structure adds specificity as well as constraints to the analysis. According to this 
understanding of discourse, scholars are able to make contingent ‘predictions’ and 
establish, for instance, that when the discursive system is under pressure, it may happen 
that several policies are presented as possible; while these may be very different from 
each other at the surface level, they are all logically possible constructions on the basis 
of the basic discursive elements available to policy makers.  
 Here I present the structure of China’s Africa discourse, which will serve as a 
framework for the empirical chapters and especially for Chapter 4, where I unpack the 
three layers through the reading of relevant policy texts. As Figure 1 illustrates, the 
discourse is structured in three layers. At the first level, the basic discourse provides 
“an analytical perspective that facilitates a structured analysis of how discourses are 
formed and engage each other within a foreign policy debate” and offers an ideal-type 
of the China-Africa partnership (and of China’s identity):76 I call it the “South-South 
cooperation” discourse. This layer consists of the basic representation of China and 
Africa as members of the same group of developing countries and serves the purpose 
of positioning China’s self within the group. China and Africa share a history of 
colonialism and Western encroachment and are thus united in the fight against the 
imbalances of an unjust world system. The basic discourse provides a series of 
possibilities and constraints in terms of how foreign policy may be presented, what kind 
of foreign policy options actors may pursue, and how China-Africa relations may be 
(re)defined. The second discursive layer comprises a number of representations that 
                                               
75 Waever, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory,” 
31–32. 
76 Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, 95. 
 37 
are informed by the “South-South cooperation” logic: China and Africa are friends, 
brothers, and partners; they are both affected by, and need to take advantage of, 
globalization and economic cooperation; they share the commitment to 
multilateralism and equal participation in international organisations, especially the 
UN; they abide by the 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, in particular respect for 
state sovereignty and non-interference in others’ internal affairs; and they are 
committed to the security-development nexus. The latter is the key representation for 
this thesis, as I show in Chapter 4: It understands peace, security, and development as 
fundamental and interconnected features of a desirable political environment, and it 
links stability to economic growth.  
The inequality of the current international system represents a threat to both the 
development and security of countries in the Global South; hence, both need to be 
addressed and pursued in order to achieve a more equal and democratic world order. 
Thus, as members of the Global South, both China and Africa are said to yield for, 
and work towards, a shared future and a “common destiny” of peace. The third layer 
adds further specificity to the abstraction of the second layer by presenting more 
specific policies. This is where a certain degree of contestation or change is allowed: 
While China’s focus until 2011-2012 was on the developmentalisation of security, 
premised on the belief that economic growth leads to stability, since then the discourse 
embraces a change towards a more pronounced securitization of development, 
whereby economic prosperity and social development can only be achieved in a 
peaceful and safe environment. This is accompanied by an increasing role for the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the continent. This change in the third discursive 
layer eventually leads to a major change in the patterns of Chinese engagement 
without producing changes in the discourses at the first or second level. It should be 
noted that both the second and the third layer are constituted by a larger number of 
policies about a wider range of topics, including education, capacity-building, 
agricultural cooperation, and so on. However, because this thesis focuses on China’s 
normative security agenda, I only provide an overview of the relevant security-related 
discourses. 
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Figure 1 Layered structure of China’s Africa discourse on peace and security 
 
The third analytical step consists of tracing the discourse across the main multilateral 
institutions where China’s security policies towards Africa are being discussed and 
negotiated. The above discursive structure is reproduced across the FOCAC, the AU, 
and the UNSC. Unlike the layered structure, which develops along a vertical, 
hierarchical dimension, these institutions represent the horizontal level of China’s 
Africa discourse (Figure 2). While I start my analysis from the FOCAC, I do not suggest 
there is a hierarchy between them; quite the opposite, discourses and policies crafted 
at the FOCAC could be the results of interactions happened elsewhere. However, the 
Forum is an exclusive China-Africa platform where it is more likely to encounter 
norms-making attempts and thus represents the starting point for the discourse (and 
China’s normative power) to spread horizontally across the three institutions. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I trace China’s Africa discourse in AU- and UN-related documents 
in order to explore how the main representations of China and Africa have been 
maintained beyond the regional, co-constituted Forum.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Horizontal dimension of China’s Africa discourse on peace and security 
 
In Chapter 7, I will then compare across the three fora to show how China’s normative 
power potential changes depending on the contingent institution. I will further explore 
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a strategy that envisions China as positioned at the centre stage of world affairs and 
international security. 
 
1.3.3 Elite interviews  
As highlighted earlier, discursive representations generate expectations about 
policy and practice; to be more precise, discourse and practice are mutually 
constitutive and reciprocal. Thus, once I have identified, mapped, and layered the 
discourse, I link such linguistic representations to patterns of interaction between 
Chinese and African elites. So, for example, Chinese leaders have made it a tradition 
to visit African countries in their first trip abroad every year; this seems to reflect and 
reinforce the representation of China and Africa as friends and partners. As this kind 
of interactions are harder to capture exclusively from reading official documents and 
given the everyday exchanges involved behind the scenes of big diplomatic events such 
as the FOCAC, ethnography would have been the preferred method. However, the 
scope of the project made it unrealistic to carry out such ethnographic observation 
within the limits of the PhD. Instead, I conducted elite interviews, in person or over 
the phone, with researchers, diplomats, military and foreign policy officers, and 
international organisation officers from China, Africa, and New York over a period of 
three years.  
The choice of fieldwork interviews was also motivated by the desire to pursue a 
“pluralistic and pragmatic position on research methods”, whereby “the selection of 
methodological approaches should depend on the questions being pursued, to be 
assessed on a case by case basis. Different methods shine under different lights, and 
generally have different limitations (e.g. depth versus breath, singularity versus 
generalizability, site-based study versus drawing on a wider range of respondents, and 
so forth).”77 In particular, Lamont and Swidler provide a defence of interviewing as a 
data gathering technique and promote an open-minded approach to interviews which 
aims “to collect data not only, or primarily, about behavior, but also about 
representations, classification systems, boundary work, identity, imagined realities and 
cultural ideals, as well as emotional states.”78 Thus, we should not mistake interviews 
for a “realistic account of some aspect of social life”, but rather remember that 
“interviews are ‘narratives’, stories about what the person being interviewed thinks 
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happened, or thinks should have happened, or even wanted to have happened … 
interviews are, almost by definition, accurate accounts of the kinds of mental maps that 
people carry around inside their heads, and that it is this, rather than some videotape 
of ‘reality’, which is of interest to us.”79 Interviews can therefore be treated as the locus 
for political discourse to play out, as much as official documents or speeches are.80 In 
this thesis, I rely on 33 interviews with policy makers, officials, researchers, and 
practitioners from China’s political elites, the African Union, and the UN, which I 
conducted in Beijing, Shanghai, Addis Ababa, and New York (see Appendix I for a 
complete list). These have given me precious insight into the practices of China’s Africa 
policy at different institutional levels, and they have broadened my understanding of 
how the underlying discourse is constituted, solidified, or changed through practice. 
Throughout most of the conversations with my interviewees, I sought to 
maintain the structure of a typical semi-structured interview, in which “the researcher 
asks informants a series of predetermined but open-ended questions.”81 I have equally 
sought to give my interlocutors the time and space to speak freely about the topic in 
question, while striving to maintain focus and maximising the time available. Every 
interview would typically involve three sets of questions. The first set of questions was 
designed to warm-up the discussion, where my main purpose was to familiarise with 
my interlocutors, acquire more information on their work, and their preliminary 
thoughts on China’s rise and its relations with Africa. The second and main batch of 
questions were more focused and spanned specific topics such as China’s increased 
involvement in peace and security activities on the continent, its modus operandi, the 
relevant debates within both the Chinese and African policy and academic side, 
changing representations of peace and security in China’s discourse, and the link 
between the different levels of China’s engagement with African security. The main 
purpose was to both gather factual information and understand how perspectives 
changed (or not) depending on the interviewee’s organisation. Finally, I would ask the 
interviewees if they had any additional, personal thought on the changing Chinese 
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foreign policy and on China-Africa ties in light of their own experience. Furthermore, 
I have maintained the anonymity of those of wished to remain off the record and I left 
the names of those who wanted to be on the record, in accordance with their individual 
wish and consent. 
 
1.3.4 Limitations of the research 
This thesis sits at the intersection of a number of disciplines, but mostly IR and 
area studies. What does it mean for this thesis? It means two things. First, that I have 
strived to find a connection between the Chinese perspective and Western IR scholars. 
That is, I have tried to strike a balance between a US/Western-centred discipline, 
which tends to see much of what goes on in the world in terms of power politics, conflict, 
and hegemony, and the Chinese perspective. Second, I have been aware that another 
side is involved in this project besides China and Western views of China, namely 
Africa. However, the subject of the present work is Chinese politics and China’s rise 
and the constraints of a PhD project only allow for that much to be done within the 
scope of one dissertation. As I suggest in more detail in Chapter 8, more research is 
needed in order to retrieve African perspectives on international relations.82 In sum, 
this project aims to provide a more nuanced and accurate view on China and its global 
ambitions, with a special attention to its perspectives on the world, and to the 
interconnectedness of such perspectives with the blurry confines of a global discipline 
such as IR is. 
Furthermore, while an inclusion of bilateral relations between China and the 53 
African countries it entertains diplomatic ties with would have made the picture even 
more comprehensive, such an enterprise would require more time and space than the 
thesis’ scope allows for. Moreover, one of the characterising features of Xi’s new 
security concept and his general foreign policy commitment is multilateralism, and I 
thus gave priority to multilateral settings in order to highlight how these are emerging 
as new powerful sites for foreign policy negotiation. This is also due to the nature of 
the project itself, which focuses on foreign policy making at the highest levels. However, 
a number of institutions and researchers have explored African perceptions of China 
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in more detail at the individual and/or country level, either with the aid of surveys or 
through case study-based research, and I address some here to account for the lack of 
focus on ordinary people and individual countries. For instance, in 2014-2015 
Afrobarometer conducted surveys in 36 African countries asking how Africans viewed 
China’s foreign investment and influence in their countries. The findings from such 
surveys suggested that the public holds generally favourable views of economic and 
assistance activities by China. Africans rank the United States and China in the first 
and second position respectively, as development models for their own countries. In 
three out of five African regions, China either appeared to match or surpass the US in 
popularity as a development model. The surveys also highlighted that in terms of 
current influence, both China and the US are outpaced only by Africa’s former 
colonial powers. Researchers that participated in devising the surveys and analysing 
their results argue that “[p]ublic perceptions not only confirm China’s important 
economic and political role in Africa but also generally portray its influence as 
beneficial. China’s infrastructure/development and business investments are seen as 
reasons for China’s positive image in Africa, though that image is tainted by 
perceptions of poor-quality Chinese products.”83 A recent Pew Research Center survey 
suggests that “[a]cross the 25 countries polled … a median of 45% have a favorable 
view of China, while 43% hold an unfavorable view. Majorities or pluralities in 12 
countries give China positive marks, with favorable attitudes most prevalent in Africa, 
the Middle East and parts of Asia.”84 The survey also highlighted a generally low 
confidence in Xi Jinping, although in Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia confidence in the 
Chinese leader was reported to be higher (53%) than in any European country polled. 
Scholars have also explored the question of how China is perceived in Africa 
through case study- and fieldwork-based research. For instance, through fieldwork in 
eight African countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Namibia, Tanzania, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe), Wang and Elliot find that “Beijing has acquired 
substantial goodwill in Africa yet is developing deep issues and facing uncertain 
challenges and growing obstacles.”85 Based on random sample and university-based 
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surveys, Sautman and Yan present three interesting findings: African views are not as 
negative as Western media make out, but they are indeed variegated and complex; the 
survey results are at odds with dominant Western media representation that it is only 
African elites who are positive about China; and that the dominant variation in African 
perspectives is by country, as compared to variations such as age, education, and 
gender.86 Rebol uses case studies from unions, political elites and civil society across 
conducted by a number of institutions, and concludes that civil society groups on the 
one hand tend to be more critical of China, but on the other hand are increasingly 
being engaged by the PRC. In general, he finds that Africa is the continent where, on 
average, people hold the most positive views on China.87  
 
1.4 Chapters overview 
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part includes Chapter 1, where I 
have clarified the empirical puzzle and research questions that prompted the thesis, 
and outlined the methodology and methods used; and Chapter 2, where I present a 
detailed theoretical framework placing the thesis at the crossroads of studies of China’s 
rise within, and its socialisation in, the current international system, and debates on 
normative power. 
The second part consists of the empirical analysis and comprises Chapter 3 to 8. 
Chapter 3 contextualises China’s engagement in Africa’s peace and security in the 
broader context of China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping and the development of a 
“new security concept”. Chapter 4 starts from the exclusive China-Africa platform, the 
FOCAC, and performs two functions. First, it identifies the basic discourse that guides 
and structures China’s Africa policy as it developed in FOCAC documents. This 
consists in mapping the recurring representations of China-Africa in China’s discourse, 
as well as their endurance throughout the 18 years since the creation of the Forum (the 
first analytical step). The chapter pinpoints a basic discourse consisting of a series of 
representations backed up by political narratives that have remained stable, despite 
China-Africa ties going through ebbs and flows. Second, it explores the construction 
of the security-development nexus within the existing discourse: this corresponds to the 
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second analytical step, which is aimed to unpack how the discourse has slowly made 
space for a change in China’s approach to, and engagement with, peace and security 
in the continent, leading to a shift in policies, but without any major change in the 
basic discourse in the first and second layers. I also briefly explore how China’s 
approach to security and development has been accepted by African heads of state as 
a direct or indirect response to Chinese leaders’ successful socialisation and normative 
attempts. 
Both Chapter 5 and 6 are part of the third analytical step, which is aimed to trace 
how dominant representations of China-Africa relations have been maintained and 
cultivated across all levels of multilateral engagement with the continent, from the 
regional, to the continental and the global levels—what I called the horizontal 
dimension of China’s Africa discourse. In particular, Chapter 5 moves onto the next 
institutional level of the discourse and explores the African Union’s mandate and its 
challenges, which are crucial to understand the dynamics underlying relations between 
the organisation and its external partners. The chapter unpacks China’s contributions 
to the AU’s peace and security objectives and traces the main narratives of the China-
Africa discourse in official documents. Chapter 6 looks at the global institutional level 
of China’s normative power and examines how the discourse on peace and security 
takes on a global twist. As a permanent member of the Security Council China has 
enormous normative potential, although it here competes with other major powers for 
influence. I analyse China’s Africa discourse as it emerges from UNSC-related 
documents and find many known elements of the representations and narratives 
identified in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 7 presents and compares the findings of the empirical chapters in light 
of the research questions and the theoretical framework. I explore the link between 
discourse and policy by looking at the practice of China’s normative power and its 
security policies in Africa, and I link these with the country’s global ambitions as a 
rising security actor. Chapter 8 draws some conclusions and proposes new avenues for 
future research agendas on both China’s rise and China-Africa studies. 
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Chapter 2 – Understanding the rise of China: Is the 
PRC a normative power? 
 
Ubuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu 
(Zulu saying, roughly meaning a person is a person through other persons) 
 
If China wants to … achieve Peaceful Rise, 
it is crucially important that it get other nations 
 to buy into the world view it proposes. 
 (J.C. Ramo, The Beijing Consensus) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent developments in China’s foreign policy suggest that the country may 
have turned to a more assertive (some say aggressive88) foreign policy. This, in turn, 
has sparked renewed interest in China’s rise and the challenges it poses to the existing 
international system. As the ‘West’ welcomed the country into the global economic 
order, leaders believed that “giving China a stake in institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) would bind it into the rules-based system set up after the 
second world war. … They hoped that economic integration would encourage China 
to evolve into a market economy and that, as they grew wealthier, its people would 
come to yearn for democratic freedoms, rights and the rule of law.”89 However, when 
the Communist Party announced that it would change the constitution to allow the 
President to serve for more than two consecutive terms, many interpreted this as a sign 
that China had rather embarked on a path to challenge liberal institutions and 
democracy.90 Scholars and practitioners in the ‘West’ are thus wondering, how does 
China’s emergence as a global security actor affect ‘our’ interests?91 Is China rising to 
challenge or rather to participate more actively in the current world order? Is it shaping 
an order of its own? If so, what are its main features? 
Simultaneously, China-Africa relations have also gained renewed attention 
among both media and academia. In particular, many are closely monitoring the 
country’s military activities in the continent, ranging from contributions to 
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peacekeeping missions to the opening of the country’s first overseas base in Djibouti.92 
These once again prompt questions on the future of the Sino-African partnership, what 
it means for Africa, what it means for the world, and what does China’s engagement 
in the continent may tell us about its changing foreign policy. 
However, the existing literature on China’s rise often tends to revolve around a 
series of unproductive dichotomies (i.e. peaceful versus threat, deter versus engage) and 
predominantly sees Chinese foreign policy in terms of its material and economic power. 
The literature on China-Africa relations similarly suffers from a number of flaws: It 
remains under-theorised and fragmented and it has not properly addressed security 
cooperation (with a few exceptions), nor it has given much attention to the discursive 
dimension of China’s engagement with Africa. In order to address these gaps, I argue 
that the concept of normative power, understood as the power to shape the ‘normal’ 
in international affairs, gives us a more nuanced understanding of both topics. In short, 
I maintain that normative power allows us to see how China contributes to 
international security by giving us insights into its preferred norms and practices and 
into the mechanisms through which it is promoting its vision of world order. Only by 
accepting that not only is China being socialised into the international system, but also 
actively contributes to shaping it, we can reach a more nuanced understanding of its 
rise and norms-making attempts. 
In order to make its case for utilising a normative power framework, the chapter 
proceeds in four sections: first, I introduce the main scholarly positions on China’s rise 
and argue that the debate suffers from an excessive focus on China-US relations and 
the balance of power, thus missing other important aspects of China’s foreign policy. 
Second, I explore the literature on China’s behaviour in the international system and 
argue that it has gone some way into advancing a better understanding of China’s 
participation in international affairs. Third, and related, I maintain that there is more 
value in exploring how the country’s rise is unfolding and what kind of power is China 
becoming. I do so by introducing the concept of normative power and asking whether 
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it can be used to describe China. Fourth, I examine elements of China’s Africa policy 
that are central to its growing role as a global security actor and norms-provider in the 
continent, with the aim to clarify why its engagement with African countries is essential 
for understanding its foreign policy and rise globally. 
 
2.2 Problematising the “China’s rise” debate 
It is commonly believed that China’s ‘Open Door’ policy under Deng Xiaoping 
has had wider implications for the rest of the world. Many contemporary 
commentaries assume that since then, China has been rising: Such a perception 
arguably depends on the definitions and indicators we choose to use.93 In 1999, Segal 
argued that China was overrated as both a power and a market, and that it had 
repeatedly failed to deliver what had been promised by its leaders. He analysed to what 
extent China did or did not matter economically, militarily, and politically, concluding 
that, at the time, it was “merely a middle power.”94 Many scholars afterwards have 
either supported or questioned his claim through more detailed empirical studies, and 
since the 1990s, a growing sense of anxiety about the implications of China’s increased 
economic and military power, especially within the United States and the Asia-Pacific 
region, has led to the production of a rich body of texts on the country’s status quo or 
revisionist ambitions. 95  China’s rise has thus been addressed from a range of 
perspectives and has produced what Hughes terms “a range of exceptionalist 
arguments.”96 In this section, I present an overview of the most influential scholarly 
theses on China’s rise and I suggest that they suffer from a number of flaws. 
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On the one hand, some scholars argue against a peaceful rise.97 According to 
Mearsheimer, the rise of China has the potential to alter the architecture of the 
international system in a way that threatens the US. His argument is that if China 
continues to rise, it would want to dominate Asia, thus emulating the US and 
eventually leading to a Sino-American war, which he sees as more likely than a war 
between the superpowers was in the Cold war era.98 Similarly, Allison argues that “[a]s 
far ahead as the eye can see, the defining question about global order is whether China 
and the US can escape the Thucydides’s Trap.”99 He suggests that unless both Beijing 
and Washington are willing to compromise, tensions will escalate into a full-out war. 
To be sure, this perception is also partly the result of internal debates within China: 
Shih shows how realism represented a source of strategy for Chinese scholars and 
policymakers to view China’s international status. This, in turn, resulted in Chinese 
intellectuals struggling to deploy a non-confrontational depiction of China’s rise.100 
Analyses that fit in a more realist understanding of international affairs thus tend to 
agree that there will be a major military confrontation between China and the US, not 
the least over influence in the Asia-Pacific—what Shambaugh argues is a description 
of the country’s ascent as “vertical” in its asymmetrical encounter with the US.101 
Shambaugh acknowledges that China is “the world’s most important rising power”, 
but unlike others, he claims his study is different in that first, it investigates “how is 
China’s newfound comprehensive power manifest globally today, and how will China 
influence global affairs in the future”; and second, it takes a more “horizontal” 
approach to how China’s impact is spreading across the globe in certain areas rather 
than to its rise per se.102 In the end, he concludes that China still has a long way to go 
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to becoming a true global power; he goes a step further and suggest that China will 
never rule the world and remains a partial power.103 
On the other hand, some scholars are more confident that international 
institutions will eventually incorporate China and thus constrain its behaviour.104 For 
instance, Ikenberry discusses the prospects of China overthrowing or becoming a part 
of the existing order in what he calls “one of the great dramas of the twenty-first 
century.”105 Unlike some of the scholars mentioned above, he does not see China’s rise 
as inevitably leading to conflict with the declining hegemon (the US), but rather argues 
that the PRC can not only gain full access to a Western-centred, open, and rule-based 
system, but can also thrive from doing so. Such a strong framework of rules and 
institutions facilitates China’s integration and the country is increasingly working 
within the existing order. Hence, he concludes, the power shift China’s rise leads to 
can be peaceful and favourable to the US. Similarly, Tang argues that in the long-run, 
the US and the West will remain the most influential players in the international order 
and that a rising China may want to participate more actively in writing the rules of 
the system, but does not seek its fundamental transformation.106 Thus, these analyses 
also view the rise of China in terms of its relations with the US, but advance a better 
prospect for a power transition to happen—one that results in the country eventually 
‘succumbing’ to the pressures to reform its economic and social systems in alignment 
with the existing liberal order. 
Other scholars also take China’s rise as given but focus on whether such a rise 
will be peaceful within the current world order, or on how the ‘West’ can respond to 
it.107 For instance, Kang suggests that China’s rise does not cause alarm—at least not 
in East Asia—because the region will accommodate its growing power rather than 
balance against it. His argument is based on the belief that “China’s expected 
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emergence as the most powerful state in East Asia has been accompanied with more 
stability than pessimists believed possible because China is increasingly becoming the 
regional hierarch.”108 Christensen provocatively argues that the United States and the 
international community need a more assertive China, since a more assertive foreign 
policy would be decisive for the country to assist the global community in facing 
common problems such as nuclear proliferation and climate change. Thus, despite 
challenging, sending messages of persuasion rather than containment represent a good 
opportunity for the ‘West’ to seek China’s cooperation through multilateral efforts.109 
Xia also echoes ‘liberal’ arguments and maintains that the more China will be 
integrated into international economic and political mechanisms, the more willing its 
leaders will be to play the role of a responsible power.110  
English School scholars have also studied China and its rise. In particular, Buzan 
has suggested how “the apparent clarity of polarity is a false gain. A more nuanced and 
historically rooted social structural view gives better insight into how China relates to 
international society both globally and regionally, and enables a clearer view of how 
those levels relate to each other.”111 After exploring China’s path into international 
society since its forceful encounter with the West in the mid-1800s, and especially over 
the past 30 years, he concludes that such rise has been peaceful. He claims that while 
the country accepts some of the institutions of international society, it still resists and 
wants to reform others. Regardless of its reformist goals, however, he suggests that a 
peaceful rise is the only possible outcome (contra a warlike rise).112 Such a rise “involves 
a two-way process in which the rising power accommodates itself to the rules and 
structures of international society, while at the same time other great powers 
accommodate some changes in those rules and structures by way of adjusting to the 
new disposition of power and status.”113 Foot similarly rejects a dichotomous view of 
China’s rise. She argues that, on the one hand, realist arguments that China is set to 
lead an anti-hegemonic coalition and is intentionally building up its economic and 
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military capabilities to directly compete with the US, are attractive because they are 
simple; on the other hand, however, they do not capture “the complexity of Chinese 
perspectives or the sense of vulnerability that underlies Chinese behaviour.”114 
After presenting the most influential scholarly approaches to China’s rise, I 
contend that they are flawed with the following fundamental, inter-related problems. 
First, most of these analyses are overly focused on the relationship between China and 
the United States; second, and related, they tend to view IR as a matter of either war 
or peace;115 third, the revisionist-to-status-quo-continuum that appears to characterise 
most analyses is premised on the Western-centric idea that revisionism or integration 
can only happen within an existing system that is strictly based upon a US-led order; 
fourth, the most important issues at stake in the rise of China for these scholars seem 
to be American power and the liberal order, and whether these will remain unchanged 
and unchallenged in the future; fifth, they tend to understand China’s foreign policy in 
terms of other great powers’ reaction to it, which leaves as the only viable options either 
deterrence or reassurance/engagement, once again leading us back to unproductive 
dichotomies. However, I argue that there is much more to China’s rise than this: 
Instead of focusing exclusively on the balance of power between the current hegemon 
and its challenger, I suggest investigating how China’s foreign policy is unfolding and 
what are the features of its normative power.116 The empirical chapters consist of a 
discourse analysis of the main representations of China-Africa. A discourse analytical 
approach provides us with insights into how discursive representations produce both 
identities and foreign policies and their outcomes. The analysis will therefore show how 
the stability of the first layer of China’s Africa discourse has made it possible to 
legitimise increasing peace and security engagement without producing a shift in the 
basic discourse; and how such stability granted China’s discourse and policies the 
necessary legitimacy to be seen as a reliable norms-maker in the continent. China’s 
socialisation into the international system is thus coupled with the country’s own 
contributions to such system. The next section addresses the former aspect and 
explores the literature on the socialisation of China in international institutions, which 
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has contributed to gain a more nuanced understanding of the PRC and its 
participation in international affairs. 
 
2.3 Socialising China in international institutions 
In this section, I explore some works that have been less explicit about the rise of 
China but have nonetheless advanced our understanding of how such a rise is 
unfolding. In particular, some scholars have looked at China’s behaviour in 
international organisations and asked whether it displays elements of rupture or 
continuity with the existing rules-based system. In 2003, Johnston already expressed 
concerns over policy debates within the US that viewed the problem of China’s rising 
power as the primary source of instability in Sino-US relations and, by extension, in 
the Asia-Pacific region. 117  According to him, the argument tends to focus on its 
dissatisfaction and revisionism, generally falling within a power-transition version of 
realism where China’s set of interests is static and interact with its changing relative 
capabilities to give it more opportunities to challenge US power. However, he claims, 
such argument is inattentive to the analytical ambiguities of the terms revisionism and 
status quo themselves and fails to examine the status quo elements in Chinese foreign 
policy until the early 2000s, as well as the problematic status of the empirical evidence 
used to make such claims of revisionism. Even when implying more rigorous criteria 
to determine whether a state’s foreign policy is status quo or revisionist, he suggests, it 
is hard to conclude that China is clearly a revisionist power. Instead he maintains, “the 
PRC has become more integrated into and more cooperative within international 
institutions than ever before. Moreover, the evidence that China’s leaders are actively 
trying to balance against U.S. power to undermine an American-dominated unipolar 
system and replace it with a multipolar system is murky.” 118  He also argues that 
approaches to Chinese foreign policy generally provide a limited understanding of the 
country’s involvement in international institutions and normative regimes. 119 
Acknowledging that China has increasingly shown a greater level of integration and 
cooperation within the international arena leads him to conclude that “Chinese 
diplomacy since the 1990s [has been] more status quo-oriented than at any period 
since 1949.”120 This is because Chinese decision makers have started to recognise the 
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positive impact of global economic and information integration on the country’s 
economic development. Globalisation and multilateralism have thus become part of a 
“new identity discourse that describes China as a ‘responsible major power’, a key 
characteristic of which is to participate in and uphold commitments to status quo 
international economic and security institutions.”121 While things have indeed changed 
after Xi took power in 2013 and embarked on a more active foreign policy, especially 
focusing on promoting China’s global image and its commitments to international 
institutions, Johnston’s analysis and conclusions still have value nowadays.122 
To be sure, accepting that China has become increasingly socialised into the 
existing world system, does not mean that the PRC has not expressed the desire to 
change some rules and norms at times. Instead, based on evidence from years of 
engagement, scholars have described its postures and behaviours in International 
Organisations (IOs) as ranging from avoidance and suspicion, to caution, to confident 
use of institutions to advance its power.123 Lanteigne suggests that “[w]hat separates 
China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 
‘growing up’ within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever 
before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions 
to promote the country’s development of global power status.”124 According to Kim, 
China’s path in the UN was system-transforming in the 1960s, system-reforming in the 
1970s, and system-maintaining in the 1980s.125 Elsewhere, he suggests that “[t]here is 
little doubt that Beijing sees many global political [intergovernmental organisations] 
IGOs … as congenial platforms from which to project its own world outlook.”126 
Indeed, he argues, China’s behaviour in the international arena is best understood by 
looking at its quest for legitimation. Whilst this is a fundamental aspect of every political 
system, it has enduring resonance for China. Beijing’s belief in being endowed with the 
Mandate of Heaven and the post-1949 long period of isolation from the international 
community contributed to make international legitimation one of the main objectives 
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of its foreign policy. Kim nicely summarises China’s strategy by describing it as a 
“multifaceted and multiprincipled multilateral diplomacy allowing China to be all 
things to all nations on all global issues.”127 
Kent similarly finds that China is not only motivated by a system-maintaining 
and system-exploiting approach (norms-taking), but also by a system-reforming 
attitude (norms-making) and has thus committed to making a shift to a multipolar 
world. 128  More recently, Nathan has examined China’s participation in the arms 
control and disarmament regime and argues that the PRC largely supports the status 
quo.129 According to him, China does not display “a pattern of promoting a distinctive 
‘Chinese model’ in the international normative system or an alternative vision of world 
order”.130 If anything, a pattern can be identified of resisting efforts by the US (and its 
allies) to shape regimes in an unfavourable way toward China (and its allies). The 
question then becomes whether the changes brought about by China’s efforts can be 
characterised as fundamental. Recently, Breslin also noted that “[t]he idea that China 
is, can, or wants to be either a wholly status quo or a wholly revisionist power seems 
somewhat problematic.”131 While there are aspects of the liberal order that do not suit 
Chinese preferences, such as norms on sovereignty and intervention, there are other 
areas where China has shown the desire to push for change and assume more power. 
Breslin suggests that since ‘revisionist’ has lost its original meaning and is now 
associated with “fundamental and revolutionary change”, it is more accurate to see 
these efforts as part of a “selective reformist agenda.”132 
According to such literature, therefore, there are some tensions between a 
‘passive’ norms-taking attitude and a more active norms-making posture. Once more, 
however, it seems like we cannot shake off the idea that China’s (peaceful) rise within 
the system depends first and foremost on how well relations with the US develop or on 
the extent the US can accommodate China in the system. On the one hand, it is 
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undeniable that the US still holds much control over setting the rules and norms of 
international relations; on the other hand, scholars have tried to suggest for a while 
how the world is moving away from unipolarity and bipolarity and towards one of 
“decentred globalism.”133 Whether one embraces this specific definition or not, the 
idea is that Western hegemony is coming to an end and a regionalised international 
order is instead emerging.134 Moreover, as Acharya suggests, mainstream IR theories 
have tended to privilege hegemonic power and socialisation in international order-
building;135 the literature on normative change is, according to him, “biased in favor of 
a ‘moral cosmopolitanism’. It concentrates on moral struggles in which good global 
norms (championed by mainly Western norm entrepreneurs) displace bad local beliefs 
and practices (mainly in the non-Western areas).”136 Related, hegemony is manifested 
in the attempt of the (liberal) hegemon to socialise secondary states into liberal norms 
and rules: This is reflected in the focus of much socialisation literature not so much on 
who is being socialised, but rather what are they being socialised into; moreover, many 
of the norms, rules, and institutions that are being promoted are liberal norms.137 
As a matter of fact, however, China has also been an agent of socialisation and 
has expressed the desire to become a norms-maker both inside and outside of Western-
dominated institutions and within the Global South, especially via the re-articulation 
of concepts of development, peace, and security, and through regional forum 
diplomacy; such efforts have, in turn, encountered responses from regions of the 
Global South. This thesis’ focus on the three multilateral institutions aims precisely to 
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address this gap, in that it sets out to bridge across forums where power dynamics and 
processes are different, with the objective of contributing to our understanding of 
China’s rise as an active participant to international peace and security. On the one 
hand, emerging countries may contribute to reshaping the system from within: 
according to Chin, who discusses China’s relationship with the World Bank, “[t]here 
was a time when it made a lot of sense to envision China’s interaction with the global 
financial institutions as “socialization,” or a process in which China internalized global 
norms through its participation in international institutions. … however … China is 
no longer only learning the established process and rules of the global institution and 
adapting itself to them, but is also actively working to move the [World] Bank beyond 
some of its established endogenous norms and practices.”138 This entails looking at 
China as an emerging power that is reshaping the norms and rules of the international 
institutions, as well as the whole system, albeit gradually. Similarly, Pu suggests that 
the current focus of the socialisation literature on such a process as a one-directional 
mechanism is biased and incomplete, and that we should rather see it as a two-way 
process in which China is not just a receiver of normative pressure but also an active 
agent shaping international norms. How emerging powers might influence 
international norms has been so far under-theorised but is becoming more and more 
salient in international politics.139 When discussing Brazil South Africa India China 
(BASIC) countries’ “penetration of the existing Western order”, Terhalle raises similar 
concerns and discusses their attempts at reshaping the status quo in terms of a 
“reciprocal socialisation”: such a pattern “accounts for the dynamics underlying the 
renegotiation process of the existing settlement. It shows how rising powers are 
socialized into the order, while at the same time reshaping it when they enter.”140 Bader 
contextualises China’s rise against the background of goods substitution: in the sense 
that China’s enhanced leverage allows recipients of its aid and trade to shield 
themselves from pressures to democratise or protect human rights, goods substitution 
threatens the mechanisms that Western countries use to uphold the international 
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liberal order.141 She also concludes that the PRC’s more active role in the provision of 
international public goods has more varied results than the binary of revisionism versus 
status quo would suggest. 
On the other hand, Alden and Alves suggest that the literature on China’s 
integration into Western norms, motivated by the need to assess the PRC’s desire to 
endorse and sustain the Western-dominated international order, 
has ignored the raft of Chinese-instigated regional initiatives, from the Boao Forum for 
Asia to the China–Latin America and the Caribbean Forum ... These initiatives are 
inevitably constructed within the developing world where Beijing surfaces as an 
alternative to the ‘Washington Consensus’ by proposing multilateral dialogue platforms 
within the South. Grounded on a different set of norms (non-conditionality, equality, 
mutual benefit, non-interference in internal affairs), such regional forums in the 
developing world are supported by competing financial institutions and funds where 
China appears as the main shareholder, namely the China–Africa Development Fund, 
the US$40bn Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.142  
Crucially, according to Hughes, “working with and shaping existing 
international institutions and regimes” or unilaterally deploy “the various foreign 
policy instruments that are given potency by the country’s growing reserves of 
economic, military, and possibly soft power” are among the options available to China 
in “trying to reconcile this dilemma between a diplomatic stance that advocates 
‘peaceful development’ and the mission of protecting ‘core interests’ that is driven 
largely by concerns over the [Communist Party of China] CPC’s domestic 
legitimacy.”143 
Therefore, China’s normative efforts can be seen outside of Western-led 
institutions too. Chung suggests that the country’s interest in constructing regional 
multilateral regimes, especially in Asia, responds to Beijing’s desire to both shape the 
rules of regional cooperation and creating a peaceful environment for its growth, as 
well as reassuring partners of its benign intentions.144 Thus, seeing China exclusively as 
a norms-taker in a Western-led system means falling in the same trap I highlighted 
earlier, namely that the PRC is purely an ‘object’ of change: While this may have had 
some validity in the first decades of its engagement with the international system, it is 
now inaccurate. Acknowledging its system-reforming attitudes may not be enough 
anymore: It is time to recognise that China is already actively contributing to 
transforming the global order and shifting our perceptions of such order. And I argue 
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that it does so in a way that is not either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, according to current standards 
of action. It is however important to keep in mind that both sides of the ‘socialisation 
game’—within and outside of the international system—are important in order to 
capture the full picture and this is why the empirical chapters will explore China’s 
normative agenda across a range of forums which display different levels of Chinese 
vis-à-vis Western engagement. I elaborate more on these points in the following 
sections of this chapter, where I first clarify what does being a normative power imply 
and second, whether we can consider the country a normative power. 
 
2.4 What does it mean to be a normative power? 
Building on the above discussion of China’s rise and processes of two-way 
socialisation, the last two sections of the chapter present the idea of normative power 
and suggest that it can be applied to China and provide us with a more nuanced 
analysis of its rise. Traditionally, the concept of normative power is associated with the 
EU: A rich research agenda prompted by Manners in 2002 has since attempted to 
refine the concept of ‘normative power Europe’ while simultaneously responding to its 
critics.145 Manners suggested that “by refocusing away from debate over either civilian 
or military power, it is possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU’s 
international identity/role as representing normative power” and that its “normative 
difference comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal 
constitution.”146 In short, a normative power is one that is able to shape conceptions of 
the normal. 147  Manners further maintains that a normative power is a vehicle of 
ideological power, seen as separable from military and economic power; this, however, 
does not mean that the latter are not important or that they cannot coexist with 
normative power. Instead, he suggests, normative power should be given greater 
attention. In sum, “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU 
is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.”148 In this first conceptualisation, as 
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Tocci reminds us, normative thus conveys a sense of standardisation rather than a 
moral imperative. Nonetheless, she notes how such a definition is entrenched in power 
dynamics: norms are associated with power insofar as only major international actors 
have the power to determine what is considered as normal and thus shape the ‘norm’ 
of international affairs. In this sense, therefore, any major power—including China—
could be a normative foreign policy actor “at least in those regions and in all those 
policy areas in which it has an active interest and presence (i.e. its neighbourhood).”149 
For the sake of clarity, there is also a second interpretation of normative power, 
which is ethically non-neutral, meaning that normative is associated with ‘good’ and 
‘ethical’. Here the challenge is to avoid sliding “into an imperialistic imposition of what 
is subjectively considered ‘good’ on the grounds of its presumed universality.”150 In 
order to do so, it is necessary to strike a balance between claims to the ‘objective’ and 
universal nature of certain norms and the ‘subjectivity’ from which they emerge. While 
I acknowledge the importance of such an interpretation, in this thesis I limit my 
analysis of China to its ontological quality as a normative power, but I do not engage 
with questions over its normative quality as such. This decision follows from the 
purpose of this research, which is to explore not the normative, but the ontological 
character of China’s Africa engagement and, consequently, of its global rise. I ask if 
and how China is contributing to shaping conceptions of and norms on security in the 
continent and the world; but I do not ask whether this is a good or a bad thing. I 
analyse if and how it is possible for decision makers in Beijing to become norm-shapers; 
but I do not question whether this represents a positive or negative change for the 
international community. 
To be sure, the first interpretation of normative power is also problematic in 
many respects. As Diez notes in his critique of the EU’s normative power discourse, 
the success of the representation of the EU as a normative power “is a precondition for 
other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU; it also constructs an identity of 
the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’.”151 Thus, he claims, such a 
discourse “constructs a particular self of the EU … while it attempts to change others 
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through the spread of particular norms.”152  Thus, normative power is not only a 
specific kind of actor, but it also connotes  
the characteristic of a relationship (in the Weberian sense of power as A being able to 
make B do what s/he would otherwise not have done). … normative power … is not a 
power that relies on military force, but one in which norms in themselves achieve what 
otherwise is done by military arsenals or economic incentives. … To the extent that 
normative power is used as an analytical category to distinguish a particular kind of 
actor (such as ‘Europe’), it relies on the possibility to trace empirically the impact of 
norms in contrast to other possible factors.153  
However, the debate on normative power Europe does not examine much whether 
the country has normative power in the relational sense, as much as whether it acts as 
a normative power. Thus, he calls for a greater degree of reflexivity, which would make 
normative power Europe stand out as opposed to the propagation of particular 
European norms. Importantly, he highlights, “‘normative power’ is not an objective 
category. Instead, it is a practice of discursive representation. From a discourse-
analytical point of view, the most interesting question about normative power, 
therefore, is not whether Europe is a normative power or not but how it is constructed 
as one, paraphrasing Stefano Guzzini, what the use of the term ‘normative power’ 
does.”154 In short, the narrative around normative power Europe constructs both the 
EU’s identity and the identity of the EU’s Others in a way that allows it to disregard 
its own shortcomings unless some self-reflexivity is inserted in such narrative. 
Partly, the empirical analysis will indeed touch upon how China’s discourse is 
constructed to make China look like, and be, a normative power, as much as it will 
touch upon questions of identity, especially Chinese identities, and how these are 
fundamental in the construction of a certain image (or more) for China—after all, 
norms and identity are mutually constitutive. However, the construction of China’s 
identities is not the main object of the analysis. Similarly, I do not focus on how China 
constructs either the ‘West’ or Africa as its Others, since it is beyond the scope of the 
thesis to do so. This does not mean neglecting China’s position of power or its subject 
positioning as compared to other actors in each of the forums analysed; instead, it 
means starting from such a position (and self-positioning), acknowledge that it is not 
fixed or given a priori, and compare the extent to which the country’s normative power 
may play out in different ways according to the place (or power position) China 
occupies in each institution. 
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Diez and Manners also suggest that he EU is not unique and different actors 
could be seen as exercising normative power; however, “these actors [ranging from the 
Vatican to the USA] differ from the EU in the extent to which the spread of universal 
norms plays a role as an aim as well as the means, and to what extent it is combined 
with or is dominated by military or other forms of power.”155 According to Tocci and 
Manners, all global actors make claims regarding their normative character in 
international relations.156 However, as the chapters in their volume suggest, when 
viewed from other actors’ perspective, the picture may change. This points to two 
important realisations: first, that normativity “comes in shades of grey”, thus 
explaining the different interpretations by different actors occupying different space 
and time places; and second, that normative interpretations differ across different 
actors and each proposed norm can claim strong roots in international law and ethics, 
since actors themselves interpret norms and normative action in different ways 
depending on their interests and identity. Moreover, normative interpretations are 
closely linked to the “power political configuration in which an actor finds itself in the 
international system”: the stronger the actor, the more it will subscribe to norms 
allowing for ‘intrusion’ in other countries’ affairs.157 Beyond power, the legitimacy and 
moral standing of an actor also play a crucial role: thus, an ascending power (such as 
is the case for China) is more prone to make new norms, but less able to ‘break’ existing 
ones. As the power balance shifts and the world becomes increasingly multipolar and 
multilateral, rising powers are more likely to set norms, especially relational norms 
concerning mutual respect and solidarity. 
Hence, given the great diversity existing across normative interpretations, it is 
imperative that, in order to understand how normative power works, we focus on the 
mechanisms and concrete episodes of power.158 For the purpose of this thesis, this 
means exploring the ways in which China is becoming a normative power by shaping 
the normal and/or shifting our understanding of norms concerning security in a way 
that is inspired by equal relations and mutual respect and benefit, while simultaneously 
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safeguarding its own interests. In this sense, mechanisms of socialisation, interpellation, 
and so on are relevant only insofar as we understand them as empirical evidence for 
whether a normative power explanation holds. The remainder of this section asks 
whether we can think of China as a normative power, while the following section of 
the chapter lays the basis for understanding China as a normative actor in Africa.159 
Chapter 8 will then reflect more critically on what would it mean for China to engage 
in more normative foreign policy while increasingly using military power to back that 
up. 
In the last few years, a debate has been going on within China discussing what 
ideas and norms should constitute the country’s contributions to world civilisation: 
Instead of simply providing parallels to (Western) IR concepts, many intellectuals have 
been promoting traditional Chinese concepts, such as harmony and Tianxia, to explain 
China’s visions of world order in a way that goes beyond its official policy of peaceful 
rise.160 If such discussions were once marginal in Chinese foreign policy circles, they 
have now become mainstream. Indeed, Womack suggests that “if we allow for the 
possibility that ‘our’ norms are not the only possible norms, and perhaps not the only 
valid ones, then the distance between China’s behaviour and that of the West may not 
be a measure of China’s moral defects, but rather of the distinctiveness of China’s 
perspective in its external relationships”; therefore, in order to understand China as a 
normative foreign policy actor, we should first understand China “on its own terms” 
and this requires “a stretching of ideas about normative action beyond the common 
sense of the West.”161 In Chinese, normative is translated into [ (biaozhun), which 
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conveys a sense of standardisation rather than a moral imperative. Thus, for instance, 
China understands normative actions as hinging on the idea of sovereignty and 
collective rights based on respect and equality in relationships; it emphasises the 
sources of international rules rather than the rules themselves, hence placing more 
importance on mutual respect than the rule of law. 162  While Western studies of 
normative international actors tend to look at the actor and its moral motives, the 
Chinese tend to focus on the ethics of the relationship between actors. According to 
such a relational perspective, “[a]s China applies relationship logic to international 
relations, its actions aim to optimize relationships rather than transactions. In this 
model China does not use preponderance of power to optimise its side of each 
transaction, but rather to stabilise beneficial relations.”163 Thus, for instance, it was 
customary for tribute mission to leave the capital with more goods, wealth, and gifts 
than they have come with, since it was more important for the Chinese empire that 
they wanted to be part of it, than to gain more from each transaction. It is thanks to 
years of intense and skilful ‘diplomacy of respect’ that China has improved relations 
with both its neighbours and Africa. And, Womack continues, “[t]o countries that 
normally do not get much respect, China lavishes attention on the leadership, assures 
that it will not publicly murmur about domestic politics, much less intervene, and it 
shows understanding for the vulnerabilities of local economies. China is not only 
nonthreatening, it is reassuring.”164 What this implies for my analysis of China is that, 
as we see in Chapter 4, China views the international system as one of multipolarity, 
where no one state should and could dominate the others and successful foreign policy 
involves cooperation based on mutual interest and respect. To be sure, as often 
happens when it comes to politics, there is a gap between rhetoric and practice. 
However, it is my view that even though China may in reality want to ‘dominate’ world 
politics, there is a general tendency towards multipolarity which will act as a brake for 
China’s efforts.165 Importantly, Womack reminds us, “in relationship logic … both 
sides feel that they are better off if the relationship continues—this is the minimum 
meaning of ‘mutual benefit’. A normal relationship does not require symmetry of 
partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require reciprocity.”166 
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Kavalski similarly suggests that we are witnessing the rise of normative powers 
outside of the West, especially if one looks at the prominence of Asian actors.167 
According to him, acknowledging “the emergence of alternative (and oftentimes) 
contending conceptualizations of political goods in global life and the appropriate 
way(s) for their attainment” would lead to acknowledging that “normative powers are 
in the business not of enforcing orders over other actors, but of engaging other actors 
in shared practices.”168 He builds his analysis on Manner’s definition of a normative 
power as one that can shape the normal in international relations, though, following 
Jackson, he places more emphasis on the legitimacy of definitions of the normal.169 In 
other words, while recognition may not be considered essential by great powers, 
normative powers on the other hand require a certain degree of acquiescence by their 
partners in order to reveal themselves as such. China has, in many ways, tried to 
picture itself as the antithesis to the EU-kind of neoliberal, cosmopolitan power, by 
articulating its practice as singularly historical. In this sense, normative power is given 
by the contingent context of interactions between actors—it is power in context. Thus, 
Kavalski suggests, a “normative power emerges in relation to the inter-subjective 
environment to which its agency is applied. … an actor’s capacity to define the ‘normal’ 
depends on the recognition of this agency by target states.”170  
While on the one hand, China has been eager to learn from the experience of 
other great powers, on the other hand “the reflexivity animating China’s international 
agency has been much more introspective and has tended to focus on China’s own 
historical recollection. [Thus t]he patterns of China’s nascent normative power present 
an intriguing intersection of the discursive memory of the past with the contexts of the 
present and the anticipated tasks of the future.”171 To an extent, therefore, China’s 
normative power may be premised more on practices of interaction than on explicit 
norms of appropriateness.  
Echoing Womack and his claim that respect is central to China’s socialising 
attempts, he also maintains that the country’s emphasis on dialogue has contributed to 
promoting the understanding that China’s unique experience is not to be imposed with 
the use of force, but by making Beijing attractive to others. Following from Chinese 
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ethics, meaningful engagements happen only when interactions are based on respect 
for, not agreement with, the other, and not in the imposition of rules or norms. Thus, 
recognition becomes the constitutive moment of international interactions: the viability 
of a ‘China model’ is not entirely dependent on Beijing’s will and decisions, but 
contingent on how other actors interpret their agency. Indeed, since an actor’s capacity 
to shape the ‘normal’ depends on whether other actors recognise their agency as such, 
“[t]he emphasis on recognition-in-context draws attention to the performative qualities 
of normative power … ‘the performative enactment of foreign policy’ … which intimates 
that to be a normative power is oftentimes less important than to appear to be a normative 
power.”172 How is recognition defined in this context? Although there is no systematic 
account of the concept and its meaning yet, it is possible to identify its main uses.173 For 
instance, Bartelson distinguishes between political, legal, and moral recognition: while 
these differ in their assumptions on the nature of the social order, they all “share a 
focus on the sovereign state as the paradigmatic subject and object of recognition.”174 
Ringmar similarly suggests that states too, as much as individuals, “are coming up with 
self-descriptions and struggling to have them recognized.”175 And, more importantly, 
he clarifies that “any process of recognition, as always, will not concern its object as 
much as our way of orienting ourselves towards it.”176 Indeed, in the case of China he 
argues that “[t]he real subject of the current torrent of newspaper articles, best-selling 
books, and assorted policy advice is not ‘the rise of China’ as much as how this rise, if 
that indeed is what it is, relates to the rest of us.”177 Prior to being recognised by others, 
however, we must make it possible for others to recognise us; this is why recognition 
regimes—understood as “socially prepared judgments, prejudgments, regarding how 
best to recognize things” 178 —have certain rules regarding self-presentation. For 
Ringmar, therefore, the most interesting question is not so much what China is really 
like, but rather “why we come to imagine the country under one recognition regime 
rather than another. … How we choose between them will depend not on China but 
on how we dream, what we hope for, and what we fear.”179 In general, “we ask our 
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audiences to recognise us as the kind of persons that our stories identify. Only if they 
affirm the validity of the description have we survived the test; only as recognised can we 
conclusively come to establish a certain identity.”180 
In practical terms, Kavalski suggests that countries can be recognised as such 
when they deliver credible commitments to the intended target(s). In his words, 
The ability to treat others with respect allows normative powers to gain the recognition 
that creates the permissive environment allowing them to define and redefine the 
standards of the ‘normal’ in international life. … the ability of a normative power to 
exert influence is contingent on its capacity to generate locally appropriate interactions, 
[which empower] local participants and enhances the perception that they (and their 
inputs) are respected. … it is by engaging in [deliberate practices of] interactions that 
definitions of the ‘normal’ gain their causal effects.181  
This is especially the case when other actors and states do as China does, rather than 
what China (or others) tell them to do. According to Breslin, “the China model isn’t 
important for others because of the specifics of what has happened to China; rather it 
is important for establishing what can be done if other countries do what is best for 
themselves based on their own concrete circumstances and not simply what they are 
told to do by others.”182 Therefore, normative powers deliberately engage in learning 
and interactions through which they can socialise other states. This is especially 
important in the case of China’s relations with African countries via the FOCAC, as 
will be shown in Chapters 4 and 5: a normative power is one that tries to engage other 
actors in shared practices and by creating communities of practice that contribute to 
the socialising of targeted actors.183 China, in particular, “seeks to socialize regional 
countries by developing shared beliefs and norms that will build the ‘community of 
shared destiny’ of the Sino-centric regional order.”184 
 
2.4.1 China’s emergence as a normative power in Africa (and beyond?) 
Building on such an understanding of China as a normative power, in the last 
section I introduce elements of China’s Africa policy that are central to its growing role 
as a global security actor and norms-provider in the continent, with the aim to clarify 
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why its engagement with African countries is essential to understanding its rise globally. 
If we accept that normative power rests on an ethics of relationships where mutual 
respect is crucial, one must first clarify how China-Africa relations have been 
constructed in the discourse as respectful and reciprocal. To this end, Alden and Large 
suggest that the notion of Chinese exceptionalism acts as a normative modality of 
engagement that seeks to structure relations with African countries in a way that, while 
they remain asymmetrical in economic content, they are characterised as equal in 
terms of economic gains and political standing.185  The official rhetoric of China’s 
government as regards its relations with Africa, they argue, should be considered as 
importantly constitutive of China-Africa relations. In particular, they maintain that 
China’s official foreign policy rhetoric as a discursively enacted normative ideal relates 
to and coheres with discourse as a descriptive feature of increasingly multifaceted, 
complex Chinese experience throughout the African continent. … [in this sense] 
China’s foreign policy rhetoric can serve to both constrain and enable: it constrains by 
imposing restrictions and storing up policy challenges, but it also enables by continuing 
to offer a tremendously successful discourse of a particular form of intervention into 
Africa to date.186  
China’s exceptionalism, they add, is informed by a discourse of difference and 
similitude: China is different than other external powers because it shares with African 
countries a past of colonial subjugation and a similar experience as a developing 
country; while economic asymmetry is not denied, the respect and benefits are mutual, 
which reminds us of Womack’s claim that a successful relationship does not imply the 
symmetry of partners, but it does imply reciprocity.187 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will provide 
a much needed analysis of China’ Africa discourse, which is so far lacking in the 
literature, and will contribute to developing a more empirically-based perspective on 
China’s foreign policy towards the continent. 
This discourse is nor static or unchanging: As argued in Chapter 1 and as I show 
later in the thesis, while the basic discourse in the first layer and the discourse on peace 
and security in the second layer have been maintained stable and coherent through 
the years, new elements and nuances have been gradually added and others stretched 
and modified in the third layer, as a result both of changing Chinese interests and 
policies in the continent and interactions with African actors. Importantly, therefore, 
we should rethink China-Africa ties in light of “a form of African development with 
Chinese characteristics, one which folds together classic assertions of modernisation 
theory, mercantilist self-interest and actual development experience within the open-
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ended rhetoric of ‘South–South co-operation’.”188 This approach is constructed in line 
with practical experience (“practice-based methodology”), and is paired with an 
outcome-based approach, where the impact of certain policies and initiatives is 
considered the only constructive locus for assessment of those policies. 
Analysing Chinese-instigated regional agreements would reveal a lot more of the 
preferred norms and practices of Chinese contemporary approaches to multilateralism 
than studies of the same within already established international institutions where 
China is more likely to conform to existing norms.189 Echoing this call, what I propose 
in this thesis is to examine China’s norms and practices of peace and security through 
a range of multilateral arenas, from the regional (FOCAC), through the continental 
(AU), to the global (UN) level. Such an analysis promises to expand our understanding 
of China’s exceptionalism and distinctive normative practices in ways which have been 
ignored so far, but that could reveal a great deal of the direction where Xi’s China is 
going in terms of its interactions with the developing world. As a matter of fact, Alden 
and Alves remind us, “although China holds a preponderance of structural power 
within … regional forums there is an ongoing process of socialisation—driven in this 
case by developing country member states and expanding over time—aimed at 
reshaping China’s behaviour to bring it more closely in line with the other members’ 
interests.”190 Hence, the importance of viewing socialisation as a two-way process: not 
only China is socialising leaders of African countries into its world view, but relations 
are in turn being affected by the responses China encounters in such countries. 
Establishing formalized relations with regional groupings of developing countries 
reflects the country’s aspiration to shape the rules and norms of regional cooperation, 
as well as to create a favourable environment for its domestic growth and the expansion 
of its interests abroad. Not the least, such platforms “become emblematic of Chinese 
efforts to site and order their foreign relations within a structure that reflects their vision 
of a harmonious global order without the overlay of Western influence.” 191  The 
FOCAC is one such example: It is precisely through the Forum that China can 
promote its views on norms on sovereignty, political equality, and mutual benefit, as 
well as seek recognition for its identities as a developing country and responsible rising 
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power. Importantly, the FOCAC is also a crucial avenue for Africans to voice their 
expectations and concerns on shortcomings in China-Africa relationships.192 
As regards peace and security specifically, Alden and Large note a number of 
issues that make it unpalatable for China to simply adapt to established practices, 
including a 
distinct ambivalence towards the interventionist character of Western-inspired 
‘liberal peace’ approaches, [and] the absence of a post-conflict and fragile states policy 
[which] sits uneasily with Beijing’ s commitment to play a greater activist role in 
international affairs generally and in support of African interests in particular. The result 
is a conscious effort to move away from ad hoc participation in African post-conflict 
settings to gradualist forms of engagement that include fomenting common Chinese–
African values and re-imagining liberal norms on intervention. In short, China is in the 
process of becoming a norms maker in Africa.193  
The continent represents one of those regions where, amidst an international 
system that remains structurally dominated by the West, China’s relative position has 
improved so much so that it can prove as a testing ground for the expression of its 
foreign policy activism. According to the authors, the “initial process of norms making 
can be seen in China’s rhetorical steps towards intervention in post-conflict 
reconstruction, and to a lesser degree, the engagement with fragile states such a process 
entails.”194 Huotari and others also briefly mention that elements of its African security 
priorities are increasingly included in UN resolutions, signalling that China is trying to 
carve out a more autonomous role for itself in an attempt to become a “shaper” of the 
way other countries and organisations discuss and perceive security issues.195 Thus, it 
becomes clearer how China’s behaviour in Africa is not only important in and of itself; 
but it also carries a deeper meaning with broader implications: what the PRC’s power 
‘does’ in the continent can give us an indication of what it will do elsewhere too. 
As I suggest that the concept of normative power can be applied to China, I am 
not denying that its strategy in Africa is also premised on leveraging its economic 
influence to advance its security interests. I am not questioning the claim that 
“Confucian rhetoric notwithstanding, its strategic thinking is fundamentally guided by 
realist power politics.”196 As Buzan points out, this is not only well documented by 
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scholars and commentators but is also not hard to find in Chinese writings.197 And, as 
Diez suggests, “… strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and … 
the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical.”198 Yet, 
China’s normative power and its influence over developing countries through the use 
of soft power constitute an important part of its Africa policies, one without which its 
presence in the continent would probably look different. On the one hand, normative 
and soft power have sometimes been used interchangeably.199 However, Diez and 
Manners suggest, Nye envisioned soft power as an empirical (positive/descriptive) 
rather than theoretical concept—it is, therefore, a foreign policy tool. In contrast, they 
argue, “normative power is not a foreign policy tool to be wielded for national 
interests. … normative power is part of discursive practices that are both constitutive 
and always present.”200 Moreover, as opposed to Nye’s combination of soft and hard 
power, they argue that “the imposition of norms through military force cannot be 
equated with changing the behaviour of other actors, which relies primarily on 
socialisation processes. Thus … normative power invariably diminishes in the presence 
of military force.”201 On the other hand, treating normative power as an analytically 
separate category does not mean that it cannot go alongside other forms of power in 
international relations, notably military and economic power; indeed, normative 
power may itself be underpinned by economic incentives or military capabilities.202 
Interestingly, Ngangom proposes that while “[m]ilitary might and economic coercion 
have traditionally been the preferred tools for the pursuit of geopolitical ambitions with 
soft power playing a supporting role”, China has shifted this norm as in several cases, 
“we see development diplomacy assum[ing] a central role in reinforcing Beijing’s 
hegemonic ambitions. Beijing’s conduct calls into question not only established 
understanding of geopolitics, but also that of global development.”203 Yet, while the 
country seems to have all the characteristics to lead effectively and unleash its soft 
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power potential, it is still not loved abroad. 204 For Nye, the limits of China’s soft power 
reside in fanning the flames of nationalism and holding tight the reins of party 
control.205 Shambaugh similarly suggests that China’s mission to enhance its soft power 
could only work if the government relaxed its “draconian restraints at home and 
reduce[d] efforts to control opinion abroad.”206 Concerns in the ‘West’ over China’s 
influence have also translated into the latest addition to the family of power concepts, 
namely ‘sharp’ power. Walker and Ludwig coined it to describe the kind of power that 
centres on distraction and manipulation. Techniques to spread it include co-optation 
and manipulation, targeted at the media, academia, and policy communities. 207 
Similar concerns have emerged recently over the role of the Confucius Institutes in 
spreading pro-Chinese propaganda in the ‘West’; 208  and the establishment of 
cooperation agreements between Chinese media and overseas publications, such as the 
case of the UK-Chinese Times.209 Thus, many have questioned whether we should 
expect a ‘convergence’ of Chinese and Western interests, motivated by the belief that 
the PRC  will be fully integrated into the Pax Americana;210 or whether its norms-
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making ambitions will lead China to reshape some of the rules of global governance in 
an ‘illiberal’ way.211  
As Chapter 7 further stresses, suspicion and scepticism over China’s soft power 
capabilities are more common in the West than in the developing world; in this respect, 
I argue that Western scholars may have missed that had it not been for China’s soft 
power and the success it achieved in building ‘equal’ relationships, perhaps there would 
not be any discussion over its normative power potential at all. Much has changed over 
the last two decades and Chinese leaders have arguably become more skilled at utilising 
the tools available to them. The win-win and mutual benefit principle that forms the 
bulk of China’s development assistance model usually contribute to building the 
perception of a horizontal partnership and equal power dynamic—of course, as 
pointed out earlier, such power relations are rarely horizontal and are charged with 
important geopolitical implications. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I aimed to clarify the theoretical foundations of the thesis. I 
started by asking whether China is rising to challenge, or be a more active participant 
in, the existing world order. Its emergence as a global security actor and its growing 
security engagement in Africa have sparked a renewed debate over its influence on 
global affairs. I have claimed that the literature on China’s rise is too polarised and 
works tend to focus on how such rise affects US-China relations and the balance of 
power. Even proponents of a more liberal and optimistic view only consider the 
growing interconnectedness of the Chinese and world economies as relevant insofar as 
it happens within Western-led institutions. Instead, building on scholars who have 
studied China’s behaviour in the international system and its organisations, I proposed 
to explore how this rise is actually unfolding. In particular, I argued that China can be 
seen as a normative power, understood as the power to set and shape the normal in 
international relations. Importantly, it is power in context, and China’s normative 
power rests not only on an ethics of relationships where mutual respect is crucial, but 
also, and more importantly, on being recognised as such by the targeted audiences. By 
appearing to its partners as reliable and reassuring, China is in a position to set the 
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common discourse; by engaging its partners in shared practices—in this case, shared 
security and development practices—China is emerging as a normative power in 
relation to the inter-subjective environment of such practices and interactions. In short, 
as long as China is recognised as a friendly partner that is able to deliver on its promises, 
it will hold the power to set standards of action. If one looks at its engagement with 
Africa and especially its growing role as a security provider; processes of socialisation; 
political rhetoric; and shared practices, these can be used as empirical evidence for 
whether a normative power explanation holds. Furthermore, looking at China’s 
understanding and practice of soft power in the continent, we incur into a different 
and broader characterization of soft power than traditional accounts. Thus, I argued, 
China’s participation in international affairs through its engagement with the African 
continent and its security regime can bear both positive and negative consequences; its 
contributions do not necessarily imply ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviour (from whichever 
standards). A study of China’s engagement with African countries does not only have 
value in itself but will also contribute to illuminate characteristics of Chinese behaviour 
elsewhere too. The second part of the thesis directly addresses these issues by exploring 
China’s Africa discourse and how it relates to its rise as a global security actor. 
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Part II – China Rises Globally and in Africa  
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Chapter 3 – Setting the context 
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The tree of peace does not grow on barren land, 
the fruit of development is not produced amidst flames of war reaching towards heaven 
(Xi Jinping, May 2014, speech on security cooperation in Asia) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, the shift to a more active engagement in Africa’s security 
environment fits into a broader shift in China’s foreign policy happening under the 
leadership of Xi Jinping. Simultaneously, this shift also follows a broader trend within 
the continent where the political focus has moved from economic integration to 
security. This chapter provides the background for the empirical analysis that follows 
and aims to contextualise the China-Africa dimension within wider political 
developments in both the country’s foreign policy and the international system. China 
has now come to the forefront of international decision making and has committed to 
be even more active in addressing global issues. As China becomes a major power, 
scholars have started to debate the implications of a Chinese vision of world order: In 
particular, the concept of Tianxia as pit against the international system by influential 
Chinese intellectuals such as Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong, has had a profound 
effect on popular culture and state policy.212 An idealised version of China’s imperial 
past is now inspiring scholars and policy makers within the country to plan for the 
future: The aim is not only to “save China”, but also to “save the world”.213 If we 
understand soft power as growing out of a normative view of one’s own political culture, 
the question should ask which norms are being revived in China: In Callahan’s view, 
intellectuals and policy makers are not just reviving ancient concepts, but they are 
mixing ideas and institutions, thus creating hybrid models of thought.214 
Intellectual and policy engagement with debates over China’s rightful place in 
the world accompany the practical opportunities and challenges that come with 
increased power. In addition to the domestic environment, China’s new leadership is 
tasked with steering the country in international waters, which has become increasingly 
difficult given the PRC’s impressive growth.215 The country’s global image has received 
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a considerable push with President Xi: In the wake of the 18th Party Congress, many 
called for a more explicit overall plan for China’s rising international standing and its 
expanding global interests.216 Unlike his predecessors, Xi has taken important steps in 
promoting a grand strategy for China, by formulating his own vision under different 
slogans, some of which are analysed in this chapter, and promoting state prosperity, 
collective pride, and national rejuvenation. In this sense, he has proved to be more of 
a political visionary and strategic thinker than many observers expected him to be.217 
I start the chapter by introducing China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping and 
Chinese visions of world order. Second, I call attention to the “new security concept”, 
how it has been promoted as China’s own articulation of collective security, and how 
it differs from the latter. Third, I provide an overview of the security dimension of 
China’s engagement in Africa’s, thus linking China’s global security ambitions with its 
regional diplomacy. 
 
3.2 China’s vision of world order: Change and continuity in the 
Xi Jinping era 
 
Arguably, China’s hermetic communism and revolutionary fervour nowadays 
has been replaced by a pragmatic approach to multilateral diplomacy. 218 
Contemporary China is especially seeking to increase its political influence and prestige 
through active participation in, rather than confrontation with, the existing 
international liberal order.219 It does so through a number of strategies, including: 
denouncing US unilateralism and promoting multilateralism; participating in and 
creating new international organisations; pursuing soft power diplomacy in the 
developing world; voting against the US in international institutions; and setting the 
agenda within such institutions, hence seeking a gradual modification of Pax 
Americana rather than a direct challenge to it. 220  Thus, according to Breslin, 
“[a]ttempts are underway to establish a new discourse that articulates a clear Chinese 
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vision of a new world order through the continuing search for a Chinese version of 
modernity.” 221  Some scholars are consequently trying to indigenise international 
relations theories and integrate it with Chinese thought. Others are advocating for new 
norms and values to be the source of a new world order led by China. While only a 
few years ago Breslin and others concluded that China lacked the will to either push 
for revolutionary change or take the leadership role that a reform of the current system 
would require,222 it seems that Xi’s thought might constitute a first step towards a 
discourse that describes China’s vision of (a new) world order. In the case of his 
predecessor, the vision for China’s role in the world was encapsulated in the idea of 
‘peaceful rise’, attributed to Zheng Bijian, who put it forward in the occasion of the 
Asia Forum in Bo’ao in 2003; it includes: 
China getting actively and economically involved in the globalization process, but doing 
so on its own terms and on the basis of its own capacities; at the same time, it entails 
China relying on domestic institutional innovations, industrial restructuring, developing 
domestic markets, transforming high savings into investment capital, and improving the 
quality of the workforce to overcome the limitations imposed by resources and other 
circumstantial problems.223 
As leaders started to acknowledge that rhetoric and perceptions matter, the concept of 
peaceful rise later became “peaceful development”, suggesting a much less threatening 
transition, although peaceful rise still frequently appears in academic debates, as I 
showed in Chapter 2.224 
In terms of the ‘practical’ realisation of Chinese visions of world order, some 
scholars claim that China does not have a “grand strategy” on international peace and 
security.225 Instead, Goldstein suggested that Chinese leaders have designed a strategy 
to pursue the country’s interests in the international system of the 21st century and that 
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such a strategy is designed to foster favourable conditions for China’s continued 
modernization, while also reducing the risk that China is perceived as a threat that 
must be countered.226 Buzan similarly suggests that “China has a reasonably clear and 
stable set of aims that involve continued increases in the country’s absolute and relative 
power, continued development and increase in prosperity, defence of territorial 
integrity, and continued domestic stability and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
rule.”227 Hughes goes as far as arguing that 
It is somewhat surprising that a number of scholars propose that the country does not 
have such a strategy, because its government and the Communist Party have always 
gone to great efforts to rationalize foreign policy actions in terms of guiding principles 
and objectives. … Since 2008, the most significant development in this grand strategy 
has been the enumeration of non-negotiable ‘core interests’. These were stated most 
systematically by State Councillor Dai Bingguo at the China–US Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue in Washington, July 2009, as: [d]efend fundamental systems and 
national security; [p]reserve national sovereignty and unification; [m]aintain steady and 
sustainable development of the economy and society.228 
Thus, based on these and more recent developments in both domestic and foreign 
policy, scholars conclude that while the definition of a Chinese grand strategy is 
ongoing, more prominent features have emerged under the rule of President Xi.229 The 
literature on China’s foreign policy is rich and comprehensive and given the scope of 
the thesis, I here focus only on China’s foreign policy and visions of world order under 
Xi Jinping.230 As Xi proclaims that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has entered 
a new era, China analysts are left to wonder what are the new and old elements of 
China’s foreign policy.231 
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On the one hand, there has indeed been a shift towards a more proactive and 
assertive posture in international affairs: The leadership is “moving away from China’s 
long-standing policy approach of ‘hiding one’s capabilities and biding one’s time’ 
(taoguang yanghui), and becoming more confident and proactive in utilizing China’s 
growing power and influence to protect and advance its national interests and to shape 
a favourable external environment.”232 Some of Xi’s activities marking a change from 
previous leaders include: a very active diplomacy of bringing in (Wqingjinlai) and 
going out ((zouchuqu); the introduction of new concepts such as a new type of 
major country relations, major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, a 
global community of common destiny, and a new type of international relations; and 
he has left a profound impact on global economic development through his signature 
initiatives. 233  Thus, under his rule, China enters a pivotal decade, in which he is 
determined to pre-empt a Soviet-style implosion as well as to revive both the Party and 
the country.234 To be sure, “[w]hile the goals have been set, how best to achieve them 
is still an open question, about which the Chinese authorities and intellectuals are 
exploring and debating.”235 What is clear is that the “megatrends” of Xi’s China are to 
deepen domestic reforms in a calculated way and play a more proactive role in 
international affairs.236 
On the other hand, some elements of continuity can also be identified. After the 
death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, a political system has then taken shape in China that 
has been called “consultative Leninism”: Such a system is based on a social contract 
whereby the Party delivers stability, order, rapid growth, and general improvement of 
people’s living conditions in exchange for its continued and unchallenged dominance 
of both government and politics.237 According to Tsang, this system has five defining 
characteristics, namely: an obsession with staying in power; a focus on governance 
reform in both the Party and the state apparatus; a commitment to enhance the Party’s 
capacity to respond to public opinion; a commitment to sustain rapid economic growth 
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and development; and the promotion of a specific kind of nationalism as the ideology. 
In short, Xi’s plan is to “restoring China’s greatness as a rich country supported by a 
powerful modern military.” 238  He promises to achieve the country’s peaceful 
development by reinvigorating the CCP and reasserting the Party’s narrative of history 
and reaffirming its legitimacy based on its “great historical achievements.” Xi has fully 
embraced this system as the basis to build the China Dream; at the same time, he 
understands that “it is not a static system but one that needs to adapt to the changing 
environment so that the Party will stay in power and direct China’s development.”239 
It is therefore not surprising that China’s political discourse under Xi is full of 
both ancient and new concepts. For instance, the concept of 9(tianxia, all under 
heaven) has been promoted as a universally valid model of world order.240 In 2005, 
philosopher Zhao Tingyang published a book on the tianxia system, sparking intense 
conversations among intellectuals and scholars on ‘Chinese-style IR’ as alternative to 
Western narratives. In its geographic connotation, the term indicates ‘everything 
below the sky’, ‘the earth’. However, the term also has two normative meanings, 
namely ‘all the people’ and ‘world institution’. Zhao therefore uses the term to suggest 
a solution to the problematic chaos of the world, too complicated to be resolved by any 
super power or international organisation, and which instead requires a global 
perspective, an all-including way of looking at things that would allow for more 
equitable solutions. He argues that the ‘all-under-heaven’ pattern is similar to the 
United Nations pattern of ‘all-states-in-a-family’. But, according to him, the UN 
inherits the problems of an individualist society and “has taken oneness as a mission of 
Western modernity to be accomplished”241, whereas “all-under-Heaven commits us to 
the oneness of the world as the intact wholeness that implies the acceptance of the 
diversities as they are and are meant to be in the world.”242 Eventually, he suggests 
tianxia as a world theory that “could provide a better view for political philosophy and 
political science.”243 While a full analysis and critique of the concept goes beyond the 
scope of the chapter, it will suffice here to say that its revival does indeed represent a 
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sign of the ‘bold face’ of China’s diplomacy.244 In Callahan’s words, “the success of The 
Tianxia System shows that there is a thirst in China for ‘‘Chinese solutions’’ to world 
problems, and a hunger for nationalist solutions to global issues, especially when they 
promote a patriotic form of cosmopolitanism.”245 
Restoring the tianxia system is, however, only one of the many ideas of world 
order informing China’s contemporary foreign policy. These also include striving for 
more power to reshape the current system in accordance to rising Chinese interests 
(but still upholding the Westphalian world order); and advocating for a more peaceful 
integration into the American-led liberal system.246 Thus, alongside what I just called 
the bold face of Chinese diplomacy, there is also ‘softer’ rhetoric, such as former 
President Hu Jintao’s plan for a 1p  (hexie shehui , harmonious society), 
announced in 2005 during a speech at the UN.247 He then argued that China was ready 
to follow the road of peaceful development and hold the banner of a long-lasting peace. 
Xi Jinping’s idea of a world order is instead reflected in his 
2] (zhongguo meng, 
China Dream), adopted as his official slogan in November 2012, which has once again 
ignited debates among both Western and Chinese media. 248  The China Dream 
represents, according to Xi, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which 
consists of four parts: a strong China, economically, politically, diplomatically, 
scientifically, and militarily; a civilised China, based on equity and fairness, rich culture, 
and high morals; a harmonious China, where amity is reached among all social classes; 
and a beautiful China, with a healthy environment and low pollution. 249  Xi’s 
nationalism consists of a clear distinction between a Chinese way of enacting economic 
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reforms and serving Western, particularly American, interests. It seems that in the face 
of domestic concerns—namely, the need to consolidate power and launch economic 
reforms, the need to legitimise the CCP’s rule and to maintain stability and unity across 
the country—nationalism represents the President’s most powerful tool to unite an 
extremely diverse nation, as it “resonates intrinsically and passionately across Chinese 
society.” 250  And indeed, discussions of nationalism as in a close relationship with 
globalisation have permeated political debates in China at all levels.251 Simultaneously, 
Xi has shown confidence in the fact that the existing political system is sufficiently 
strong, effective, and robust to deliver the national rejuvenation encapsulated in the 
China Dream.252 In one of the latest chapters of what the Party’s mouthpiece Xinhua 
New calls “Xiplomacy”, Xi took pride in the success that his formulation of “a 
community with a shared future for mankind” has had among other countries and 
people, even coming to be written into UN documents.253 In his vision, such a shared 
future is encapsulated in China Dream, blending together the national and the 
international dimensions. In short, the China Dream can be realised by achieving the 
“Two 100s”: first, the material goal of transforming China into a “moderately well-off 
society” by 2020, which is the 100th anniversary of the CPC; and second, the goal of 
modernising the country to make it fully developed by 2049, the 100th anniversary of 
the founding of the PRC.254 In his long speech during the 19th Party Congress, Xi 
further laid out a specific timetable in order to reach the second goal, with a first period 
from 2020 to 2035 and a second from 2035 to the middle of the twenty-first century. 
In light of these objectives, the President’s main focus has been to unify and 
centralise the foreign policy making process, to strengthen his own position and the 
Party’s, and to take China into a new stage of development. Such an attempt has 
become far more evident since after the latest National Congress of the CCP held in 
November 2017. Only a couple of months afterwards, the People’s Daily called Xi “
_” (renmin lingxiu), which, according to Xu Wei from the Party School, does not 
simply mean leader, but “it is often bestowed to a leader who enjoys the highest prestige, 
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who is the most capable and who is widely recognized by the entire Party.”255 Around 
the same time, the Party proposed to include Xi’s thought on “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics for a new era” into the country’s constitution.256 As a matter of fact, 
Chinese foreign policy is being strictly controlled by the Party now more than ever, 
and Xi’s process of centralisation and unification of leadership and power within the 
CCP are a good indication of this development. Thus, his personality and ambitions 
are strong drivers of the country’s foreign policy and while the process has indeed 
become more open to other influences and actors throughout the years, the trend 
seems now to be reversed, at least for the time being.257 Analysis of Xi’s operational 
code beliefs seem to suggest that while he will not depart significantly from his 
predecessor, he has a more instrumental understanding of achieving goals.258  
The strategy to achieve “national rejuvenation” includes both ideological and 
practical components. On the one hand, as part of the government reshuffle, the 
United Front Work Department (UFWD) is being strengthened, as it will subsume the 
activities of the three departments responsible for ethnic affairs, religion, and overseas 
Chinese (namely the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, the State Administration for 
Religious Affairs and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council).259 The 
UFWD has traditionally been tasked with winning support for Chinese political 
interests and building influence abroad through measures such as co-opting and 
influencing the overseas Chinese diaspora and other groups outside the Communist 
Party—in short, it helps the CCP tell its preferred “China story”.260 As Groot highlights,  
Much of the rationale for the shift in policy seems to revolve around Xi Jinping’s rise 
and his analysis of what the Party must do to both survive and to achieve his vision of 
national rejuvenation. Xi takes very seriously those Party analyses undertaken in the 
wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc which stressed the loss of 
Party control over the levers of government, the failure to take ideology seriously enough, 
the alleged role of “hostile foreign forces” and civil society forces like churches, and the 
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growth of ethnic consciousness among the USSR’s many minority nationalities. The 
UFWD’s new policies reflect his determination to prevent anything similar from 
happening in China.261 
As the Party understands the importance of winning allies through the appeal of 
China’s ideals, institutions, and policies, it regards the UFWD’s work as key to its soft 
power projection, “behind which looms the hard power attraction of China’s 
continuously growing economic clout and relatively efficient bureaucracy.”262 
On the other hand, among the major initiatives that are part of this strategy, the 
“Made in China 2025” was launched as China’s ambitious industrial plan aiming to 
turn the country into a manufacturing superpower in the coming decades. 263  In 
January 2016, Xi addressed the opening ceremony of the China-backed AIIB and 
hailed the new bank as a stepping stone in boosting development in Asia as well as 
reforming the economic governance system. 264  But Xi’s true signature project is 
arguably the now ubiquitous H (yidai yilu, One Belt One Road, now called Belt 
and Road Initiative). In its initial formulation during Xi’s state visit to Kazakhstan in 
2013, the plan was to revive the ancient Silk Road connecting Central Asia. It was 
then expanded to incorporate a more ambitious, global network of transportation, 
energy, and telecommunication infrastructures linking Europe, Asia, and Africa via 
land and sea.265 As of its fifth anniversary in September 2018, China has invested 
USD25 billion into BRI-related infrastructure projects, not counting the projects still 
under construction or in the planning phase, which involve much larger investment 
volumes.266 However, as Tsang aptly puts it in a recent interview, while the definition 
                                               
261 Groot, “The Rise and Rise of the United Front Work Department under Xi.” 
262 Kuo, “China’s United Front Work”; For more background on this, see: Gerry Groot, Managing 
Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism and Hegemony. (New York: Routledge, 
2004). 
263 See for instance Jost Wübbeke et al., “Made in China 2025. the Making of a High-Tech Superpower 
and Consequences for Industrial Countries,” Papers on China (MERICS, 2016); “Made in China 2025: 
The Domestic Tech Plan That Sparked an International Backlash,” SupChina, June 28, 2018, 
https://supchina.com/2018/06/28/made-in-china-2025/. 
264  “Chinese President Addresses AIIB Opening Ceremony,” January 16, 2016, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/16/c_135015075.htm; see also L. Jin, “‘Yatuoxing’ Shi 
Dui Guoji Jinrong Zhixu de Wanshan. [The AIIB Will Improve the International Financial Order],” 
in “Yidai Yilu” Guojia Dingceng Zhanlue Shiji Yu Xingdong Buju. [‘One Belt, One Road’: National Strategic Top-Level 
Design and Action Plan], ed. Caixin (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2015), 41–44. 
265 “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt 
with Central Asian Countries,” September 7, 2013, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml; 
Rolland Nadège, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
(National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), https://muse.jhu.edu; Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views 
and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy,” China Leadership Monitor, 2015, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/28/chinese-views-and-commentary-on-periphery-
diplomacy-pub-56306. 
266 See for instance: Li Xing, ed., Mapping China’s “one Belt One Road” Initiative, 1st edition, International 
Political Economy Series 13996 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018);  “MERICS Belt and Road 
Tracker,” MERICS, accessed August 14, 2018, https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker; “China 
 85 
is vague, getting too caught up in it misses the point; according to him, “[i]f you’d like 
a project to be Belt and Road, it can be Belt and Road … You can fit anything into it. 
It’s a way of getting support for your project.”267 Thus, which projects exactly are 
framed as part of the BRI is not so much important as the fact that these initiatives and 
the accompanying slogans decisively set apart Xi’s presidency from his predecessors’; 
and the fact that Xi considers “how China can use connectivity to influence the 
‘software’ of global governance’s ideas, norms, and rules.”268 
China’s foreign policy activism under Xi’s rule is thus marked by an emphasis 
on multilateralism, both via strengthening its participation in existing institutions and 
creating new ones—an aspect which, among others, this thesis is set to explore in more 
detail.269 According to Lanteigne, one of the most visible changes in China’s foreign 
policy since the post-Deng reform era is its approach to multilateralism and 
international institutions.270 A more active process of engagement with various types of 
organisations, with the aim of gaining more goods and information from the 
international system, had already begun under Jiang and Hu, and as China’s power 
grew, so did its ability to shape the policies and directions of political, economic and 
security organisations, and thus of its structural power. However, it is only under Xi 
that we are witnessing a further step in advocating and creating new organisations, 
such as the above-mentioned AIIB, the BRI, and the FOCAC. In particular, the 
creation of institutions such as these “adds further weight to the idea of shifting global 
economic power further towards Asia … [and] it is the strongest proof to date that 
China is now much more confident about putting forward its own economic ideas and 
institutions on a global scale.”271 It is therefore clear that, with Xi, a new kind of 
thinking has emerged: what Wang Yizhou calls “creative involvement”, “a guiding 
thread somewhere between a metaphysical theory and an exemplified interpretation 
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of policy”.272 Or, as the more assertive Yan Xuetong argues, a radical rethinking of the 
principles of Chinese foreign policy is ongoing.273 
 
3.3 The “new security concept” defined  
China’s engagement with economic and political organisations has always been 
more pronounced as compared to its participation in security regimes; however, Xi’s 
mark on the country’s foreign policy can be felt in the security realm as well, which 
represents the most interesting development in terms of the topics addressed in this 
thesis. China’s “creative involvement” includes embracing collective security in a way 
that, not unlike other major powers, is informed by its changing interests, power status, 
and identity; nonetheless, its multilateral diplomacy, especially at the UN, is not just 
an ad-hoc reaction to outside stimuli, but rather indicates Beijing’s interest in 
establishing a less instrumental international order. 274  Collective security can be 
defined as aiming to provide security for all states, by the action of all states, against 
those seeking to challenge the existing order; it thus contrasts both the notion of self-
help and the concept of alliances, and it is best embodied by the UNSC.275 Hence, 
under a collective security arrangement, an aggressor against any one state is 
considered an aggressor against all other states, which act together against it. 
Building on this definition, China made sure to articulate its own understanding 
of collective security, which arguably looks more like cooperative security. Especially 
relevant in this sense is Xi’s “new security concept”. Of course, this security concept is 
not very new, as it started to emerge in the late 1990s as a response to both domestic 
and external challenges, and converged with other notions such as peaceful rise, 
responsible great power, harmonious world, and so on.276 Such security concept draws 
from principles that the Chinese government has advocated for long since the 1950s, 
especially the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, but early formulations only 
seemed to cohere by 1998, when a white paper was issued in that respect. The 
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following year, then President Jiang Zemin presented the new security concept in a 
speech and it was subsequently enshrined in the declaration at the 16th CCP Congress 
in 2002. Its core consisted of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, cooperation, 
dialogue, consultation, and negotiation conducted on equal footing, all based on the 
UN Charter, the Five Principles, and other universally recognised principles. 277 
President Xi has recently presented his own interpretation of the new security concept, 
as he has done with other aspects of China’s foreign policy.  In a 2014 speech 
addressing the Summit of the Conference on Interaction and  
Confidence Building Measures in Asia, he describes such a concept as being informed 
by four characteristics: - (gongtong, common), {, (zonghe, comprehensive ),  
(hezuo, cooperative), and+Qz (kechixu, sustainable). He argued that 
As a Chinese saying goes, ‘a wise man changes as time and circumstances change.’ We 
need to keep pace with the changing circumstances and evolving times. One cannot live 
in the 21st century with the outdated thinking from the age of Cold War and zero-sum 
game. We believe that it is necessary to advocate common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable 
security in Asia. We need to innovate our security concept, establish a new regional 
security cooperation architecture, and jointly build a road for security of Asia that is 
shared by and win-win to all.278 
First, with common he means “respecting and ensuring the security of each and 
every country.” Despite the great variety of countries, people, and traditions across the 
region, security must be universal, equal, and inclusive: all Asian countries should have 
the same right to participate in the security affairs of the region and seek their own 
security, although that should not come at the expense of others. Hence, we should do 
so by abiding “by the basic norms governing international relations such as respecting 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal 
affairs, respect the social systems and development paths chosen by countries on their 
own, and fully respect and accommodate the legitimate security concerns of all parties.” 
Second, comprehensive speaks to the need to address both traditional and non-
traditional security threats: In particular, he maintains that the challenges brought 
about by terrorism, transnational crimes, environmental security, cyber security, 
energy and resources security, and natural disasters are on the rise and thus require a 
security concept that is broader in both “scope and implication”. Third, cooperative 
entails “promoting the security of both individual countries and the region as a whole 
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through dialogue and cooperation.” This means engaging in dialogue and 
communication that increase mutual trust, reduce misunderstandings, and seek 
common ground. He stresses that “[w]e should stay committed to resolving disputes 
through peaceful means, stand against the arbitrary use or threat of force, oppose the 
provocation and escalation of tensions for selfish interests, and reject the practice of 
shifting trouble to neighbours and seeking selfish gains at the expense of others.” 
Finally, he defines sustainable security as the need to  
focus on both development and security so that security would be durable. … Development 
is the foundation of security, and security the precondition for development. … To build an Asian 
security mansion that could stand the test of wind storms, we need to focus on 
development, actively improve people’s lives and narrow down the wealth gap so as to 
cement the foundation of security.279 
These four features essentially reiterate China’s traditional opposition to unilateralism 
and unilateral intervention; no interference in the internal affairs of other states and 
respect for state sovereignty; respect for each country’s chosen path of development; 
and the emphasis on the security-development nexus. 
Hence, as Wang suggests, for historical reasons there is still a preference for 
common and cooperative over collective. However, China’s attitude towards collective 
security has indeed changed throughout the years, as the concept was initially 
perceived as a synonym for imperialist intervention, whereas now it is a legitimate word 
in the international vocabulary of Chinese leaders and elites.280 It is furthermore worth 
noting that while Xi’s formulation was originally intended for the Asian security 
environment, Chinese officials have adopted the term to refer to the country’s 
engagement in security elsewhere too, as will be shown in the empirical chapters. 
Alongside these formulations, we also find more specific references to a future where 
the PLA will play a more important role abroad. In China’s latest white paper on 
defence, published in 2015, Beijing lays out a new military strategy emphasising a more 
active defence posture and a greater naval presence abroad.281 The paper envisions a 
greater global role for the country’s military to face a variety of “new threats”, 
including “hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism.” 282  Especially 
following operations in Libya and South Sudan, the paper “provides a clear 
confirmation that the PLA will continue to expand its range of operations and 
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capabilities.” 283  China’s military is thus increasing its participation in military 
operations other than war (including Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), non-
combatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
operations. Furthermore, China is laying the ground for its troops to operate overseas 
and is increasingly focusing on military cyber and space capabilities. According to 
Huotari et al., “these trends reflect China’s newfound level of comfort with potential 
intervention abroad.”284 Thus, for all practical purposes, China is emerging as a “full-
spectrum global security actor”, mostly through performing four different roles: 
diplomat, soldier, trader, and shaper.285 
 
3.4 The security dimension of China-Africa relations 
China’s increased attention to Africa’s security environment is thus not 
happening in a vacuum. On the one hand, we have seen how its leaders have been 
promoting a more active approach to international security and how the country is 
emerging as a global security actor. On the other hand, the continent has witnessed a 
shift of political focus from matters of economic integration to security over the last 20 
years. If the 1990s saw the consolidation of economic integration communities, mostly 
through the regional economic communities (RECs), the 2000s brought a bigger focus 
on security and on the security-development nexus. Policy and academic attention was 
redirected to understanding the role regional economic and security organisations 
could play in conflict management in post-Cold War Africa.286 In this sense, therefore, 
China’s increased engagement with the APSA has been following broader trends 
across the continent. The shift has been accompanied by growing attention to non-
traditional security threats, while moving away from traditional, Cold War-type 
warfare. Today, not only is China’s global role expanding, both security- and otherwise, 
but its current engagement in Africa moves at an unprecedented pace, and peace and 
security are finding a larger space in Sino-African relations. Empirically, this can be 
easily observed by comparing the PRC’s latest Africa white papers from 2013 and 2015, 
as I show below. 
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The field of China-Africa studies is a very rich one and debates abound; therefore, 
I only focus on the contemporary era and security engagement, which is a relatively 
novel area of involvement and is only now starting to receive attention from IR and 
other scholars. 287  According to Kuo, Chinese leaders view the liberal peace as a 
neocolonial hegemonic imposition of the West and they believe such a project 
contributes to African insecurity; according to him, this view comes from its 
interactions with African elites, China’s own experience with colonialism, and a mix 
of realist, Marxist, and postcolonial perspectives on the African security context.288 
Beijing essentially understands African (in)security as a direct result of “weak” states 
and this weakness as the result of colonialism, tribal conflicts, and enforced 
democratization. Thus, leaders believe that China’s engagement in African security 
should be balanced among many demands. This leads to tensions between respect for 
state sovereignty and the need to demonstrate the country’s credentials as a peaceful 
rising power. Furthermore, they are aware of the need to maintain good bilateral 
relations with African countries as well as with Western-dominated organisations; and 
they are wary that while increased participation in PKOs shows good faith, too much 
engagement will raise concern among other countries, especially in the ‘West’.289 
As relations evolve and China’s interests expand, therefore, the quantity and 
quality of its involvement in the continent are changing. Although the conventional 
perception is that China is only interested in Africa’s natural resources, relations are 
also prompted by political, economic, security, and ideological motives.290 In particular, 
as relations deepen, so do related challenges, and this could not be truer for the 
country’s engagement with peace and security. Crucially, the Chinese have 
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traditionally understood overseas military activities as a political means serving their 
strategic purposes, and not simply as freestanding initiatives from the part of military 
professionals. 291   Historically, “the shadow of the past loss of Chinese sovereignty 
during the ‘century of humiliation’ caused elites to be particularly leery of 
humanitarian intervention” 292  and to stick to a conventional understanding of 
sovereignty. However, during the 1990s, Chinese elites came to a re-interpretation of 
the sovereignty-intervention nexus both as a consequence of humanitarian operations 
during this period—including US-led interventions in the Gulf War and Kosovo—and 
of China’s eagerness to be seen as a responsible member of the international 
community. The official discourse still aimed to delegitimise the normative change, 
while foreign policy elites started internalising these new norms. The importance of 
history is clear in that “we should place the ‘new learning’ that is taking place within 
the context of earlier ‘lessons’ that have made Chinese elites particularly sensitive about 
ceding any aspect of Chinese sovereignty.”293 Hence, even though the principles of 
non-interference and respect for state sovereignty traditionally represent the 
cornerstone of China’s diplomacy, the need to protect its citizens and interests abroad 
has gradually led to a shift away from those principles to a more active participation 
and pragmatic adaptation to changed circumstances.294 China’s engagement in Sudan 
undoubtedly marks a crucial moment in the PRC’s engagement in peace and security 
and the existing IR literature documents the motives and dynamics of this shift.295  
During the Hu Jintao era (2002-2012), China’s diplomatic reach into Africa 
expanded considerably. It was during these years, Sun argues, that China began to 
adopt the principle of an “all-round/all-directional” foreign policy that, in theory, does 
not differentiate among geographical regions or countries, thus emphasizing balanced 
diplomacy and seeking to develop ties with all countries.296 According to Qin Yaqing, 
developing countries are the foundation of such a foreign policy direction while 
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multilateral platforms are the stage for such relations to expand.297 Following from this, 
China has consistently stepped up its efforts in Africa, a trend which continues under 
Xi. According to Shinn, during his time as leader of China Xi will continue to pursue 
the country’s interests in the continent (including access to raw materials, garnering 
support in international forums, and cultivating an attractive market for its exports) 
and even increase efforts to strengthen existing ties, both with individual African 
countries and with regional organisations. 298  To be sure, Xi Jinping also faces 
increasing challenges in the Sino-African partnership, such as growing Chinese 
migration to the continent, trade deficits with individual countries, environmental 
concerns, work safety, and concerns with the security of its citizens abroad—challenges 
which arguably have become more urgent now than they were for the previous 
administration. 
In terms of China’s engagement with peace and security in particular, the 
decisive move began towards the end of Hu’s administration, when the China–Africa 
Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security was announced. In addition to 
supporting the AU’s own peacekeeping operations in the continent, China committed 
to provide financial support to the AU’s standing army and to train security officials 
and peacekeepers. But China’s direct involvement in African security reached a new 
level only under Xi and is now an explicit part of Beijing’s foreign policy.299 Van Staden 
even argues that “[f]or the foreseeable future, Africa’s engagement with China will be 
shaped by Xi’s vision.”300 Among the trends he identifies that will shape such future 
are UN reform and its global security role, especially in terms of military expansion 
and contributions to peacekeeping. In part, Dûchatel et al. suggest that “the Chinese 
military is now more involved in African security affairs because it can be—China has 
been the world’s second-largest military spender since 2009, with a military budget of 
$146 billion in 2016. Its changing capacities are themselves a driver of change in its 
foreign policy.”301  In addition, other decisive factors shaping this renewed foreign 
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policy are its interest in contributing to international peace and security and its 
commitment to protecting its interests abroad.302  
Moreover, Alden and Large identify several areas where China has been 
emphasizing its own perspective.303 First, a focus on restoring social order (not the least 
by physical reconstruction and a maximalist state role in directing economic 
development) as opposed to traditional, liberal peacebuilding which combines 
democratization with market liberalization. Second, emphasis on indigenous African 
ownership of solutions. Third, a belief in the efficacy of economic processes to achieve 
peace (the ‘developmental peace’ as opposed to ‘liberal peace’ 304 ). Fourth, a 
predilection for enhancing the primary role of regional organisations, especially the 
AU, in managing peace and security on the continent. Fifth, and finally, the belief that 
the state is a central actor in peacebuilding efforts. If we look at all these issues 
collectively, the authors argue, it is increasingly plausible that there is an agenda in the 
making—one of African state building with Chinese characteristics. 
From an empirical perspective, a comparison between China’s two latest Africa 
white papers already reveals such a shift among Beijing policy makers. While the 2013 
paper was entirely dedicated to economic and trade cooperation, the 2015 paper is 
much more comprehensive and better reflects the pace of the relations (and of FOCAC 
declarations).305 There are also explicit references to the new security concept, which, 
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although initially meant with reference to the Asian region, has been widely applied to 
Africa as well.306 In 2015, China pledges to “play a constructive role in maintaining and 
promoting peace and security in Africa.”307 Furthermore, the security-development 
nexus has been ‘promoted’ to principle, as we read that “China will strengthen 
dialogue and consultation with African countries and regional organizations on peace 
and security issues, pursue the principle of securing peace through development and promoting 
development with peace, and implement the consensus on achieving common, cooperative, 
comprehensive and sustainable security.”308 The empirical chapters will further show 
how such nexus has become a building block of China’s Africa discourse. The 2015 
white paper also outlines deepened military cooperation through initiatives including 
military and technological exchanges, joint military exercises, training of military 
personnel, and capacity building in national defence and peacekeeping. Thus, the 
grounds are firmly laid for the future of China-Africa security ties; more importantly, 
these steps represent a blueprint for how China’s military and security apparatuses 
work abroad, both in the sense of what China is learning and how it is improving its 
practices, and as a way to understand potential future engagement in other regions of 
the developing world. 
Perhaps the most discussed topic in China-Africa studies in this sense is the 
recently-built military base in the Eastern African nation of Djibouti. Announced in 
2015 and opened in 2017, the base is China’s first military facility abroad. It adds to a 
number of already existing foreign outposts in the small country operated by the US, 
France, and Japan. For some, this represents a change in China’s role from a resource 
extractor to a long-term strategic partner;309 for others, Djibouti is a testing ground for 
the PRC’s meddling of commercial and military interests abroad;310 some question 
whether the base is simply a logistics facility or rather a platform for China’s 
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geopolitical ambitions;311  some are starting to draw parallels with similar Chinese 
ventures elsewhere and speak of a “debt-trap”.312 Meanwhile, Africa’s largest free zone 
has been opened there too and is set to focus mostly on trade, logistics, export 
processing, business and financial support services, manufacturing, and duty-free 
merchandise retail.313 Not surprisingly, these latest developments have been of special 
concern for the American administration.314 An equally important development, in line 
with China’s defence strategy in Africa more in general, is the China-Africa Defence 
and Security Forum hosted in Beijing in June 2018. The Forum brought together 
representatives from over 50 African countries, the African Union, and the Chinese 
Ministry of National Defence to discuss the continent’s independent capacity-building 
in security and China’s contributions to it.315 According to Benabdallah, the Forum is 
yet another example of Beijing’s efforts to solidify its role as a provider of expertise and 
technical know-how. 316  Sino-African security relations have thus become relevant 
beyond the community of China and/or Africa scholars and is now of interest to the 
IR discipline more in general, as is China’s rise as a global actor. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide the background for the empirical analysis 
and contextualise the China-Africa dimension within wider political developments in 
both China’s foreign policy and the international system. China’s shift to a more active 
engagement with Africa’s security environment is happening within a broader shift in 
the country’s foreign policy, which has taken an especially international and, some say, 
aggressive turn under the rule of Xi Jinping. Simultaneously, this shift is also 
accompanied by a political trend within Africa where debates have moved from 
focussing on economic integration to security.  
As China has come to be at the centre of international decision making,  scholars 
and intellectuals in the country have started to debate the implications of a Chinese 
vision of world order. An idealised version of the country’s past, coupled with 
consultative Leninism and lessons from China’s contemporary experiences, are 
increasingly informing leaders’ vision of the future. Xi Jinping has articulated his own 
vision of a future where China plays a major role in international affairs and has laid 
out slogans and initiatives such as the China Dream, the Belt and Road, and the new 
security concept. In particular, as China is now a major contributor to international 
security, the new security concept serves as a framework for policy action and a guide 
towards contributing to world order. The concept envisions international cooperation 
as based on the principles of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable 
security. These four features fit with China’s traditional opposition to unilateralism and 
unilateral intervention; no interference in the internal affairs of other states; respect for 
state sovereignty; respect for each country’s chosen path of development; and emphasis 
on the security-development nexus. As the country proposes its own understanding of 
security, its involvement in African countries similarly reflects an emboldened foreign 
policy, which aims to both promote its global image as a responsible power and protect 
its interests and citizens. China pledges to play a constructive role in maintaining and 
promoting peace and security in the continent and explore new ways—with Chinese 
characteristics—to constructively participate in resolving critical issues in Africa. Such 
increased engagement coherently fits as much in China’s broader foreign policy as well 
as continental and international political trends, as in China’s Africa discourse, which 
the next chapter presents as the starting point of the empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 4 – The Forum on China Africa Cooperation: 
Legitimising security policies 

Slm:`
Crossing the river by feeling the stones 
(Deng Xiaoping) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter performs two functions. On the one hand, it represents the first part 
of empirical puzzle that motivated this thesis and its aim is to trace China’s Africa 
discourse at the regional level. On the other hand, and most importantly, this chapter 
consists of the first and second analytical steps identified in Chapter 1. The first step 
consists in identifying and mapping the basic discourse on China-Africa, as well as its 
endurance throughout the 18 years since the creation of the Forum, through a 
discourse analysis of FOCAC documents. The basic discourse includes a series of 
representations backed by historical and political narratives that have remained 
relatively stable despite China-Africa ties going through ebbs and flows. The FOCAC 
is an ‘exclusive’ institutional space for Sino-African relations to be developed outside 
of the West and provides an ideal platform for China to promote its discourse and its 
norms-making attempts. Then, I explore the construction of the security-development 
nexus within the existing discourse. This corresponds to the second analytical step—
layering the discourses—which aims to unpack how the discourse has made space for 
a change in China’s approach to, and engagement with, peace and security in the 
continent, leading to a shift in policies, but without any major change in the basic 
discourse. This step will enlighten the discursive construction of the security-
development nexus in the China-Africa context, because, “for problems or facts to 
become questions of security, they need to be successfully constructed as such within 
political discourse.”317 Using the concept of interpellation presented in Chapter 1, I 
also look at how China’s approach to security and development has been accepted by 
African heads of state as a direct or indirect response to Chinese leaders’ successful 
socialisation and normative attempts. 
The main argument I make here is that Chinese decision makers have 
constructed a successful discourse that pictures China and Africa as long-term friends, 
united in a shared effort to redress the imbalances of a Western-centric international 
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order. They have done so by mobilising a series of historical and political narratives 
which have successfully interpellated African actors by creating a sense of belonging 
and ‘common destiny’. The creation of the FOCAC in 2000 has greatly contributed 
to building this idea of a shared community. As the country’s foreign policy towards 
the continent shifted towards greater engagement with peace and security matters, this 
shift has not been accompanied by changes in the basic discourse (first and layer), but 
rather by adding new narratives (from the second to the third layer). I argue that rather 
than fabricating an entirely new discourse to justify and legitimise China’s new security 
and military presence in the continent, they have instead built on the existing, basic 
discursive representations. Maintaining a coherent and logical discourse despite the 
change has been possible mostly thanks to the security-development nexus: As the 
concept entails a close link between the promotion of economic growth and social 
development and the achievement of stability and peace, growing security and military 
commitments appear legitimate and reasonable. Of course, the success of the discourse 
depends not only on the coherence and persistence of its main representations, but also 
on the positive response these have found among African leaders.  
The chapter beings by providing a brief history of the Forum. I then zoom in on 
the latest edition of the Forum and some of the features that set it apart from the other 
meetings. Third, I delve into China’s Africa discourse and explain how FOCAC 
documents have contributed to create stability in the construction of China and Africa 
as friends and members of the same group of developing countries. Fourth, I explain 
how this basic discourse provides a broad framework to span across a range of policies 
towards security on the continent. Finally, I explore how African leaders have 
positively accepted the Chinese narratives, and I conclude by assessing the ‘success rate’ 
of China’s normative power in the context of the regional forum. 
 
4.2 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: A Brief History 
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is a dialogue platform established in 
2000 to foster Sino-African exchanges on a broad variety of topics and issues, and 
which follows an exponential increase in cooperation between the two actors from the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. As Taylor puts it, the Forum can be seen as the 
“institutionalization of Sino-African [relations and] also the formalization of 
relationships which have been long in existence”.318 Ministers and head of states of 53 
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member countries,319 as well as the African Union (admitted as a full member in 2011), 
gather together with their Chinese counterparts every three years, alternately in China 
and Africa. The original purposes of such meetings included: promoting an overall 
Chinese foreign policy strategy towards the continent which emphasises South-South 
cooperation and economic development; ‘advertising’ the Beijing’s leadership position 
of “moral relativism” on issues such as human rights, as well as their own vision of the 
global order; and countering Taiwan.320 In practical terms, FOCAC action plans—the 
output documents of Ministerial Conferences and Summits—discuss future 
cooperation in the areas of “trade, investment, poverty reduction, infrastructure 
building, capacity building, human resources development, food security, hi-tech 
industries”, and, more recently, peace and security.321 There have been seven editions 
of the Forum to date, with the last one taking place in Beijing in September 2018. 
Among these, the 2012 meeting was considered by many to be ground breaking: A 
credit line of USD20 billion was extended by China over the following three years and 
commitments were made to strengthening and operationalisation the APSA.322 
The FOCAC represents a global governance platform for Chinese decision 
makers to discuss the agenda plans and development goals for the future with their 
African counterparts. 323  Benabdallah focuses on three main opportunities that the 
FOCAC provides for China to enhance its role in global governance. First, she argues, 
it offers Chinese policy makers feedback from African leaders so that they can 
continuously adjust and adapt their policies. Second, interaction on such a wide range 
of subjects enhances the international practice and credibility of Chinese practitioners, 
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soldiers and policy makers alike. Finally, projects implemented via the FOCAC give 
China a chance to test its development-led model on African contexts and thus gain 
experience and feedback.324 Moreover, Africa in general offers China the opportunity 
to engage in activities and policies in which they are less willing to get involved 
elsewhere (i.e. contributing to peacekeeping in Africa is arguably less contentious than 
doing so in China’s neighbourhood).325  
Indeed, the FOCAC is an instrument of China’s regional forums diplomacy, 
which the PRC has been implementing elsewhere in the world—for instance through 
the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (2004), the China-Central and Eastern 
European Countries Cooperation Forum, or 16+1 (2012), and the China-Community 
of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum (2015).326 According to 
Beijing officials, regional forums are efficient and time-saving, and they also reflect 
China’s “new type of major power relations”: Instead of focusing on major powers, 
this group cooperation diplomacy is aimed to gather comparatively smaller 
countries—a move that makes it easier for China to promote its key official priorities 
and development model.327 Hence, for instance, the FOCAC “serves as a means by 
which Beijing can advance a position of moral relativism regarding human rights to a 
mostly sympathetic audience, consolidating its standing within African elite circles.”328 
Regional forum diplomacy, in turn, is said to be part of a wider attempt to become a 
global normative power through seeking recognition by other fellow developing 
countries.329 Practically speaking, however, “China’s ability to ensure its interests is 
influenced over time by its capacity to maintain effective control over the 
administrative and financial structures [of regional forums].” 330  Interestingly, the 
majority of non-Chinese scholarship tends to regard the FOCAC as a multilateral 
platform, whilst some Chinese authors claim instead that it is the best practice of 
bilateral relations.331 On the one hand, FOCAC meetings are carried out at three 
different levels: individual countries, regional organizations, and African Union. In this 
sense, therefore, it represents a ‘multilateral’ scheme. On the other hand, if one takes 
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the whole of Africa as the point of reference, it can be defined as a bilateral platform.332 
The Chinese MFA Ambassador for FOCAC affairs, who has extensive experience 
working in several African countries, seems to believe that security is one area that 
cannot be dealt with at the bilateral level: Its broad implications for a number of other 
areas make it necessary to find solutions at the multilateral level, first and foremost 
through the Forum. However, he does not deny that security moves via the AU and 
multilateral agreements and bilateral agreements between some countries.333 Zhang 
Chun instead suggests that while its negotiation process happens between China and 
Africa as a whole, its implementation is bilateral—that is to say between China and 
individual African countries. Thus, according to him neither the negotiation nor the 
implementation process is a multilateral one like others suggest.334 While I will return 
to the issue of reaching a consensus in the last section of the chapter, it is important to 
note here that China unequivocally enjoys a privileged position in the platform. 
Before moving on to the next section, an explanation is needed for why I chose 
the FOCAC as the thesis’ point of departure. This is due to two reasons. First, starting 
from the Forum roughly follows the ‘spatial’ scope of the empirical puzzle: One of the 
main objectives of this project is to trace the institutionalisation of China’s Africa 
discourse across several organisations. I thus start the analysis from the regional 
platform and then proceed in concentric circles through the continental and finally to 
the global platform. The second reason, which has more important normative 
implications, is that the Forum constitutes an exclusive institutional space where basic 
discourses are being normalised. To be sure, the concentric circles metaphor I just used 
does not imply any temporal or causal path. As a matter of fact, it is the case that 
certain linguistic elements employed by Chinese leaders and representatives to describe 
relations with African countries were developed at a much earlier stage than the 
creation of the FOCAC; it will suffice to look at mentions of Africa at the UN to realise 
that China’s preoccupation with the continent goes far back, as do Sino-African 
relations themselves for that matter. Related, I do not mean to give these levels a 
teleological character either: Discourses crafted during FOCAC meetings may well be 
the results of social interactions happened elsewhere (Beijing or New York), and thus 
their contents per se may not be any more valuable than discourses developed within 
                                               
332 Interview with Professor, Peking University, April 2017.  
333 Interview with Ambassador for FOCAC affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, May 2017.  
334 Zhang Chun, “China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security,” in China and Africa. 
Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent, ed. Chris Alden et al. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 
130; see also Zhang Chun, “Sino-Africa Relationship: Moving to New Strategic Partnership,” Shanghai 
Institute for International Studies, May 1, 2013, http://en.siis.org.cn/En/Research/1676. 
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other institutions. Nonetheless, the FOCAC does represent a space which is uniquely 
co-constituted and dedicated to China and Africa, where broad foreign policy lines as 
well as economic deals are negotiated, announced, and discussed. 
 
4.2.1 The 7th FOCAC Summit 
Now at its 7th edition, the 2018 Forum was upgraded to Summit in order to 
respond to the needs of this growing partnership and hailed with a new website 
launched a month before its start in September.335 These are just some of the novelties 
that the latest Forum carries with it. For instance, a number of promotional videos 
were released ahead of the meeting and some were aired during the opening ceremony. 
A series titled “China and Africa – The fruits of cooperation” comprises four episodes, 
each touching on the themes of shared opportunities, win-win cooperation, mutual 
progress, and enduring friendship respectively.336 Another series titled “A new era of 
China-Africa cooperation” instead addresses the topics of shared dreams, shared 
aspirations, integrated interests, connecting people, and future partnership, thus 
stressing the reciprocity and mutual character of China-Africa ties.337 Significantly, 
another video was called “The family” and dramatically shows images of Africa’s 
nature, historical heritage sites, cities, and people—all of this as  two kids (a Chinese 
and an African) swing together on a see-saw, while a voice-over tells us about Xi’s trips 
to the continent and his commitments to its development.338 China and Africa are 
described as sharing “weal and woe, although their skin colors are different” and as 
“feel[ing] close and understand[ing] each, although they are thousands of miles 
apart”.339 Another video, showed at the opening ceremony and titled “A shared dream, 
a shared future”, is said to demonstrate “the successful cooperation and achievements 
of China and Africa in industry, agriculture, infrastructure, healthcare, education, 
sports and cultural exchange”; it also shows “that relations between China and Africa 
are as good as ever, and China will always stand with Africa, as a friend committed to 
connecting its development with that of Africa in order to kick off an era of win-win 
                                               
335 See: Xiaoxiao Ding, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2018 Upgraded to Summit,” January 
3, 2018, http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/china/9/20180103/73268.html; Joseph S. Margai, “China’s 
Foreign Affairs Ministry Launches FOCAC Website,” August 9, 2018, 
http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0809/c90000-9489154.html; The new website can be found at: “

,6%E,” accessed August 20, 2018, http://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/chn/. 
336 “Videos,” accessed September 4, 2018, https://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/jcsp_3/default.htm. 
337 Ibid. 
338  “The Family,” accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
09/01/c_137434358.htm. 
339 Narratives focusing on geographical distance but emotional proximity are very common in China’s 
Africa discourse, as will be shown later in the chapter; Ibid. 
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bilateral cooperation.”340 Since everything, including gestures, monuments, and films 
can be read as text, these videos should not be overlooked as carriers of China’s 
discourse.341 
Furthermore, the Summit was not only co-hosted by Xi Jinping and South 
Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, but it was exceptionally inaugurated by the 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) Moussa Faki Mahamat, the 
Chairperson of the AU for the year 2018 Paul Kagame, and the UN Secretary-General 
António Guterres.342 Their presence confirms China’s aspiration to align the FOCAC 
and the BRI with both the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable 
development—an alignment that seems to be shared by some UN representatives.343 
This is also reflected in the action plan, where, among the priorities, are stepping up 
BRI security cooperation and creating a “[s]trong synergy between the BRI and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations, Agenda 2063 of the 
African Union (AU), as well as the development strategies of African countries.”344 
 Xi Jinping began his inaugural speech by enumerating his visits to the continent 
during his presidency; he also praised the China-Africa partnership for being authentic 
and strong: 
China values sincerity, friendship and equality in pursuing cooperation. … We respect 
Africa, love Africa and support Africa. We follow a “five-no” approach in our relations with 
Africa: no interference in African countries’ pursuit of development paths that fit their 
national conditions; no interference in African countries’ internal affairs; no imposition 
of our will on African countries; no attachment of political strings to assistance to Africa; 
and no seeking of selfish political gains in investment and financing cooperation with 
                                               
340 “Promotional Video for the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC 2018 Airs at Opening Ceremony,” 
September 3, 2018, 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414d3251544f79457a6333566d54/share_p.html. 
341 See relevant citation of Dunn and Neumann, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research on page 
40 of this thesis. 
342 “In Beijing, UN Chief Urges Win-Win Collaboration between China and Africa for ‘the Future We 
Want,’” UN News, September 3, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1018242; “AU 
Commission Chairperson Arrives in Beijing for FOCAC Summit,” September 1, 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/01/c_137436708.htm; “Rwandan President Says 
FOCAC Summit Comes ‘at the Right Time,’” September 3, 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_137439506.htm. 
343 See for instance Desheng Cao, “New Measures to Be Rolled out for Africa Cooperation,” August 23, 
2018, //www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/23/WS5b7df391a310add14f3873c0.html; “In Beijing, 
UN Chief Urges Win-Win Collaboration between China and Africa for ‘the Future We Want’”; Xu 
Wang, “UN Official Sees Bright Future in BRI Connections - World - Chinadaily.Com.Cn,” September 
4, 2018, //www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/04/WS5b8dc4bfa310add14f3895f0.html. 
344  “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021),” 2018, 
https://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hyqk_1/t1594297.htm; links between the Belt and Road and 
Africa’s economic integration and sustainable development agenda are also mentioned in the 2015 
action plan: “The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018),” 
December 25, 2015, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys_1/t1327961.htm; see also Annex II. 
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Africa. … For China, we are always Africa’s good friend, good partner and good brother. No one 
could undermine the great unity between the Chinese people and the African people.345 
Coherent with the relationship logic that Womack suggests is driving China’s 
normative efforts, where both sides feel equally rewarded and better off as the 
relationship continues, President Xi also pointed out that “China believes that the sure 
way to boost China-Africa cooperation is for both sides to leverage its respective 
strength … In doing so, China follows the principle of giving more and taking less, 
giving before taking and giving without asking for return.”346 Xi further announced 
eight major initiatives that will be the focus of cooperation over the next three years. 
These include: industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, 
green development, capacity building, health care, people-to-people exchanges, and 
peace and security. In order to implement such initiatives, Xi pledged USD60 billion 
“in the form of government assistance as well as investment and financing by financial 
institutions and companies.” 347  It is worth noting that unlike previous FOCAC 
meetings, where the amount of funding was bigger every time, the 2018 financing 
pledge was lower than what announced in the 2015 edition, if one considers that the 
government is contributing USD50 billion, while USD10 billion are to be invested by 
Chinese private companies. 348  As Moore suggests, Chinese financing is indeed 
changing, as a result of both domestic and international pressures; of course, since it 
starts from a high baseline, any reduction will not lead to a disappearance of Chinese 
lending, but rather to a readjustment of economic priorities. 349  All these 
announcements fit in the broader trend of China’s Africa discourse, which I proceed 
to mapping in the next section. 
  
                                               
345 “Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Speech at Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing 
Summit,” September 3, 2018, https://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxyw_1/t1591508.htm; emphasis 
added. Note how the “five-no” policy is also an implicit critique of Western-style aid. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid.; see also Jiayao Li, “Xi Says China to Implement Eight Major Initiatives with African Countries 
- China Military,” September 3, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-
09/03/content_9271031.htm; for more details on how much of the 2015 financing has been delivered, 
see Yun Sun, “Foresight Africa Viewpoint – China’s Engagement in Africa: What Can We Learn in 
2018 from the $60 Billion Commitment?,” Brookings, January 30, 2018, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/30/foresight-africa-viewpoint-chinas-
engagement-in-africa-what-can-we-learn-in-2018-from-the-60-billion-commitment/. 
348 Deborah Bräutigam, “China’s FOCAC Financial Package for Africa 2018: Four Facts,” September 
3, 2018, http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2018/09/chinas-focac-financial-package-for.html. 
349 W. Gyude Moore, “2018 FOCAC: Africa in the New Reality of Reduced Chinese Lending,” Center 
For Global Development, August 31, 2018, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/2018-focac-africa-new-reality-
reduced-chinese-lending. 
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4.3 The “South-South cooperation” discourse: Mapping 
representations of China-Africa 
In this section, I analyse FOCAC action plans, declarations, and related speeches 
given by China’s top leaders, officials, and diplomats on a number of occasions, 
including follow-up meetings to the Forum, in the period 2000-2018. In addition to 
these documents, I use interviews from my fieldwork in 2016 and 2017 in both Beijing 
and Addis Ababa. Arguably, since the Forum’s inception in 2000, attention to peace 
and security, and peacekeeping in particular, has gained prominence, and this has 
resulted in a shift in policies from non-involvement and non-intervention to 
considerable engagement in a variety of security-related activities. Simultaneously, 
while the change is detectable in the third discursive layer, the first and second 
discursive layers that sustain China’s Africa policies have remained the same (I further 
clarify this aspect in section 4.4.) Here, I start by mapping the main representations of 
the China-Africa story as backed by political and historical narratives, as well as their 
persistence throughout the nearly two decades since the creation of the FOCAC.  
Through this analysis, a basic discourse emerges that constructs China and 
Africa as fellow members of the Global South and defines their relations in terms of 
South-South cooperation. The South, according to Alden, Morphet, and Vieira, forms 
a source of identity for both state and non-state actors; an identity that is constantly 
negotiated at the meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 
(G77), and other regional and sub-regional organisations and which encapsulates the 
common experience of colonialism and imperialism. Ultimately, the South is being 
used as a mobilising strategy based upon a critique of the asymmetries and inequalities 
of the contemporary international system.350 Furthermore, according to Breslin, in 
promoting South-South cooperation, “we see China’s leaders clearly trying to establish 
common motivations with other developing countries as they frame their calls for 
change to the existing structures of global governance.”351 Assuring the West, as well 
as developing countries, that China is not a neo-colonial power entails building an 
image of the PRC as a fraternal state seeking to establish win-win partnerships. A close 
read of FOCAC declarations and Chinese leaders’ speeches has revealed a constant, 
coherent discourse which frames China and Africa as members of the same group. 
                                               
350 Chris Alden, Sally Morphet, and Marco Antonio Vieira, The South in World Politics (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
351 Shaun Breslin, “China and the Global Order: Signalling Threat or Friendship?,” International Affairs 
89, no. 3 (2013): 615–34. 
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Based on this, a number of different representations have come to define China-
Africa relations as based on friendship, brotherhood, partnership, shared experience 
with colonialism and Western encroachment, and unity in fighting a hegemonic world 
order. Despite relations going through difficult times as much as successes, the basic 
discourse has remained stable and coherent. To be sure, the historical and political 
narratives that support it have not remained entirely unchanged either: At times, some 
have been dropped and new ones introduced that better suited changes in the 
relationship.352 However, as Strauss mentions, a set of consistent logical supporting 
ideas can be identified, including the shared history of anti-colonial struggle and 
respect for state sovereignty and non-interference.353 While her piece represented an 
important contribution to the China-Africa field, it was in many ways limited.354 Here, 
I expand on Strauss’ study by identifying a more precise and nuanced set of 
representations that have contributed to the construction of a stable and coherent basic 
discourse. These representations not only draw on past experiences, but also, and most 
importantly, they accompany China-Africa ties as they develop, thus (re)producing a 
discourse that allows such relations to proceed unscathed even in the face of change. 
As Krebs and Jackson remind us, any form of political communication is premised on 
a political community that shares at least some understandings of the boundaries of 
acceptable discourse; such a political community is “defined by a common rhetorical 
lexicon and coalesce around particular rhetorical configurations.”355 The more tightly 
linked the community, the greater the possibility for successful political communication. 
It is thus especially important for Chinese decision-makers to build their discourse on 
a strong ‘belonging’ basis. This is why some representations we encounter below, such 
as China as a fellow developing country and an ally are especially relevant and need 
to be constantly cultivated.356 Afterwards, utilising the concept of ‘interpellation’, I 
show how Chinese elites have so far been successful at combining and recombining 
                                               
352 On this, see Strauss, “The Past in the Present”; Sverdrup-Thygeson, “The Chinese Story: Historical 
Narratives as a Tool in China’s Africa Policy.” 
353 Strauss, “The Past in the Present,” 779–80. 
354 First, her analysis is not based on any clear methodological principles, including no definition of 
discourse, no specification on how and why the texts were chosen, or what kind of analysis was 
conducted; second, while she repeatedly asks why was it possible for such a coherent rhetoric to survive 
the changes in the relationship, her answer is unfortunately unsatisfactory, since she only focuses on a 
limited set of “bursts of China’s official and semi-official coverage of China–Africa affairs”, and mentions 
the important topic of target audiences without following up on it. Ibid., 779. 
355 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” 61. 
356 While it is legitimate to wonder whether China can still be considered part of the Global South (if 
one is to look at the World Bank’s income category, for instance), we must not forget that such a category 
relies on broader shared experience, such as colonialism, geographical and political position in world 
affairs, and a shared identity. A more appropriate question is instead, for how long China will be able 
to sustain its self-identity as a member of the developing countries group. 
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existing representations (North/South, developed/developing, colonial/anti-colonial, 
etc.), thus creating a coherent discourse that has enabled Beijing to span across a 
relatively wide range of policy options without deviating from the basic 
representations.357 The main discourse provides the framework within which policies 
are undertaken.358 In particular, I am interested in exploring how it has progressively 
made space for peace and security to become an essential element of China’s Africa 
policies while maintaining a stable rhetoric. To be sure, changes in the narratives are 
detectable, especially if one compares the tone of the 7th FOCAC with the previous 
one, but these changes only apply to the third discursive layer, while the basic 
discourses have remained the same. The analysis of FOCAC-related documents thus 
highlights both continuities and changes in Chinese decision makers’ representations 
of the China-Africa story in the face of developing relations and instability in the 
continent. 
 
4.3.1 The main representations 
The basic discourse not only comprises the “South-South cooperation” logic, but 
also elaborates on the premise of such cooperation, which is the unjust world system. 
Such injustice is said to be rooted in the economic, scientific, and technological gap 
between the North and the South. This widening divide, said Premier Wen Jiabao 
during the 2003 Ministerial Conference,  
makes it all the more difficult for developing nations, particularly African nations, to 
maintain economic security and achieve sustainable development […] It is all too clear 
that world peace and development cannot possibly be sustained if the North-South 
divide grows wider and developing nations go poorer.359  
Imbalances between the North and the South are the symptom that “[h]egemonism 
and power politics still exist. Developing countries are still faced with an arduous task 
of safeguarding their sovereignty, security and interests.”360 In turn, such system is 
identified as the cause of “[p]rolonged poverty and backwardness, [which] coupled 
with external factors, have exacerbated the otherwise latent ethnic rifts, religious feuds 
and social conflicts in some developing countries, led to conflicts and wars in these 
                                               
357 Weldes, “Constructing National Interests;” see also Chapter 1. 
358 Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. 
359 “Let Us Build on Our Past Achievements and Promote China-Africa Friendly Cooperation on All 
Fronts: Address by H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
At Opening Ceremony of the Second Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum,” 
accessed April 12, 2017, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dejbzjhy/SP22009/t606816.htm. 
360  Zemin Jiang, “China and Africa-Usher in the New Century Together,” 2000, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhy/SP12009/t606804.htm; “Full Text of Chinese President Xi 
Jinping’s Speech at Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit.” 
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countries and impaired their state stability and national development.”361 Hegemony, 
in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, is represented by the domination of developed 
countries in the current world order, which are also responsible for practicing power 
politics (a practice from which China distances itself), as well as for exploiting natural 
resources from developing countries.362 Such hegemony is held responsible for the 
poverty and backwardness which are the “true” causes of conflicts in the continent. 
The current world order is inequitable, because tailored to developed countries’ needs. 
It is thus beset by contradictions, which, if not addressed, could escalate to crisis. The 
most serious are: exploitation of the poor by the rich; an attempt to force ideologies on 
others against their will; the violation of state sovereignty; and the persistence of 
hegemonism.363 Hence, China’s proposal—creating a new world order: “[i]t has been 
the demand of the times and call of the people all over the world to establish an 
equitable and just new international political and economic order. Let us work together 
with wisdom and courage to build such a new order and advance the lofty cause of 
peace and development for mankind.”364 Chinese leaders are careful to clarify that it is 
not the country’s intention to subvert the existing system altogether. Rather,  
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter, the principles and spirit enshrined in the [Organization of African Unity] OAU 
Charter and other universally recognised norms governing international relations should 
form the political basis for the new international order. Furthermore, it is imperative to 
establish some new principles responsive to the spirit of the times and to the changes and developments in 
the world provided that people of all nations can reach consensus.365 
China accepts some of the universal norms upholding international relations, thus 
reassuring Western countries that it does not pursue a revisionist foreign policy, whilst 
also calling for the inclusion of “new principles” that reflect both the role developing 
countries deserve to perform in such a system and China’s norms-making ambitions. 
Premised on this basic discourse, a number of representations (and related 
policies) are developed. As shown above, during the latest Forum President Xi 
described China and Africa as friends, brothers, and partners. China attaches even 
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more value to this friendship by positioning itself within the group of developing 
countries. The first FOCAC Action Plan states that  
there exists a solid foundation for friendly relations and co-operation between China and 
Africa, given their time-honoured traditional friendship. We also emphasise that both China 
and African countries are developing countries with common fundamental interests and 
believe that close consultation between the two sides on international affairs is of great 
importance to consolidating solidarity among developing countries and facilitating the 
establishment of a new international order.366 
In 2006, President Hu Jintao spoke to participants of the third Ministerial meeting and 
argued: 
Though vast oceans keep China and Africa far apart, the friendship between our peoples 
has a long history and, having been tested by times, is strong and vigorous. In the long 
course of history, the Chinese and African peoples, with an unyielding and tenacious 
spirit, created splendid and distinctive ancient civilisations. In the modern era, our peoples 
launched unremitting and heroic struggle against subjugation, and have written a glorious 
chapter in the course of pursuing freedom and liberation, upholding human dignity, 
and striving for economic development and national rejuvenation.367 
Not only China and African countries are friends, but several other assumptions 
are implied here. First, according to the narrative their friendship is a long-lasting one, 
dating back to the early Ming dynasty: A friendship which had been maintained long 
enough and is therefore likely to continue for as long.368 Of course, such a depiction of 
the events does not represent the historical reality of China-Africa ties since then, 
which were all but continuous. As a matter of fact, some scholars argue that Zheng 
He’s expeditions may not have been as peaceful as Beijing likes to portray them.369 
Furthermore, after such few encounters, China-Africa relations were essentially 
interrupted and only resumed in their modern form during the Mao era.370 However 
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inaccurate, the narrative has served, and still does, the diplomatic purpose of 
portraying China and African countries as sharing a long past as ‘friends’. Second, in 
ancient times Chinese and Africans civilisations used to be “splendid” and “distinctive”, 
whilst in modern times these civilisations have been threatened by colonialism and 
have jointly mobilised against “subjugation”. In the case of Africa, this refers to the 
struggle for independence from European colonial powers from the 1950s throughout 
the 1970s. In the case of China, it refers to British encroachment following the first 
Opium War (1839-1842) and the century of national humiliation, from which China 
is believed to have recovered only with victory over Japan in 1945 and the founding of 
the PRC in 1949. As Sverdrup-Thygeson argues, this historical narrative, which he 
calls the colony narrative, is often used, together with the Zheng He narrative and the 
TAZARA narrative, as a tool in China’s Africa policy.371 In short, “Beijing is […] 
challenging the current historicity applied to the African continent by bringing forth a 
set of historical narratives that serves […] also to turn the tables with regard to the 
Western actors that find themselves occupying the unusual role of the ‘‘Other’’ in this 
new mode of regarding Sino-African history.”372 Hence, China and African countries 
are depicted as sympathetic members of the same community of developing countries 
with “common fundamental interests”. The latest Forum goes a step further and 
describes the two as a “family”; they share a temporal identity, which belongs to a 
glorious past, and an ethical one, which makes them victims of subjugation, colonialism, 
and imperialism. As a token of such friendship, it has become a tradition for Chinese 
leaders or officials to visit African countries as their first destination abroad each 
year.373 Furthermore, new research points to the importance of “in person” diplomacy: 
the Chinese leaders have shown that they prioritise the continent by showing up, 
something that is not necessarily part of other major countries’ foreign policy priorities 
(with the exception of France).374  
Another important representation is globalisation as a challenge and a risk, based 
on China’s narrative that understands today’s international environment as not being 
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friendly for developing countries.375 The first Action Plan states that “globalization 
currently represents more challenges and risks than opportunities to the vast number 
of developing countries”.376 This depiction remains largely stable throughout the first 
three Forums and is then replaced by concerns around the global financial crisis 
starting from the fourth Action Plan, according to which “the world is still gripped by 
the economic recession triggered by the global financial crisis.”377 In the former case 
(globalisation as a threat to developing countries), the implication was that developed 
countries, which have shaped the current world order according to their norms and 
interests, are benefitting from globalisation, whilst developing countries, including 
China, are left with a series of arduous tasks. In the latter case (financial crisis as a 
threat), interestingly, the idea is that the  
international financial crisis has led to a world economic recession and has brought 
about profound and complex changes to the international political and economic 
landscape. Therefore, it is of even greater importance to strengthen China-Africa 
cooperation in international affairs. […] Despite its own difficulties caused by the impact 
of the global financial crisis on the Chinese economy, China expressed commitment to 
further scaling up assistance to Africa.378 
It should be pointed out that both narratives equally legitimise increasing economic 
contributions to the continent. Either ways, it seems, “China […] believes that the 
world should not overlook the issue of development while tackling the crisis.”379 In both 
instances, therefore, China still portrays itself as a faithful ally of African countries, 
willing to continue, and even scale up, its financial commitments to ensure economic 
growth for the continent. As “[b]oth African countries and China are developing 
countries facing common challenges of development and sharing broad common 
interests in a world that is undergoing and will continue to undergo profound and 
complex changes”, China remains a reliable and trustworthy partner.380 Globalisation 
eventually comes to be represented as an opportunity that developing countries need 
to seize: Chinese official discourse, Johnston notes, has come to accept, albeit 
reluctantly, that global economic integration could have a positive impact on economic 
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development. 381  Recently, China acknowledged that “anti-globalization, trade 
protectionism, falling commodity prices and policy uncertainty of developed 
economies have exerted a negative impact on the development environment of 
emerging markets and developing countries.”382 In the 2018 declaration, China and 
Africa call on the international community “to join efforts in promoting trade and 
investment for development and making economic globalization more open, inclusive, 
balanced and beneficial to all.”383 
This is coupled with support for Africans’ positions and for their inclusion in the 
UNSC. Support for the UN and multilateral organisations is thus another essential 
element of China’s discourse. Sections on international affairs and multilateral 
cooperation appear in each Action Plan, and Chinese leaders like to stress “the central 
role of the United Nations in international affairs and promote multilateralism and 
democracy in international relations.” 384  Interestingly, the idea of democratising 
international relations is often associated with multilateral cooperation. Chinese 
decision makers use democracy when referring to democratic negotiations, that is, 
equality among all countries in being able to make decisions, especially in the Security 
Council. The latest Declaration reads that China and Africa “follow the principle of 
achieving shared benefits through consultation and collaboration in global governance, 
advocate multilateralism and democracy in international relations, and believe that all 
countries are equal, irrespective of their size, strength or wealth.”385 It is therefore 
different from a liberal, Western understanding of democracy, which prescribes the 
equal protection of human and civil rights and political freedom. Again, the 
international system is presented as undemocratic because it precludes (certain) 
developing countries from actively participating in political, financial, and economic 
decisions within international organisations. On the contrary, it is argued that China, 
by being a member of the UNSC, holds this power and intends to use it to advocate 
for developing countries’ positions. 
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Related, adherence to the principles of non-interference in other’s internal affairs 
and respect for state sovereignty is a milestone of China’s Africa discourse. China 
reiterates “support for [African countries’] efforts in independently resolving regional 
conflicts and strengthening democracy and good governance and oppose the 
interference in Africa’s internal affairs by external forces in pursuit of their own 
interests.”386 Often accused by some of being a neocolonialist,387 Chinese leaders have 
rejected such accusations by arguing that  
The structure of trade between China and Africa that is based on energy and resources 
should indeed be improved. Meanwhile, the same situation exists between Africa and 
all its major trading partners. […] China-Africa cooperation does not match that 
between Africa and its traditional partners in either scope or depth. […] One should 
also recognize that the unfair and unreasonable international political and economic 
order is still a major obstacle hindering Africa’s development. To reverse the situation, 
it is crucial that those countries leading international relations make an effort.388 
To be sure, the question of China’s position on non-interference has often come up in 
China-Africa debates in the last few years. Its support of mediation efforts in Sudan, 
its alleged role in some countries’ changes of leadership and elections, and its growing 
contributions to the continent as a whole are putting these principles increasingly 
under strain. The next section aims to address the question of how do peace and 
security policies, as well as China’s increasing involvement in security and military 
activities in the continent, fit into the basic discourse. 
 
4.4 The layered structure of China’s Africa discourse: 
Legitimising the securitisation of development through the 
security-development nexus 
As discussed in Chapter 1, I argue that the discourse is structured along three 
layers, which have gradually made space for increased engagement in the continent’s 
peace and security regime, producing a major shift in policies, but not in the basic 
discourse. The last 18 years since the inception of the FOCAC have seen a gradual 
shift to increased Chinese engagement in peace and security on the continent and UN-
led PKOs, based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, albeit with space for 
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adjustments. The concept of security itself has undergone changes in the narrative 
horizons of Chinese leaders, as seen already in Chapter 3. A position paper from 2002 
maintains that  
After the cold war, the international situation has become characterized by relaxed 
international relations and growing world economy. Under the new historical 
conditions, the meaning of the security concept has evolved to be multifold with its 
contents extending from military and political to economic, science and technology, 
environment, culture and many other areas. The means to seek security are being diversified. 
Strengthening dialogue and cooperation is regarded as the fundamental approach to 
common security.389 
The understanding of peace and security that emerges from FOCAC documents is one 
very much rooted in China’s domestic practices, where security is intimately connected 
to development: reducing poverty and improving living conditions is considered to be 
key to achieving peace and, consequently, security.390 To be sure, Chinese official 
rhetoric in this sense does not mention domestic social and political control and 
repression as other forms of security, which is another example of the gap between 
rhetoric and practice. China’s own experience in focusing on economic development 
in order to strengthen stability informs its international approach too. Poverty, 
backwardness, and lack of development, which China essentially blames on hegemonic 
powers, are the main causes of insecurity, conflicts, and war. While the security-
development nexus is a Western concept, it does have an equivalent in China.391 In the 
Western context, it is a familiar representation that has long been at the centre of what 
Duffield calls the ‘liberal way of development’.392 And, in the context of China-Africa 
relations, the use of ‘security’ in the nexus refers to the links between internal stability 
and economic growth. However, within China the nexus refers to something different: 
As Benabdallah argues, “China’s own history with political interference in economic 
development since the inception of the CCP under Mao’s rule has resulted in a strong 
belief in the necessity of economic growth to maintaining internal order.”393 Therefore, 
it points to the fundamental difference between regime security and national security. 
While the former involves the governing elites as being secure from violent challenges 
to their rule, the latter, which has long meant military security, has now come to 
incorporate other issues as well, such as the people, the economy, the energy, and the 
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environment. 394  Despite such differences, establishing the nexus as a successful 
representation in China’s Africa discourse was possible also because the link between 
security and development has existed for a long time already. Such nexus, I argue, is 
key to understanding the successful legitimisation of increased security practices within 
the existing discourse. 
As Xi Jinping argued during the Fourth Summit of the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, 
Sustainable security means that we need to focus on both development and security so that security 
would be durable. As a Chinese saying goes, for a tree to grow tall, a strong and solid root 
is required; for a river to reach far, an unimpeded source is necessary. Development is the 
foundation of security, and security the precondition for development. The tree of peace does not 
grow on barren land while the fruit of development is not produced amidst flames of 
war.395  
Premier Li Keqiang further said that “[w]ithout a peaceful and stable environment, 
development will be out of the question.”396 In a joint statement following the third 
round of consultations between Chinese and African Ministries held in New York in 
2013, we read that “efforts should be made to strike a balance between peace, security, 
stability and development in order to deal with the root causes of conflicts. It is 
important to take a holistic approach to address both the symptoms and root causes of 
hotspot issues and to persevere with dialogue and negotiations in settling regional 
disputes.”397 
The principle thus understands peace, security, and development as 
fundamental and interconnected features of a desirable political environment. Since 
the inequality of the current world order represents a threat to both the development 
potential and the stability of countries in the Global South, it is necessary to address both 
in order to achieve a more equal and democratic international system. In other words, 
the nexus creates a sort of quasi-causal argument à la Weldes, and the importance of 
such an argument lies “in their provision of ‘warranting conditions’ which ‘make a 
particular action or belief more “reasonable”, “justified”, or “appropriate”, given the 
desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors’”.398 In this case, given that security can 
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only be achieved through development, it is ‘acceptable’ that China provide substantial 
economic aid to African countries in order to simultaneously promote security. 
Furthermore, the nexus is considered appropriate by both parties, since African leaders 
seem to have accepted the China model based on development-first policies (I return 
to this in the last section of the chapter). Hence, such discourse legitimises 
developmental, infrastructure, and logistics-related policies in light of the pursuit of 
peace and security. Simultaneously, as we have seen from the documents cited earlier, 
security issues have gained more prominence in China’s Africa policy and this reflects 
a major change in its security policies on the continent. The analysis above has shown 
that the discourse has remained stable throughout the years: The centrality of the 
security-development nexus allows Chinese leaders to modify their policies toward 
peace and security without changing the basic discourse or the narratives supporting 
it. To say this with Weldes, since “identities are the basis of interests”,399 “the interests 
of the state are already entailed within the representations in which the identities of 
and relations among the relevant actors or objects are established”.400 As the largest 
developing country and leader of the developing world, it is believed that China should 
and must provide economic assistance to African countries. Crucially, economic 
development is considered an essential tool in achieving security. As suggested in 
Chapter 3, this is in line with continental priorities, and the African Union itself is 
premised on the securitisation of development: Security is a prerequisite for 
development, and the barriers between security, governance, and development are not 
rigid but rather malleable.401 Both Chinese and Africans seem to agree that “security 
forces can, and should on occasion, contribute directly or indirectly to development.”402 
The third discursive layer thus adds further specificity to the abstraction of the second 
layer and results into more specific policies that consists of increased participation in 
peacekeeping missions and building a military base in the continent, among other 
things. This is where a certain degree of contestation or change is allowed: While 
China’s focus until 2011-2012 was on the developmentalisation of security, premised 
on the belief that economic growth leads to stability, since then the discourse embraces 
a change towards a more pronounced securitization of development, whereby 
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economic prosperity and social development can only be achieved in a peaceful and 
safe environment. This is accompanied by an increasing role for the PLA in the 
continent. The change in the third discursive layer eventually leads to a major change 
in the patterns of Chinese engagement without producing changes in the discourse at 
the first or second level. 
In the preceding section, I have identified the basic discourse and the main 
representations that Chinese decision makers have been employing when constructing 
China-Africa relations within a South-South cooperation framework. Such discourse 
legitimises policies directed at helping African countries develop economically as a 
need, a duty, and a priority. Within this framework, security occupies an important 
place; however, the extent to which it has been a part of China’s Africa policy has 
changed throughout the years. While mentions of peace and security as one element 
of the China-Africa partnership are detectable from 2000, the first two Forums only 
present vague and general references to the topic; then, they start becoming more 
prominent from 2005, when China takes part in the peace negotiations between Sudan 
and South Sudan. But it is only from 2012 that the PRC starts to fund peace and 
security through both the AU and the UN and that is when China’s position on security 
matters becomes more clearly articulated (see Appendix II). These developments 
coincide with the start of Xi Jinping’s term and his foreign policy informed by 
multilateralism and the new security concept. The first sign of change can be detected 
in speeches from 2005; for instance, during the Consultation between the Secretariat 
of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC and African Diplomatic Envoys 
in China (a follow-up mechanism that is aimed to revise the progress of each action 
plan in-between the Ministerial Conferences), Director-general Xu Jinghu said: 
In March this year, China decided to join the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan, 
rendering its support to Sudan’s peace process with real actions. In the coming weeks 
and months, Chinese engineers, medical and transportation detachments, military 
observers, civilian police, and political officers will arrive in Sudan. On the question of 
Darfur, China ardently supports a leading role of the African Union. To back up the 
AU’s peacekeeping efforts there, China provided certain financial assistance at the 
beginning of this year. In April, the 218 Chinese peacekeepers in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo have been replaced. At present, there are a total of 843 Chinese 
military staff serving in eight areas of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, among 
whom 776 are peacekeepers and 67 are military observers.403  
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China’s mediation efforts in Sudan mark an important moment in the PRC’s 
engagement with peace and security in Africa and the existing literature documents 
well the motives and dynamics of this shift.404 One of my interviewees, who took part 
in the peace negotiation process from 2005 as a EU delegate, confirmed that the 
situation in Sudan at the time prompted an alignment of the Chinese position to the 
EU’s, and even saw Chinese representatives being more assertive than Europeans and 
finally “getting their hands dirty with diplomatic mediation”.405 From then on, peace 
and security, and peacekeeping in particular, feature more prominently in all FOCAC 
action plans. For instance, the implementation of the follow-up actions of the Beijing 
Summit document in 2009 states that 
China continued to take an active part in the United Nations peacekeeping operations 
in Africa. Since the Beijing Summit, China’s deployment of peacekeeping troops and 
police to Africa has totaled 6,281 person-time, with 1,629 Chinese soldiers and police 
officers remaining in service in six UN peacekeeping missions in the region. China 
actively supported post-war reconstruction in relevant countries and strengthened 
cooperation with them on the establishment of the UN Peace Commission. In order to 
support the efforts of Africa to maintain regional peace and security, the Chinese 
Government appointed a Special Representative on African Affairs, actively 
participated in the resolution of, and strengthened, with the African side, consultation 
and coordination on Darfur and relevant issues of significance to peace and security in 
Africa.406 
However, it is from 2012 that peace and security occupy a central position in 
China’s Africa discourse and China starts to commit funding to it. The Sharm el 
Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) places political affairs and regional peace and security 
as the first item of concern, and states that, in the spirit of “solving African problems 
by Africans”, China will intensify cooperation with African countries in peacekeeping 
theory research, peacekeeping training and exchanges, as well as in supporting the 
building of peacekeeping capacity in Africa.407 The Beijing Declaration following the 
5th FOCAC meeting maintains that the Chinese are “deeply concerned about the 
turbulences in certain regions and reaffirm our commitment to upholding the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the basic norms governing 
international relations” and they commit to “[i]ncrease the exchanges and cooperation 
between the two sides in operationalizing Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture, 
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continue to support and assist African countries in increasing their capabilities for 
maintaining peace and security, and enhance coordination and communication in the 
UN Security Council and other multilateral institutions.”408 The 2013-2015 Action 
Plan commits RMB600 million in free aid and other measures to strengthen the 
practical cooperation between China and the AU.409 Furthermore, the 6th Forum’s 
Action Plan argues that  
The Chinese side will continue to take an active part in UN peacekeeping missions in 
Africa, offer the African side support on peacekeeping training and intensify 
communication and coordination with Africa in the UN Security Council, in adherence 
to UN Security Council Resolution 2033 that recognizes the importance of an 
enhanced relationship between the United Nations and the African Union, as well as a 
strengthened capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations, in particular the 
African Union, in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict 
stabilization.410 
This time, USD60 million in free military assistance over the following three years are 
pledged for the strengthening of the APSA. In his speech during the 7th FOCAC 
Summit, Xi explicitly links future China-Africa security cooperation with his “new 
security concept” and he proposes to 
Build a China-Africa community with a shared future that enjoys common security. 
People that have gone through adversity value peace most. China champions a new vision 
of security featuring common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We firmly support 
African countries and the African Union as well as other regional organizations in Africa 
in solving African issues in the African way, and we support the African initiative of 
“Silence (sic) the Guns in Africa”. China is ready to play a constructive role in promoting 
peace and stability in Africa and will support African countries to strengthen their 
independent capacity for safeguarding stability and peace.411 
The promise is to implement “100 million dollars military assistance in support of the 
African Standby Force and African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis, and 
work with Africa to raise the voice and influence of developing countries in the field of 
UN peacekeeping.” 412  Moreover, peace and security features as one of the eight 
initiatives that will constitute the focus of the next three years, and likely for longer as 
well. As Xi states, 
We will launch a peace and security initiative. China decided to set up a China-Africa 
peace and security fund to boost our cooperation on peace, security, peacekeeping, and 
law and order. China will continue to provide military aid to the AU, and will support 
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countries in the Sahel region and those bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of 
Guinea in upholding security and combating terrorism in their regions.413 
Among the ‘news’, a China-Africa peace and security forum was also announced, 
which will serve “as a platform for conducting more exchanges in this area”; 
furthermore, “[f]ifty security assistance programs will be launched to advance China-
Africa cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, and in areas of law and order, 
UN peacekeeping missions, fighting piracy and combating terrorism.”414 
 To be sure, the question remains as to how the official Chinese rhetoric is 
adapting in light of these changes, at least in a way that guarantees the continued 
credibility of China as a friend and partner. Another response to the often-raised 
accusation of neocolonialism came from then vice Foreign Minister Jun Zhai, who 
argued that  
Non-interference in domestic affairs has not gone outdated. For developing countries in 
particular, it remains an important tool for defending their rights and interests. In recent 
years, some countries ignored opposition from regional countries to intervene militarily 
in some regional hot-spot issues and press for regime change. This has disrupted regional 
and world peace and stability. […] Support for democracy and good governance in 
Africa is not the “monopoly” of certain countries.415 
Former Premier Wen Jiabao similarly said allegations that China has come to Africa 
to plunder its resources and practice neocolonialism are “totally untenable”. 416  A 
Global Times article tellingly called the FOCAC the “poster child for South-South 
cooperation” and maintained that the responsibility to put Chinese aid, investments, 
and loans to good use is Africa’s, not China’s: While the latter should lay down feasible 
principles and targets, the former has the responsibility for successfully reaching those 
targets.417 It should also be noted that Chinese academics and scholars are currently at 
work to conceptually redefine these important pillars of their policy (respect for state 
sovereignty and non-intervention/non-interference) with the aim to “keep them intact 
but adapt them retroactively”.418  It is furthermore interesting to observe the shift 
occurring both in the narratives utilised and in the kind of financing extended to 
African countries. On the one hand, in the official Chinese media’s narrative around 
BRI-related projects nowadays the tone has gone from assertive—i.e. calling for the 
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BRI to spread “Chinese solutions”—to a more tempered and defensive one. 419 
Recently, Xi commented that the BRI is an economic cooperation initiative and not a 
geopolitical or military alliance building; it is an open process, not an exclusive “
2
” (zhongguo julebu, China club); it is a welcoming initiative, not a zero-sum game 
defined by ideological lines.420 On the other hand, China is now giving more money to 
African countries via grants and interest-free loans, than through interest-bearing 
credit lines; it is hard to ignore how this change is happening in the context of mounting 
criticism of Chinese debt. 421  The discursive and practical developments of these 
principles are important elements in China’s foreign policy and they need to be 
carefully monitored in the future as China-Africa ties enter a phase of even greater 
engagement.  
 
4.5 Accepting China’s discourse 
As mentioned earlier, the endurance of China’s representation of itself as a 
faithful friend to African countries throughout decades of relations does not only 
depend on the leaders’ intriguing articulation of such identity and the related policies. 
On the one hand, some find China’s Africa policy even “disturbing”. In a recent report, 
the Council of Foreign Relations describes China as plundering Africa’s natural 
resources, causing environmental damage, and, it accuses China of willingly using “its 
seat on the UN Security Council to protect some of Africa’s most egregious regimes 
from international sanction, in particular Sudan and Zimbabwe”, a practice which is 
labelled as “most disturbing to US political objectives”.422 On the other hand, the 
discourse revolving around the concepts seen above, and its security policies in 
particular, have arguably been more successful among African decision makers. I 
argue that China’s process of interpellation has been successful in constructing China-
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Africa friendship as opposed to colonialist practices perpetrated by developed countries, 
as well as the security-development nexus as central to its policies, even when these 
have shifted from focusing on the importance of economic development as a driver to 
peace, to focusing on the centrality of security to achieve sustainable development. I 
have defined interpellation as the process of hailing or recruiting subjects: Through 
this mechanism, identities (or subject-positions) are created and individuals are hailed 
into such identities. As the targeted audience come to identify with a certain subject-
position and its representations, such representations appear as common sense. 
Foreign policy makers need only present foreign policies that seem legitimate to the 
relevant audiences. African leaders have been successfully interpellated into the 
language of the security-development nexus as members of the same group of 
developing countries with a “shared destiny”. China, on its part, seems to believe that 
Africans share its positions on sovereignty and seek to emulate the PRC’s path to 
modernisation.423 In one of my interviews with a Chinese diplomat, it emerged that 
requests for creating the Forum in the late 1990s came from Africans themselves, who 
felt the moment was ripe to institutionalise bilateral relations with China.424 Indeed, 
such perception finds confirmation in many African leaders’ speeches. For instance, 
the Ethiopian special envoy to the Forum in 2005 argued that  
China is a beacon of hope for Africa. What we Africans could learn from China's successful 
and remarkable economic development in the past three decades is that, if the right 
domestic policies, coupled with peace and stability, are prevailing, it is possible to bring 
sustainable economic development to Africa also. It is our conviction that Africa's 
development endeavors need genuine partnership from countries like China whose 
development experiences are relevant to Africa’s present day conditions. […] In today’s 
globalizing world, economic cooperation is at the heart of relations between countries. It is 
the foundation, on which the entire edifice of relations has to be built.425 
President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe similarly stated that “indeed, […] poverty and 
hunger, if not properly addressed, pose a serious threat to peace and security.”426 In 
2009, then Vice President of Ghana John Dramani Mahama argued that  
Since its inception in the year 2000, the FOCAC has provided a veritable channel for 
the incremental enhancement of Sino-African relations. The architects of this strategic 
partnership were motivated by the lessons of history, the realities of today and the 
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legitimate aspirations of the millions of people in China and Africa. In spite of the 
difficulties that have characterized the global economic and financial environment, 
China and Africa have shared the virtues partnership and are well-placed to deepen this 
new strategic engagement for sustainable development.427 
Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf also remarked that the partnership 
between China and Africa, “based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, is the spirit 
of South-South cooperation.” 428  During the 12th Senior Officials Meeting of the 
FOCAC held in Beijing in November 2017, Deputy Minister of International 
Relations and Cooperation Nomaindiya Mfeketo of South Africa argued that the 
Forum has indeed become a model for South-South cooperation and that China has 
always attached great importance to Africa.429 During the first stop of a four-countries 
tour preceding the BRICS Summit in 2018, Xi was welcomed by Rwandan President 
Kagame who praised China for treating Africa as “an equal”, an attitude which he 
called “more precious than money.”430 
To be sure, while China’s discourse has found wide acceptance among African 
elites, I am not suggesting that China’s policies toward the continent are solely 
motivated by its benevolence and generosity. Quite the opposite, the slow shift away 
from a strict understanding of non-interference reflects the increasingly urgent need to 
protect Chinese citizens and interests abroad. 431  Security is a prerequisite for 
investments, Sr. Col. Ouyang Wei told me candidly during an interview.432 The first 
Chinese military strategy white paper released in 2015 also acknowledges that China 
has become “more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, 
serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests 
concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication, as well as 
institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.”433 
Yet, increased Chinese involvement in peace and security policies has largely 
been welcomed by Africans regardless of their motivations. South African President 
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Zuma had been reported by a local newspaper to have said that “we are certainly 
convinced China’s intention is different from Europe’s, which to date continues to 
attempt to influence African countries for its sole benefit.”434 Then Tanzanian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs said in 2012 that the Chinese “had proved to be true friends of 
Africans by investing in Africa and keeping the relationship with Africa regardless of 
the difficult circumstances and the challenges Africa faced […] China is the greatest 
ally of the continent of Africa. No matter whether a country was devastated by civil 
war, drought, floods or disease, the Chinese would be there.”435 Thus, the security-
development nexus is appealing to African leaders because China was able to reframe 
it within an appealing narrative of long-lasting friendship and equal relations. In the 
words of a senior researcher from the IPSS, their “descriptive” approach, rather than 
a typically “prescriptive” Western approach has led such a discourse to succeed and 
find acceptance among African elites. 436  During the 7th FOCAC, African leaders 
described the China-Africa cooperation in a variety of ways. President Paul Kagame 
of Rwanda called China’s engagement in the continent “deeply transformational”; 
President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa said the Forum “refutes the view that a 
new colonialism is taking hold in Africa, as our detractors would have us believe”; 
President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya proclaimed himself “satisfied” with the great 
progress achieved by bilateral relations between his country and China; Ghanaian 
president Nana Akufo-Addo admitted to be “inspired” by the Chinese model and 
committed to replicate it at home; and Mokgweetsi Masisi of Botswana said the Forum 
was a “unique” opportunity for African countries to build stronger relations with the 
Asian giant.437 In his speech at the opening ceremony, President Ramaphosa further 
added that  
Africa and China enjoy a rich history characterised by friendship and solidarity. … The progress 
that has been made over the last 18 years demonstrates the tangible and lasting benefit 
of FOCAC to the people of Africa and to the people of China. The relationship that we 
have forged through FOCAC is premised on the fundamental and inalienable right of the African 
people to determine their own future. It is premised on the African Union’s Agenda 2063, a 
vision that has been crafted in Africa, by Africans. It is a vision of an integrated, 
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prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic 
force in the international arena. It is a vision of a continent where commerce, trade, 
investment, skills and knowledge move freely across the borders that were imposed on 
us by our colonial rulers. We look to China as a valuable and committed partner in advancing 
Agenda 2063. It is in pursuit of this vision that we embrace China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative.438 
Indeed, he also acknowledged the trade-gap between China and Africa and exhorted 
his African colleagues to use platforms like the FOCAC to balance the structure of 
trade between the two parties. He further mentioned global economic volatility and 
concerns about peace and security as challenges for developing countries, as well as 
renewed threats to the rules-based multilateral global trading system, and the need to 
utilise China-Africa cooperation to reaffirm their commitment to multilateralism and 
a fair international system—both of which are recurring representations in China’s 
discourse.439 
As stated in Chapter 1, the analysis presented in this thesis refers to elite 
perceptions. Time and word limits do not allow for analysis of other kinds of 
documents or actors that go beyond the official sphere. The perceptions presented here 
are hence those of the main foreign policy actors, which are most involved in policy 
formulation. Whilst I am not suggesting that foreign policy processes are the exclusive 
domain of a restricted group of actors, nor that the foreign policy decision making 
process is a unitary one, discourses and narratives appear to be still in the hands of 
selected elites.440 This, however, does not mean that policies are formulated via a top-
down approach only. On the contrary, the leadership in Beijing often relies on 
feedback and suggestions from their officials and ambassadors on the ground, at least 
on selected issues.441 The Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group remains in 
control of final decisions on which policies to propose and/or implement, and does not 
actively look for suggestions or advice, except in case of exchange and official visits to 
and from Africa, my interviewee said. In fact, much of what happens on the ground 
seems to be due to the initiative of the individual ambassadors, who may present their 
ideas to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in turn would consult with their 
counterparts in other Ministries, to then seek approval from “the top”. Chinese officials 
would have also consulted with their African counterparts on what kind of policies are 
more need in a certain country. As one can see, therefore, such top-down and bottom-
up processes remain confined within the realm of foreign policy elites. The FOCAC 
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follow-up mechanisms, such as the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC and 
the African Diplomatic Envoys in China, provide institutionalised mechanisms to 
make such exchanges smoother. The practice, however, my interviewee suggests, is 
less smooth than it seems, and it may take a long time before suggestions and advice 
from the bottom are considered by the leadership. For instance, when he was involved 
in such mechanisms himself between 2003 and 2005, he found that most often African 
ambassadors would only report to Beijing what was in the interest of their own country, 
while not necessarily reaching regional consensus with their neighbours. Sometimes, 
these mismatches involuntarily create a layer of competition among the 53 country 
members of the FOCAC, which has been acknowledged by some African leaders too. 
During the fifth Forum, the then Zambian Foreign Minister told Xinhua that he was 
hoping African countries would “present an African Agenda, and not myopic specific 
country agenda. [He thought Africans] must go [to FOCAC meetings] united to bring 
development to the whole of the continent.” 442  It is such flaws in the follow-up 
mechanisms which make the FOCAC simultaneously a multilateral and a bilateral 
platform. This, however, while it may create disagreement as to the individual 
countries’ policy preferences, does not affect broader consensus on the beneficial effects 
of the China-Africa friendship. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I mapped China’s basic discourse as premised on South-South 
cooperation: Such a discourse includes a number of representations backed by 
historical and political narratives that have remained relatively stable despite China-
Africa ties going through ebbs and flows. The FOCAC is an exclusive institutional 
space for Sino-African relations to develop outside of the West and provides an ideal 
platform for China to promote its discourse and its norms-making attempts. The main 
argument I made is that Chinese decision makers have constructed a successful 
discourse that pictures China and Africa as long-term friends, united in the shared 
effort to redress the imbalances of a Western-centric international order. They have 
done so by mobilising a series of historical and political narratives which have 
successfully interpellated African actors by creating a sense of belonging and ‘common 
destiny’. The creation of the FOCAC in 2000 has further contributed to building this 
idea of a shared community. Alden and Large further maintain that China is trying to 
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move away from ad hoc participation in Africa’s peace and security to “gradualist 
forms of engagement that include fomenting common Chinese-African values and re-
imagining liberal norms on intervention”—which, according to the authors, makes 
China likely to become a norms-maker in Africa.443 The FOCAC has thus great value 
for China’s foreign policy in the continent: It grants them an exclusive platform where 
leaders have more manoeuvring space to push for China’s own developmental model 
and its preferred norms (be they different and alternative to, or endorsing existing ones) 
and practices. The Forum offers the most potential for China to becoming a normative 
power. 
I have further explored the construction of the security-development nexus 
within the existing discourse. In the context of China’s Africa basic discourse, the nexus 
understands peace, security, and development as interconnected features of a desirable 
political environment. Since the inequality of the current world order represents a 
threat to both the development potential and the stability of countries in the Global 
South, it is necessary to address both in order to achieve a more equal and democratic 
international system. Since the concept entails a close link between the promotion of 
economic growth and social development and the achievement of stability and peace, 
growing security and military commitments appear legitimate and reasonable: As the 
country’s foreign policy towards the continent shifted towards greater engagement 
with peace and security matters, this shift has not been accompanied by changes in the 
basic discourse (first layer), but rather by added new narratives (second to third layers). 
I have argued that rather than fabricating an entirely new discourse to justify and 
legitimise China’s new security and military presence in the continent, they have 
instead built on the existing, basic discursive representations. 
The success of the discourse depends not only on the coherence and longevity of 
its main representations, but also on the positive response these have found among 
African leaders. Using the concept of interpellation, I have argued that by and large, 
African elites have embraced the idea of China being a friend; when looking for 
potential trading and security partners, they are increasingly looking East; and they 
have developed a sense of belonging to a community of with a common destiny. The 
endurance of China’s discourse for the last 18 years since the inception of the FOCAC 
has assured both sides that equal relations are maintained. To recall the arguments 
made in Chapter 2, such relations remain asymmetrical in economic nature, but they 
are supposedly beneficial to everyone involved. By constructing its own identity as a 
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fellow, benevolent developing country which is ready to ‘assist’ through thick and thin, 
China has also established its own interests. Simultaneously, by accepting and 
embracing such narratives, African leaders have found themselves comfortable in their 
identity as developing countries in need of assistance from a friend (not from a 
hegemon), and have thus established their interests too, in what is being described as a 
convenient win-win situation—at least for the elites involved.  
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Chapter 5 – The African Union as a security actor: 
What role for China? 
 
Without its independence, Africa is nothing at all. 
With its independence, it can be everything. 
(Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AUC, January 2018) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Admitting the AU as a full member of the FOCAC in 2011 was arguably aimed 
at aligning China-Africa cooperation with the AU’s priorities and objectives, while 
simultaneously recognising the organisation’s status as the major pan-African 
institutional actor on matters of peace and security.444 Thus, alongside the Forum, 
China pursues its Africa policies via a dedicated partnership with the AU. Such 
partnership has taken different forms. In 2012, China built the AU’s new headquarters 
in Addis Ababa as a ‘gift’ to the continent; in 2015, they established a diplomatic 
mission to the organisation, the third after the US and the EU; in the last few years, 
China stepped up its contributions to the AU peace and security budget. However, 
Beijing has also encountered a series of challenges in dealing with the organisation, 
which are partly inherent to the AU itself and partly depend on the peculiarity of 
Chinese diplomacy that relies heavily on government-to-government ties. Since 
China’s institutionalised engagement with the AU is a recent phenomenon, this 
chapter does not have an extensive background section on China-AU relations like 
Chapters 4 and 6 have on China-FOCAC and China-UNSC relations respectively. 
Instead, I start by introducing the historical security context that prompted the creation 
of the OAU and subsequently the AU, and I describe the organisation’s mandate and 
its internal challenges. These are crucial in understanding the dynamics that underlie 
the relations between the organisation and its external partners. Second, I delve into 
China’s contributions to the AU’s peace and security architecture, a topic which is yet 
understudied. As official documents and speeches directly touching upon such relations 
are somewhat limited, this chapter relies more heavily on fieldwork interviews than on 
written sources.445 As part of the third analytical step, the aim of the chapter is to trace 
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how China’s Africa discourse is maintained at the continental level. I find that some of 
the representations highlighted in Chapter 4 also appear in China-AU related 
documents, albeit with less frequency and less emphasis than elsewhere. I conclude 
with a section on UN-AU relations, which discusses the role of China as both a 
member of the UNSC and one of Africa’s major partners and serves as a bridge 
between this and the following chapter, which focuses on the global dimension of 
China’s Africa policies. 
The African Union thus represents the second level in China’s discourse on 
peace and security: Moving on from the FOCAC, which some say provides an 
“omnibus ‘organizational’ umbrella around which China’s engagement with the AU 
is anchored”,446 the latter represents the institutional link between the regional and 
global levels. While being the locus of African agency par excellence, it still struggles with 
organisational and funding issues and some still question whether it is truly 
independent from external influence yet. As one of its major partners, China has the 
potential to contribute to promoting its agenda, but its path in this sense remains uphill, 
especially with respect to European countries. 
 
5.2 Africa’s security context 
Understanding the African security context would be incomplete without 
reference to the colonial era and the anti-colonial struggles which followed and led to 
decolonisation. Since such a thorough historical reconstruction goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis, I limit my introduction to briefly presenting the African security context. 
The disappointment at the conclusions of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
and the collapse of what Manela calls the “Wilsonian moment”, acted as a trigger to 
the process that launched the transformation of the norms and standards of the 
international society, characterised by the demand of the colonised and marginalised 
to be recognised as sovereign and independent actors in world affairs.447 The language 
of self-determination was hence adopted regardless of geographic confines or 
narratives, to the point that the ideology of nationalism evolved within an international 
context, which saw an escalation of resistance to imperial penetration and 
encroachment, exemplified, for instance, by the 1919 revolution in Egypt or the May 
Fourth movement in China, setting the stage for future anticolonial struggles. Between 
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the 1950s and the 1960s, an international system that included legal overseas 
dependencies of European colonial powers—one whose normative framework was 
constituted by the rules of international law and diplomacy—was transformed into one 
where most colonies gained independent status.448 However, for colonies to become 
sovereign states did not automatically represent the key to development and peace. 
Quite the opposite, once independent, many countries in the developing world did not 
have enough time to create viable political structures and conditions of poverty, 
underdevelopment, and resource scarcity limited their pursuit of developmental 
objectives. Furthermore, the spillover of many revolutions or separatist movements 
across national boundaries often caused regional instability.449 
It is therefore not surprising that many authors tend to emphasise the colonial 
origins of most conflicts, as well as the role of decolonisation in shaping the African 
peace and security architecture. As they suggest that many postcolonial conflicts are 
indeed rooted in colonial conflicts, Nhema and Zeleza remain aware that the causes 
of African wars are complex and entail conjunctures of political, economic, social, and 
cultural factors that are borne out of specific historical experiences.450  Henderson 
similarly stresses the effects of decolonisation on the newly independent states of Africa, 
which were often left without institutional support or specialists by colonisers to face 
the dual challenges of state-building and nation-building.451 The desire for economic 
development also complicated the picture, and while that tends to reduce conflict in 
the long term, it may increase the likeliness of violence in the short term, as uneven 
growth in different sectors of an economy may lead to increasing inequality. 452 
Williams is instead more cautious in blaming current conflicts on colonialism, which, 
he argues, is certainly an important underlying factor but not the main cause behind 
contemporary wars. He argues that armed conflicts in the post-Cold War era are 
rather a consequence of state-society relations coupled with the politics of regime 
survival in most countries across the continent, and he identifies five ingredients that the 
literature considers having played a major role in African conflicts: neopatrimonialism, 
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resources, sovereignty, ethnicity, and religion. In his view, “[d]iscriminatory and 
oppressive systems of governance which lacked effective means of resolving conflicts 
without resorting to violence were thus an important ingredient in every one of Africa’s 
wars.”453 Hence, what becomes clear from this introduction to the African security 
environment, is that conflicts do not happen is isolation, but rather are complex social 
phenomena that are simultaneously local and global, and the degree to which every 
actor and cause vary in each conflict suggests that generalisation is not always possible 
when explaining warfare, and the different historical, political, social, and economic 
contexts always matter greatly. 
 
5.2.1 The African Union: Shaping the APSA 
Thus, as the continent tried to address such interrelated causes of conflicts, the 
concept of an African peace and security architecture started to emerge in the late 
1990s. The APSA is meant to include all decision-making processes, structures and 
values aimed at “the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, 
post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent”454 Arguably, the AU is 
the APSA’s main institutional platform. So far, however, its record is mixed at best. 
This section sketches its origins since the transition from the OAU to the AU, as well 
as internal and external responses to conflicts.  
When the OAU was established in 1963, at its core lay the desire to liberate the 
continent from white rule and find a common Pan-African identity.455 While security 
was indeed a major concern of the founders, the concept was understood strictly in 
terms of state interests—in the form of territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the 
protection of state boundaries. This resulted in the organisation essentially acting as a 
“protection club” for statist values, often neglecting (or ignoring) human rights and the 
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rule of law.456 In the post-Cold war era, when Western powers shifted their attention 
from Africa to other regions (Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, China), the UN was 
often over-burdened by requests to intervene in continental conflicts, and therefore 
started calling for increased regional engagement.457 The OAU, which was expected 
to respond to these needs, was not able to provide strong leadership nor take significant 
actions to address conflicts, mostly because it was still inspired by Cold War institutions 
that became incompatible with post-Cold War realities.458 
With the aim of performing the tasks the OAU could not handle and in the hope 
to create a stronger feeling of African unity, the AU took its place in 2002.459 The 
organisation was institutionally modelled upon the EU and primarily seeks the unity 
of the continent, the promotion of a larger market to make Africa more competitive in 
international economy, and addresses the continent’s plethora of security challenges.460 
The transition between the OAU to the AU and the emergence of the APSA, 
according to Williams, “occurred within a broader set of normative debates that took 
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place in Africa (and beyond) about how best to respond to armed conflict and mass 
atrocities. In particular, the introspection that followed the 1994 Rwanda genocide was 
a major catalyst in prompting the subsequent shift in the normative climate of the 
African society of states.”461 In this regard, as stated in Article 4 of its Constitutive Act 
the Union has the right “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.”462 Recently, “the AU has departed from the passive policy of non-
interference to the more proactive policy of non-indifference to issues of human 
[in]security.”463 
Besides regional and continental efforts from the part of the AU, the continent 
has also experienced several waves of foreign intervention, which Schmdit believes 
have exacerbated some African conflicts and harmed indigenous populations.464 The 
history of foreign involvement in the continent has deep roots in the first commercial 
and cultural exchanges between Europe and Africa; this is mostly a history of loss and 
dispossession, which culminated in externally driven slave trades, to the point that the 
distinction between involvement and intervention often becomes blurred. Furthermore, 
the economic inequality between African and industrialised countries persisted after 
independence in a neo-colonial system, and when African nations turned to Western 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, their aid came with conditions attached.465 Related, conflicts in the post-Cold 
War period generally saw a rise in negotiated settlements. 466 However, peacemaking 
in Africa is often affected by the lack of an official political doctrine and a roadmap on 
how to conduct mediation processes. Furthermore, the outcomes have not always been 
positive and cases such as Angola in 1992, Rwanda in 1993, Sierra Leone in 1999, and 
Darfur in 2006 serve as a warning that mediation can sometimes worsen crises. Power-
sharing agreements have often been criticised as they rarely produce stable peace and 
lack transformative capacity: They tend to include all armed factions but 
simultaneously exclude ordinary citizens and civil society; and they incentivise violence 
by providing rebel factions with a share of power in negotiation processes, with the 
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unwanted effect of encouraging other groups to take up arms against governments. 
The key challenge is instead to promote long-term stability by demilitarising politics467 
and marginalising groups that use violence to attain power.468 
Similarly, peacekeeping operations produced mixed results in the continent, 
where over 60 missions took place between 1990 and 2009, with most operations prior 
to 2002 being conducted by sub-regional organisation, particularly the Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). However, since regional organisations were not 
well prepared for such operations, they suffered from serious deficiencies. It was partly 
after the Black Hawk Down episode in Mogadishu in 1993, leading to a descaling of 
US humanitarian efforts in the region, that it became clear to leaders on the continent 
that African problems required African solutions. This rhetoric started to have great 
resonance, because it recalled anti-imperial and anti-colonial sentiments by 
representing “a normative defence of the pluralist conception of international society 
and a rejection of neo-colonial enterprises.” 469 It has since then come to signal the 
desire of African institutions to lead conflict management activities, while still 
welcoming external assistance.470  
The problem of financial ownership remains perhaps the most important. As the 
AU Peace and Security Department knows all too well, the “APSA still suffers from 
the absence of financial ownership by the AUC and [regional economic 
communities/regional mechanisms], and from a high dependency on donors and 
international partners. This problem is due to two main reasons: the Member States’ 
contribution to Peace Fund is low and the APSA has attracted very limited additional 
funding from alternative sources of finance.”471 In the realm of peacekeeping missions, 
a new norm has established itself whereby African states provide the bulk of the 
personnel, while other (external) actors provide funding, training, logistics, and 
planning support—a practice that has been called ‘partnership peacekeeping’.472 As 
the AU recently committed to fund 25% of its own peace operations, the US proposed 
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to explore a standing UN commitment to support AU-led peace support operations 
that have been authorised by the UN Security Council. Such support would take the 
form of UN-assessed contributions and would cover 75% of the costs of the 
operations.473 These partnerships are thus mostly carried out between the AU and the 
UN, the EU, the RECs, and other American and European institutions. China, on the 
other hand, has so far preferred to engage in bilateral relations with selected regimes.474 
And yet, as the next section explores, in the last few years Beijing has shown greater 
interest in embracing multilateralism to address peace and security issues.  
While the AU has indeed committed to a process of comprehensive reforms, de 
Coning suggests that some of these will have direct impact on relationships with key 
partners, the extent of which depends on each specific context.475 Two aspects of the 
reform package in particular are likely to directly impact partnership arrangements: 
The first proposal suggests “that instead of all the African countries meeting regularly 
with partners, such as during the … FOCAC, or the … [Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development] TICAD, only the Troika, the AUC Chairperson, 
the Chairpersons of the RECs and the Chairperson of [New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development] NEPAD, should represent Africa at these bilateral summits. … The 
second proposal is aimed at reducing the presence of partners at the AU Assemblies. … 
This aspect of the reforms is intended to reduce the transaction costs of partnership 
summits as well as the impact of partner delegations at AU Assemblies.”476 While it is 
likely that a more nuanced formula will be agreed on, foreign countries may not have 
as easy access to AU’s decisions as it has been the case so far.  
Moreover, since the AU has become reliant on its multilateral and bilateral 
partners for its Peace Support Operations (PSOs) expenditure, “[t]he financial reform 
package is aimed at addressing the dependence on international partners by 
introducing an alternative financing model that is meant to generate self-sustainable 
funding for the Union and increase the ownership of its Member States.”477 Ownership 
of security and reform of the AU were also the central themes of this year’s Tana High-
Level Forum: African leaders agreed that lasting solutions have to be homegrown. The 
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Chairperson of the AUC defined ownership as “the need for efficiency, innovation of 
responses, and sustainability of solutions locally sourced and fitting to the context of 
African problems”.478 During a meeting of the Eastern Africa Standby Force in July 
2018, AU military chiefs have expressed concern over the involvement of foreign 
powers in regional conflicts and the growing number of foreign military bases.479 AU 
leaders are aware that being able to finance their own security agenda will translate in 
reducing dependence on external donors and foreign intervention; as will be shown 
later in this chapter, this dependency and the intended reforms profoundly affect 
China-AU relations and the scope of Chinese normative power within the organisation. 
Lastly, with respect to African ownership of conflict management, an important 
element is the fact that the AU and the RECs “are not living up to the political, 
financial, and military implications of their self-declared primacy in matters of African 
security cooperation.”480 The institutional development of such security cooperation, 
Franke and Gänzle argue, “seems to be sponsored by Western norms, ideas and 
templates for regional integration to a much greater deal than was anticipated.”481 
What they identify is therefore a gap between the use of the discourse around African 
security and the failure to implement it. Increasingly, though, the regionalisation of 
conflict in the continent has contributed to the emergence of regional peacekeeping 
alongside the presence of the UN.482  The new prominence gained by subnational 
actors, such as rebel groups and mercenaries, has led to the spread of new armed 
conflict practices; this, in turn, has influenced patterns of involvement and response to 
such conflicts, on the part of both external and subregional actors. Since many conflicts 
believed to be of a ‘domestic’ nature often spill over into neighbouring countries or 
create regional war zones, the UN has been weak in finding appropriate solutions and 
regional organisations have thus stepped in. From the early 1990s, with the first 
regional peacekeeping mission in Liberia led by ECOWAS and then the AU’s missions 
in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, and Comoros, the past two decades have seen increased 
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regional peacekeeping intervention.483  Hence, though originally born as economic 
formations, the RECs have become key actors in peace and security. 484 
Since continental organisations are at the forefront of efforts to promoting peace 
and security and building the APSA, they have also become essential platforms in 
defining norms on intervention and conflict management. Consequently, “both 
Western countries and China are trying to exert influence over the outcome of norm-
formulation processes and specific conflict resolution initiatives in Africa. While the 
West has used its financial aid to shape Africa’s regional security infrastructure, China 
has mostly provided diplomatic support in international forums.”485 The next section 
addresses China’s contributions to the AU in more detail. 
 
5.3 What role for China? 
Whilst China’s relations with African countries have traditionally relied on 
bilateral relations and, after 2000, on FOCAC meetings, changes in the multilateral 
political landscape of the continent have led China to adapt its preferred mode of 
engagement and step up its cooperation with regional organisations.486 On the one 
hand, “China’s interaction with regional bodies should not be overestimated. Above 
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all, the regional dimension of Chinese involvement in Africa does not come at the 
expense of bilateral relations, which is what China currently values most.”487 On the 
other hand, China does promote a greater role for African regional organisations in 
conflict resolution and it considers them better equipped to make judgments on the 
internal affairs of member countries.488 China has found that increased engagement 
with regional organisations provides a good way of responding to international 
pressures and expectations, while simultaneously advancing its own views on peace 
and security.489 Deflecting international criticism for entertaining relations with pariah 
states such as Sudan or Zimbabwe is easier for China when it aligns its policies to those 
of the AU or other organisations.490 In this sense, its support for regional organisations 
can be seen as purely instrumental: it encourages their work and endorses regional 
solutions to conflicts to boost its image and protect its economic interests, and, 
increasingly, its citizens.491 Yet, the South-South cooperation discourse still plays an 
important role both in China’s policies towards the AU and the RECs and in the 
promotion of a ‘Chinese way’ of conflict management—for instance, by finding 
resolution models that respect state sovereignty.492 
Increased involvement with the AU also brings about other benefits. As 
Benabdallah argues, “closer co-operation with the AU commission provides Beijing an 
opportunity to tap into the expertise of the African Union Peace and Security Council 
and its knowledge of the intricacies involved in different conflicts.”493 To be sure, 
challenges still remain, namely in the form of consensus-building and follow-up 
mechanisms. Managing the concerns and priorities of over 50 members is a daunting 
task and it is often hard to negotiate a unified multilateral agenda. Moreover, the lack 
of formal follow-up mechanisms makes it difficult to carry on project evaluation—
neither does the AU have enough power to enforce implementation of such 
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mechanisms in member states.494 Interestingly, as it emerged in one of my interviews, 
Chinese diplomats seemed to be under the impression that establishing a dedicated 
mission to the organisation and thus increasing their diplomatic presence there, would 
translate into the capacity to “catch two birds with one stone.”495 
Until a few years ago, China’s support for the AU and RECs was limited to 
diplomacy, financial and logistical contributions, and military assistance at the bilateral 
level. In 2005, China appointed representatives to ECOWAS, Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the AU, and SADC.496 Strategic dialogues 
and multilateral consultation mechanisms have also been in place: the first AU-China 
Strategic Dialogue was held in Addis Ababa in 2008, while the last one took place in 
Beijing in February 2018.497 As regards its financial contributions, mainly in the forms 
of ad hoc grants to the AU, these have been fairly limited with respect to traditional 
donors, especially the US and the EU. However, since 2012, China has increased its 
donations and the construction of the new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in 2012, 
financed by the Chinese government with an investment of USD200 million, was a 
sign of the PRC’s interest in strengthening relations with the organisation. It was 
unfortunate that the building came to be at the centre of renewed debates over China’s 
influence, when the French newspaper Le Monde Afrique accused the country of data 
theft in January 2018.498 According to the newspaper, data had been transferred from 
the headquarters’ computers to servers located in Shanghai during nigh time, over a 
period of five years. Both the Chinese and the African sides have repeatedly denied the 
accusations, but the episode did represent a thorn in the side of China’s otherwise 
smooth AU diplomacy record.499 
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Figure 3 The AU Conference Centre and Office complex built by China in 2012 in Addis Ababa; the picture 
is my own 
In FOCAC documents, we find the first mention of security cooperation with 
the AU in the Addis Ababa Action Plan of 2003, under the ‘Peace and Security’ rubric: 
We are resolved to step up cooperation and work together to support an even greater 
role of the United Nations, the African Union and other sub-regional African 
organizations in preventing, mediating and resolving conflicts in Africa. … China will 
continue its active participation in the peacekeeping operations and de-mining process 
in Africa and provide, within the limits of its capabilities, financial and material 
assistance as well as relevant training to the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union. In order to strengthen the capacity of African States to undertake peacekeeping 
operations, we look forward to the strengthening of China’s cooperation with African 
States and Sub-regional organizations in the areas of logistics.500 
We read similar statements in the 2006 Beijing Action Plan,501 and, in 2009, the Sharm 
El Sheikh Action Plan states that 
The two sides applauded the important contributions made by the African Union … 
and sub-regional organizations in Africa to actively resolving African issues and 
promoting the African integration process as well as sub-regional economic integration 
and peace and development in Africa. The two sides noted with satisfaction that China 
and the AU have set up and launched the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism and agreed to 
exchange views on China-Africa relations and other major issues through this 
mechanism. They support the AU in playing a bigger role in regional and international 
affairs.502 
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In 2012, not only did China build the new organisations’ headquarters, but it also 
committed RMB600 million in free assistance to the AU within three years starting 
from then.503 In addition,  
To enhance cooperation with Africa on peace and security issues, the Chinese side will 
launch the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security” 
and will provide, within the realm of its capabilities, financial and technical support to 
the African Union for its peace-support operations, the development of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture, personnel exchanges and training in the field of peace 
and security and Africa’s conflict prevention, management and resolution and post-
conflict reconstruction and development.504 
In the 6th Forum Action Plan, it is argued that 
The Chinese side continues to support the African Union, its Regional Economic 
Communities and other African sub-regional institutions that play a leading role in 
coordinating and solving issues of peace and security in Africa and further continues to support and 
advocate for African solutions to African challenges without interference from outside the continent. The 
Chinese side will provide the AU with USD60 million of free military assistance over 
the next three years, support the operationalization of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture, including the operationalization of the African Capacity for the 
Immediate Response to Crisis and the African Standby Force. The two sides will 
maintain the momentum of mutual visits by defence and military leaders, continue to 
deepen exchanges on technologies and expand personnel training and joint trainings 
and exercises.505 
President Xi also reiterated continued support for UN peacekeeping missions 
and for capacity building in the areas of defence, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, 
customs, and immigration control.506 Relations between China and the AU have thus 
predominantly been focusing on peace and security since the beginning. In 2014, when 
welcoming Premier Li Keqiang to the AU headquarters, the then chairperson of the 
AUC Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made a statement that reflects the discourse around 
historical ties between China and Africa: 
This strategic and unique relationship is an expression of a long, deep and enduring solidarity 
between Africa and China. It was built in the long walk of Africa’s struggles against 
colonialism and foreign domination, and Africa’s pursuit for self-determination, 
freedom, justice, peace and prosperity. […] The Africa Union considers China’s 
cooperation with Africa a model of a win-win partnership, based on mutual respect and aimed at 
producing tangible results in areas of common interest.507  
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In June 2017, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met with Moussa Faki 
Mahamat in the Ethiopian capital. Together they identified five priority areas for 
future cooperation between China and the AU, among which are peace and security. 
The two also discussed the issues of military assistance, enhancing Africa’s capability 
to address security concerns and peacekeeping operations, supporting African 
solutions to African problems, and continued promotion of the UN’s role in advancing 
the cause of independent peacekeeping solutions “made in Africa”.508 Wang Yi stressed 
that such priority areas are “in full compliance with the current needs of Africa, in line 
with the urgent aspirations of the African people and the strategic direction mapped 
out in the AU 2063 Agenda.”509 In February 2018, the Chairperson of the AU visited 
Beijing and, in his speech, we find several representations of China-Africa from the 
first and second discursive layers: 
The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to promote multilateralism and the role of the 
United Nations against the backdrop of evolving and complex global challenges. They 
expressed the conviction that their partnership is an example of solidarity among peoples 
based on mutual respect and benefits, noting that Africa and China together represent more 
than one third of humanity and share a history of external domination – in this respect, the 
African Union Commission delegation reiterated its gratitude to China for its support 
to the liberation of the Continent. They agreed to proactively work towards a better 
representation of Africa in the international system, including in the United Nations Security Council, as 
part of a new global governance system.510 
Soon afterwards in May 2018, Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
National People’s Congress of the PRC, visited Addis Ababa and met with ambassador 
Kwesi Quartey, deputy chairperson of the AUC. The two used the meeting to renew 
commitments to further promote multilateralism and deepen the AU-China strategic 
partnership.511  Moreover, during the 7th FOCAC Summit, the AUC Chairperson 
formally launched the much-anticipated AU representational office in Beijing by 
unveiling a plaque inaugurating the mission.512 The AU Chairperson also joined 37 
African countries in signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with China 
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expressing the intention to jointly develop the BRI and inject new impetus in China-
Africa cooperation, as well as align the BRI with Agenda 2063, Agenda 2030, and the 
development strategies of African countries.513 In general, the announcements made 
during the Summit pointed towards increased cooperation especially in fields of peace 
and security and capacity building. Alongside the commitments to peacekeeping 
mentioned above, China also pledged to help providing training “to improve African 
law enforcers’ ability to safeguard the security of major domestic economic projects 
and protect the safety of Chinese nationals, Chinese companies and major projects.”514 
While these measures are mostly associated to specific Belt and Road security 
cooperation, other areas are also covered. Xi promised 50 security assistance 
programmes in the areas of law and order, fighting piracy, and combating terrorism. 
These will include more defense and military personnel training; sharing intelligence, 
technology, and experience; enhanced cooperation on military medical science; anti-
corruption capacity building; provision of training and equipment for police forces and 
short-term law enforcement training courses; and the creation of a China-Africa Law 
Enforcement and Security Forum. While there are no indications whether these 
assistance programme will be carried out via the AU or through bilateral agreements, 
it is clear that the focus of China-Africa ties is shifting to more peace and security 
cooperation. Similarly, capacity building also has assumed a big role in recent years 
and will continue to be at the centre of future exchanges.515 It is interesting to note that 
a recent report of the EU Court of Auditors has called for a refocusing of the EU’s 
funding to the AU from supporting basic operational costs (mostly paying staff salaries) 
towards capacity building measures.516 Questioning the effectiveness of EU’s funding 
so far and its lack of clear priorities and long-term vision, the report recommends to 
shift to “well-targeted capacity-building programmes” and to link such support to 
improvements in the way in which the AU and sub-regional organisations work.517 
There are therefore signs that both China and the EU are looking into new ways of 
engaging the AU; it remains to be seen whether this is an area for potential future 
trilateral cooperation and what will be the real impact of the proposed AU reforms 
mentioned above. 
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The narrative that China’s support for the AU responds to the needs of the 
continent does not only emerge from documents but has also come up in my interviews 
with AU officials and Addis-based researchers. Some claim that while Washington 
“dictates” to African countries what to do in a father-figure fashion, China does not 
name-and-shame, but rather relies on quiet diplomacy.518 On the one hand, no one 
denies that the Chinese have their own agenda (i.e. protecting their interests and 
citizens); on the other hand, they are often seen by Africans as providing a better 
alternative to the West because “they accept Africa as  it is […] and Africans are not 
choosing which master is better, but rather which partner is better”.519 Many reject the 
Western criticism that China represents a somehow ‘imposed’ choice simply because 
it offers aid and investments without ties attached, and rebut that Africans are free to 
decide whom to partner with, based on the quality of a proposal rather than the 
conditionalities that come with it. A British diplomat from the EU delegation to 
Ethiopia insisted that Africans are not passive actors in negotiations with Chinese 
companies or government and are instead well aware of the opportunities and the risks 
that come with Chinese deals.520 One AUC-UNECA adviser further pointed out that 
the African elite is increasingly sharing with China the belief that development leads 
to security in the long-term, another sign that the security-development nexus has 
started to being internalised by many policy makers in the continent. She also 
maintained that there is a sense of renewed confidence in Africa: the people believe 
that improvements need to come from within their own countries and that it can, and 
needs to, happen without support from the West.521 One AU officer holds the opinion 
that China’s engagement in the continent puts Africa in a better position in 
international affairs,522 and AU’s Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga confirms the 
widely shared view that Africans are pursuing equal-to-equal relations and the AU is 
taking active responsibility in identifying and prioritising the areas where funding is 
needed, thus setting the course of the partnership. Though the Chinese may not be 
“the perfect partners”, they are normally meeting the AU’s expectations: the Africans, 
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he said, are not accepting anything less and they do not feel like China is imposing 
anything on them.523  
One senior officer at the Peace and Security Department argued that “we need 
to debunk the myth that China comes to Africa telling us what to do, that they are 
scoping around our natural resources, and that we are just passive in all of this.”524 
While acknowledging that the AU still does not have enough power to set the norms 
on every aspect of peace and security and that a lot of activities are still negotiated at 
the bilateral level, he argued that it is the organisation which decides how to allocate 
Chinese funding and does not simply receive that without any agency. African 
governments are now increasingly pushing back on several issues: he mentioned, 
among others, requests to import less labour force from China and instead employ 
more local workers in infrastructure, and requests to improve the quality and standards 
of the work and products provided by Chinese companies involved in infrastructure 
projects. Another important point he made was that China had not shown interest in 
“improving” policy making in the continent—which is not to say that they have no 
influence on such matters; rather, he believes, they do it via quiet diplomacy and soft 
power. In giving the example of Confucius Institutes, this seemed to be his main 
concern: The quick spread of the Institutes may potentially represent an element of 
“cultural imperialism” paired with big waves of migration from China to African 
countries.525 However, he also praised the AU and the RECs for taking “very robust 
instruments to deal with issues of governance, democracy, and human rights on the 
continent” and he did not think that Chinese investments were undermining those 
values. We also discussed the role of the AU vis-à-vis bilateral relations and his opinion 
was that peace and security is probably the area where multilateralism has been more 
successful. In this sense, he considers China’s support for Africa’s position at the UNSC 
a measure of such success (a point to which I return in the following chapter). In sum, 
he argued, China is unlikely to have either a positive or negative impact on the 
democratisation and institutionalisation processes that are already in place throughout 
the continent.526 These views are also confirmed by recent statements given by the 
AUC Chairperson and the AU Chair for 2018. Addressing the 7th FOCAC Summit, 
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the AUC Chairperson said that the eight initiatives and the USD60 pledge announced 
were “concrete proofs of China’s support to Africa” and added that “[we]e need to 
further create synergy between the AU’s Agenda 2063 and the Belt and Road Initiative. 
The AU welcomes the Belt and Road Initiative.”527 In the same occasion, Rwandan 
President commented that China and Africa share a common aspiration for 
development and stability. He maintained that “China has been a supportive friend 
for Africa for a long time … The reform should build our capacities and make the partnership 
more meaningful. We are looking to China to strengthen us in this quest for unity, 
independence and efficiency.”528 And, responding to accusations of China creating a 
debt-trap for African countries, he argued that the concept was fabricated in an 
attempt to discourage relations between them and that “those criticizing China on debt 
give too little”, while Africa needs the funding to build capacity for development.529 
To be sure, some of my interviewees hold less positive views of China’s support 
to peace and security via the AU. A senior researcher (1) from the ISS believes that the 
main problem with Chinese engagement is their preference for elite-to-elite relations; 
in his opinion, members of the Chinese government often bypass their own 
ambassadors on the ground and prefer to deal directly with the heads of African states 
instead.530 Another issue he highlighted was the institutional weakness of the AU; even 
the commissioners, according to him, are only able to operate within the limits of what 
the member states allow for. Despite deepened cooperation, what he calls the “cultural 
take” still represents a barrier: Because of their lack of exposure to the continent, as 
compared to Western countries, the Chinese often do not understand the ethnic or 
religious roots of many conflicts; their knowledge of specific regions and their 
institutions is, he said, equally lacking.531 Another senior researcher at the ISS, echoed 
his concern about the state-to-state character of China-Africa relations; in this sense, 
China’s approach to the AU still needs to be defined and perfectioned.532 As the 
Chinese mission to the AU was created to speed up the learning process of dealing with 
multilateralism effectively, it was a first step in such a direction. Bedzigui still expressed 
doubts about the non-interference policy: China’s increased contributions will 
eventually lead to greater political engagement. However, he does not have the 
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impression that Chinese leaders and foreign policy makers have any policy priorities 
when it comes to Africa (as opposed to Western countries that have a more targeted 
and selective approach to their financial contributions).533 One Western diplomat at 
the EU delegation to the AU shared a similar concern that the China model is mostly 
advantageous to the elites, whom, in turn, are slowly starting to realise that the Chinese 
approach has issues as much as the “Washington consensus”.534  
Hence, while views on China’s engagement are varied (though mostly positive), 
it seemed that many shared a kind of wait-and-see attitude. Since the 
institutionalisation of the China-AU partnership is recent, no one was keen on drawing 
rushed conclusions. In general, it can be concluded that both documents and 
interviews point to an increasingly shared Chinese and African security-development 
model, which is simultaneously a product of independent initiative on the part of 
Africans and support from China in the form of assistance in the peace and security 
realm.  
 
5.3.1 The UN-AU partnership: The China link 
Finally, the last section of this chapter performs two roles: first, it addresses an 
important element of multilateral cooperation on peace and security and second, it 
acts as a bridge between this and the following chapter. Cooperation between the UN 
and the AU is another recent phenomenon, but one which is increasingly intensifying. 
According to Boutellis and Williams, the basis for such relationship lies in the mutual 
recognition of several facts, namely that peace and security challenges in the continent 
have occupied most of the UN agenda of the last decade; the recognition of the primary, 
but not exclusive, role of the UN in maintaining international peace; and related, the 
acknowledgment that no organisation can deal with such complex challenges alone.535  
Formally initiated in 2006 by a framework agreement, UN assistance to the AU 
began as part of a Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme.536 Its main objectives were 
the enhancement of institutional and technical capacities, as well as cooperation 
between the UN, the AU, and the RECs.537 Subsequent triennial reviews were carried 
out, generally acknowledging the positive impact of the UN on the capacity building 
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needs of the continent at various levels, but also the limitations of both institutions in 
addressing challenges effectively.538 While the third triennial review is yet to be released 
and the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme (TYCBP) came to an end in 2016, 
the UNGA adopted a new UN-AU Partnership for Africa’s Integration and 
Development Agenda (PAIDA) 2017-2027 as the successor framework of the TYCBP. 
PAIDA is supposed to serve as an overall platform for UN-AU cooperation as regards 
Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.539 The second AU-
UN Conference held in Addis Ababa July 2017 further agreed on the continued 
promotion of the integration between the two agendas.540 
PAIDA’s mandate covers as many as thirteen thematic areas, among which is, 
not surprisingly, peace and security. On this regard, in April 2017, UN Secretary-
General António Guterres and AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat signed a 
framework to enhance cooperation between the two organisations. 541  Under the 
agreement, the UN and the AU are set to “collaborate from the earliest indications of 
conflict on the African continent” and, should preventive measures fail, “work together 
throughout the stages of conflict management”.542 The report echoes earlier calls for 
more systematic and strategic relations, including Secretary-General’s report on 
strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and 
security in Africa, released in September 2016, 543  as well as previous UNSC 
resolutions. 544  Both organisations share the commitment to look for “sustainable 
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political solutions in keeping with international standards and principles” and both 
believe that any peace and security effort should respect the fundamental principles of 
“the protection of civilians, the promotion of human rights standards and the 
prevention of human rights violations, as well as respect for international humanitarian 
law.”545 
Following the signing of the joint report, China hosted an open UNSC debate 
on “Enhancing African Capacities in the Area of Peace and Security” in July 2017; 
arguably, peace and security represents “[o]ne of the priorities of China’s Council 
presidency”.546 The PRC sees itself as one of the major international actors in the 
efforts to build a stronger UN-AU relation. As argued by Mariani and Wheeler, China 
has always “put emphasis on the need for greater co-operation between the United 
Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations towards the maintenance of 
international peace and security.” 547  According to Ambassador Wang Guangya, 
“regional organizations have unique advantages in dealing with problems in their 
respective regions …[and] we should strengthen mutual assistance and give 
prominence to Africa. Many issues on the Security Council’s agenda relate to 
Africa. … The necessary financial resources and logistical and technical support must 
be provided with a view to strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and 
African regional and subregional organizations so that the peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding capacities of those organizations can be enhanced.”548 
This also reflects a broader rationale for China to engage in international 
collaboration and cooperation, after recognising that multilateralism can also be an 
instrument in safeguarding its interests.549 Comments from the Chinese ambassador to 
the UN Liu Jieyi echo familiar elements of Beijing’s position on issues of peace, security, 
and intervention: respect for the role of African countries in resolving “hotspot issues”; 
improvement of the cooperation mechanisms between the two institutions, especially 
in the key areas of conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict 
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reconstruction; and sustained support for the AU’s capacity building.550 Furthermore, 
a greater role for China might be prompted by America’s recent behaviour: As its 
contributions to the UN are being cut and preference is given to bilateral relations over 
multilateral commitments, according to De Carvalho and Connolly “the financing side 
of the AU-UN partnership is left without a UN Security Council champion.”551 While 
I address China’s use of its UNSC permanent seat to support Africa’s positions on 
international affairs in the next chapter, it will suffice here to say that its eagerness to 
take active part in such debates shows an interest in supporting multilateral efforts to 
tackle peace and security in the continent. Its increasing contributions to peace 
operations and the risks associated with them have raised awareness among the 
Chinese leadership of the challenges of financing and coordinating such complex 
missions, and I argue that China’s self-positioning at the frontline of diplomatic efforts 
is an important element in its attempt to becoming a norms-maker in international 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding—an argument that I further explore in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the second level of China’s Africa diplomacy in order 
to identify the major elements of the cooperation between China and the African 
Union. I have traced China’s Africa discourse and its main representations in AU-
related texts and through my interviews, to unpack how the main narratives hold at 
the continental level. As argued earlier, the continental organisation is acknowledged 
both by China and other international partners as the chief actor in maintaining peace 
and security in the region. While it still suffers from several structural, organisational, 
and financial issues there is increasing consensus over a number of reforms that would 
make it less dependent on external partners and funding. China is following the 
footsteps of other countries, mostly from the EU, and is now attaching greater 
importance to its cooperation with the AU. Whilst the PRC traditionally prefers 
bilateral mechanisms, its support for the AU and the RECs has substantially increased 
throughout the last decade, motivated the belief that international cooperation can 
best serve the interest of both Africa and China. On the one hand, African elites share 
China’s emphasis on the security-development nexus; the sense of belonging to the 
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same group of developing countries, the shared history of colonialism at the hands of 
the West, and China’s central position in many diplomatic efforts to tackle conflicts in 
the last decade (i.e. in Sudan) give the PRC a (perceived) advantage other powers do 
not have. On the other hand, its engagement with the AU is relatively new and, as seen 
in some of the interviews above, most of China’s AU initiatives are aimed at getting 
more familiar with continental security structures. While generous announcements 
and multimillion-dollar buildings make for catchy news headlines, it would take a lot 
more for this partnership to become truly effective. Furthermore, the programme of 
AU reforms ultimately aims to reduce financial and political dependency on external 
partners and could thus reduce foreign participation in AU’s decisions in the long term. 
As Mehler puts it, “[a]lthough a majority of peace-keeping troops deployed in Africa’s 
crises are from Asia or Africa, their mission is conceived somewhere else, most of the 
time in the United Nation headquarters in New York, in Brussels, or in Paris. This has 
impact on the way security is conceptualized.”552 It is thus significant that nowadays, 
conversations on African ownership over its peace and security provision are 
happening with increasing momentum across and within the continent.  
Arguably, as Ukeje and Tariku suggest, maintaining a constant presence at the 
AU and engagement with its officials can prove decisive in developing stronger 
relations. For instance, they point out that Western experts are often found at the AU 
Peace and Security Department on relatively long-term posts: By working, and thus 
socialising, on a regular basis they are in a better position to develop shared values and 
practices. Exchanges and official visits between Chinese and African officials have 
indeed increased in number and frequency and this is a clear signal that the PRC does 
not wish to be left behind and is aiming for an ‘upstream’, norm-setting contribution 
to the conception, planning, and deployment stages of peace and security initiatives.553 
However, the status of partnerships and agreements with external actors is changing: 
While it is likely that they will not be altered substantially, they are undoubtedly 
evolving. For these reasons, I argue that China’s normative power at the AU is limited, 
at least for the time being, as compared to its role at the FOCAC and at the UN 
Security Council, which the next chapter explores in more detail.  
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Chapter 6 – China’s Africa discourse goes global: The 
United Nations Security Council 
 
Peace is costly but it is worth the expense. 
(Kenyan proverb) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 is the last piece of the empirical puzzle that prompted this thesis. Here, 
I take China’s Africa discourse to the global level and enquire into how it has been 
articulated at the UN Security Council, the chief multilateral organisation China uses 
to promote its foreign security policies. The chapter is divided into two parts. In the 
first, which serves as a background for China’s engagement with the UN, I first give 
an overview of China’s path into international organisations since 1971; second, I 
explore the crucial role of the Council in providing China with a global institutional 
platform for the promotion of its peace and security discourse; third, I briefly discuss 
the PRC’s contributions to UN-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the two areas 
that are most relevant to its Africa policies. In the second part of the chapter, following 
the third analytical step as outlined in the Introduction to the thesis, I trace China’s 
Africa discourse as it develops at the UN by looking at official documents and speeches, 
as well as practitioners’ views as they emerge from fieldwork interviews in New York. 
The aim is to trace the three layers of China’s Africa discourse as articulated at the 
global level, after having already examined the regional and the continental 
dimensions. I conclude by arguing that, not surprisingly, China’s behaviour at the UN 
in the last two decades tends to be system-maintaining, supported by the stable “South-
South cooperation” discourse. At the heart of the country’s UN diplomacy lie the 
security-development nexus, respect for state sovereignty and non-interference (albeit 
flexible), and support for multilateralism and international institutions, which, as 
argued in Chapter 4, constitute essential tenets of its Africa discourse and policies. 
Simultaneously, the UN has seen a transformation of its peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding practices towards the ‘sustaining peace agenda’, which aims to prioritise 
prevention and sustainable development. Thus, the organisation’s shift from a reactive 
to a proactive approach to conflicts has converged with China’s aversion to 
interventionism. Such a convergence is the result of both ongoing debates at the UNSC 
and China’s increased participation in such debates over the last few years. 
 
 154 
6.2 China in international organisations 
Since the 1980s, China has undergone a process of progressive opening up to 
international institutions, a feature that has become a key element of its multilateral 
approach to foreign policy, arguably marking a sharp departure from the isolationist 
policies adopted during the first few decades following the founding of the PRC.554 Its 
foreign policy of intensified diplomacy and linkages with other states roughly began in 
the 1990s, mostly as a means to mitigating the damage created by the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square massacre,555 as well as a way of reaping the benefits of adopting a neutral stance 
on the Gulf War of 1991. 556  Since then, Beijing has developed relations with 
international regimes in three stages. First, avoidance and suspicion in the period 
between the founding of the PRC and the 1970s; an alienation which, Kent suggests, 
had more to do with UN members rejecting its role as the sole representative of China, 
than with the policy choices of the communist government.557 Second, cautious and 
conservative opening to institutions, mainly of an economic nature (i.e. the IMF) in the 
1980s. And third, post-Tiananmen and post-Cold war expansion of China’s 
engagement with international institutions. A fourth, more recent phase that had 
begun in the 2000s, Lanteigne argues, involves sophisticated and confident use of 
institutions to advance its power in international relations.558 From a slightly different 
angle, Kim interprets China’s path within the UN in the 1970s in terms of its attitudes 
towards international regimes: First, China assumed a system-transforming posture in 
the 1960s, especially after its quest for international recognition vis-à-vis Taiwan had 
repeatedly failed and Chinese leaders called for a ‘revolutionary’ UN. 559  Such 
campaign reached its peak when Mao, in 1969 and 1970, openly declared he wished 
to improve relations with countries in the Third World as well as with the United States: 
This initiated a phase of ‘ping-pong diplomacy’, which included two visits of Henry 
Kissinger in preparation for the meeting between Mao and Nixon. 560  Second, 
throughout the 1970s China took on a system-reforming approach, when it treated the 
UN and other regimes mostly as an arena for the promotion of anti-hegemonic (read, 
anti-Soviet) struggles. Third, system-maintaining in the 1980s, when the leadership 
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showed more interest in the benefits it could obtain towards its own modernization 
rather than in reforming the system.561 
The most immediate impact of China’s entry into the UN in 1971 was symbolic: 
On the one hand, its admittance served as a reminder of the end of Pax Americana in 
the organisation; on the other hand, within the UN system there was a general feeling 
of enthusiasm that the admission of China, representing one-fifth of humanity at the 
time, made the UN more representative and more able to deal with global problems.562 
Soon after joining the organisation, China was also recognised by a range of other IOs. 
First, in the years before 1978, its foreign policy seemed still inhibited by the Cultural 
Revolution, and the organisations it joined during those years were mostly technical, 
scientific, and educational (such as the International Labour Organization, ILO, and 
United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP). Second, between 1977 and 1983, 
the PRC saw an increase in its membership of international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) (including the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, 
and the International Olympic Committee, IOC). The third phase was the one that 
truly saw the move towards full-scale participation, and China entered more politically 
sensitive bodies, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the Conference on 
Disarmament.563 Subsequently, China joined a diverse range of international bodies 
with different characteristics and scope, and the literature is rich in accounts of many 
of those.564 
While some scholars suggest that Beijing cooperates with institutions in a 
conservative way and only under very specific circumstances (for instance, informality, 
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lack of a clear mandate, compatibility with its own domestic interests), 565  these 
conclusions are being continuously challenged by recent Chinese behaviour towards 
international institutions.566 To be sure, China’s newcomer status in IOs required a 
steep learning curve in the last thirty years: the PRC normally prefers to use bilateral 
mechanisms for the resolution of interstate or intrastate conflict, and views 
international relations more from a realist than a liberal perspective.567 Nonetheless, 
leaders in Beijing have gradually come to accept that IOs also provide a stage for the 
country to project its power; they constitute a source of prestige, status, and legitimacy 
at the domestic level; and they offer solutions to the problems created by 
globalisation.568 They also serve as the global stage for China to dramatise its national 
role for domestic and international audiences; the government arguably sees the UN 
as the most suitable platform from which to project its world view and foreign policy 
line.569 Kim goes as far as arguing that the UNGA was “the surest and shortest way to 
China’s international forum shopping.”570  
In explaining why China has been such a strong joiner of international regimes 
starting from the 1990s, Nathan underlines that different interests and calculations 
have motivated Chinese policy makers: As regards economic-related regimes, the 
country supposedly joined them to reap the material benefits of membership; as 
regards arms control and disarmament, China would have thought the agreement to 
be beneficial to its security; and as regards the human rights regime, Chinese leaders 
must have understood that there was much to be gained from its position as a UNSC 
permanent member if China was also a member in all regimes closely associated with 
it.571 Similarly to Kim, he also suggests that in joining the international system as a 
whole, the PRC gained access to and influence over it, as well as the opportunity to 
shape its rules and norms. As its power and diplomatic sophistication have increased, 
China has become not only a rule follower, but also a rule shaper. In examining its 
participation in the arms control and disarmament regime, Nathan finds that China 
does not display “a pattern of promoting a distinctive ‘Chinese model’ in the 
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international normative system or an alternative vision of world order”.572 If anything, 
a pattern can be identified of resisting efforts by the US and its allies to shape regimes 
in an unfavourable way toward China and its allies. 
Arguably, the need for peaceful coexistence and stability in China’s large 
periphery has always been an underlying theme of Chinese foreign policy.573 However, 
despite its borders being (relatively) safe, due to increasingly warm relations with both 
Russia and Southeast Asia, China has become more sensitive to perceived externally-
based threats. Its security interests have shifted from traditional strategic concerns 
(state vs state and ideology-based warfare) to more diverse issues, such as economic 
security, arms smuggling, drugs, ethnic unrest, and separatism. It is therefore at the 
regional level that we register the most activity in joining and participating in 
institutions developed to counter threats and preserve stability. According to the ‘new 
security concept’, its security relations with neighbouring countries are aimed at the 
pursuit of common interest, peaceful dialogues, creating common security for all 
regional actors, and discouraging formal alliances or polarising unilateral policies.574 
Despite being more active in the region, Johnston observes that, beginning in the 1980s, 
the rate of increase in China’s accession to international security institutions, especially 
multilateral arms control agreements, grew faster than that at which new security 
institutions had been created.575 In contrast to the hard realpolitik ideology inherited 
from the Mao era, which was being reinforced by the narrative of Chinese 
victimisation, he argues that contemporary decision makers have shifted their 
understanding of participation in security regimes as a result of social interaction and 
as a product of dynamics of identity construction and differentiation.576 As China has 
joined most international institutions that regulate interstate behaviour, so far it has 
not tried to undermine their functioning or purposes.  
On the one hand, the profound effects that IOs have had on China are 
undeniable. Membership in international regimes has enhanced its power, secured its 
participation in globalisation and modernisation, conferred China prestige, status, and 
international and domestic legitimacy. On the other hand, China in turn makes 
normative contributions to IOs, such as strengthening peace and security, promoting 
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dialogue between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’, as well as South-South cooperation.577 
Furthermore, as part of its limited ‘reformist’ goals, China has been attempting to 
empowering the UN as the sole legitimate decision making body to act upon 
translational issues or domestic state failure. 578  Related, the promotion of state 
sovereignty is also part of China’s pursuit of a reform of the current world order. As 
Breslin notes, such defence is clearer in rhetoric than it is in practice: It seems that 
while Chinese leaders increasingly accept that there are grounds for the infringement 
of sovereignty and that the concept itself can be bent, what really seems to be at stake 
is rather regime change.579 However, the recent case of Zimbabwe, among speculations 
of the role the Chinese leadership may or may not have played in the military coup 
that removed Robert Mugabe from office and brought Emmerson Mnangagwa to the 
presidency, perhaps suggests that as much as China dislikes coups, it is willing to turn 
a blind eye on them so long as the new government pledges its ‘loyalty’ to the PRC. 
 
6.3 China and the United Nations Security Council 
Of all UN organs and agencies, China has developed a special relationship with 
the Security Council, not the least because of its position as one of the five permanent 
members. According to Kim, “[b]oth the image and prestige of the Council have been 
substantially enhanced as a result of China’s participation.”580 After its entry, the PRC 
adopted a diplomatic style that was focused on maintaining a low profile and being 
willing to learn the rules of the organisation. Hence, instead of defying or ignoring such 
rules, China attempted to master them for the sake of pursuing its interests and 
principles.581 Thus, on the one hand, the PRC has made the Council more universal, 
representative, and relevant without making it politically ineffective at the same time. 
In sum, China has enhanced both the Council’s political legitimacy and political 
stability.582 Furthermore, the functional paralysis envisioned by many analysists that 
would result from China’s overuse of the veto did not materialise.583 While the use of 
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the veto did increase since its entry, China’s record is one of the best among the 
Permanent Five (P-5).584 
On the other hand, it is more difficult to assess the impact of the Council on 
China’s diplomacy: Its behavioural characteristics suggest that such influence has been 
indirect and subtle. As Kim notes, Chinese policy in the 1970s revealed a discrepancy 
between verbal and voting behaviours: If one were to judge according to the voting 
behaviour, Maoist ideology would be seen as playing a marginal role. If, instead, one 
were to judge its policies according to verbal behaviour, then opportunist pursuit of 
national interests would become more prominent.585 In a later work, discussing China’s 
participation in the UNSC throughout the 1990s, Kim adds that “China has exerted 
considerable leverage, if not normative influence, not by hyperactive positive 
engagement but by following an indeterminate strategy vacillating between tacit 
cooperation and aloofness”586—a practice which has led to abstention becoming a sort 
of normative veto or principled opposition, reflecting what he calls a “maxi/mini 
diplomacy” aimed at maximising benefits while minimising financial responsibilities. 
Chinese representatives have arguably relied on the UN norm of consensus in exerting 
their diplomatic influence, especially within the UNSC, where China would normally 
hint at the dangers of the lack of consensus rather than wielding an outright veto. 
Importantly, though, its influence is also determined by how Beijing is being perceived 
by other member states in its role as a permanent member.587 However, as Lanteigne 
notes, [i]n both economic and political regimes, China at the start of the twenty-first 
century appears to be slowly but perceptibly moving away from Kim’s ‘maxi/mini’ 
principle of engaging institutions to gain the maximum number of rights while 
minimising the associated responsibilities.588  
Wuthnow otherwise defines China’s UNSC behaviour in the 2000s as “a study 
in contradictions”.589 While its voting was converging with other permanent members, 
ideological rhetoric almost disappeared, and its contributions to PKOs rose, China 
also proved to be a contentious actor in some negotiations on rogue regimes. According 
to him, there seemed to be a concern shared by policy makers in the US and Europe 
that China might be seeking to protect its interests by preventing the international 
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community from exerting pressure on rogue regimes condemned for external or 
internal behavior subverting international norms, such as Myanmar or Zimbabwe. 
However, China has also been cooperative, or abstained from voting on resolutions 
that were taking measures against states where its interests are high, such as Libya in 
2011 and North Korea in several instances, and the reality of its diplomacy regarding 
these and other countries has been much more nuanced, expressing a mix of 
interventionist and protectionist elements.590  
This mixed approach should not be surprising. On the one hand, it is in China’s 
interest to pursue cooperation through international institutions. As argued earlier, 
these provide the country with a chance to exercise its role as a responsible power, with 
the leadership responsibilities that come with it, and working within the structures of 
IOs reinforces multilateralism and discourages US unilateralism. On the other hand, 
interventionism directly challenges China’s adherence to the norm of state sovereignty 
and its belief that coercion is not an effective means to settle international disputes. 
However, China has shown elements of pragmatism and adaptability that suggest a 
firmer stance in principle than in practice. Whether China’s cooperativeness in the 
UNSC is assessed by looking at concessions and convergence, shifting preferences, or 
political pressure, Wuthnow’s conclusion is that it is impossible to monolithically 
characterise the PRC as cooperative or confrontational: “impulses towards 
conservatism driven by concerns about sovereignty, the utility of force, and parochial 
interests in these regimes have been tempered by other factors that have led in the 
direction of cooperation.” 591  Today, for instance, China has embarked on an 
unprecedented period of international advocacy motivated by the need to conduct 
foreign policy in a way that is commensurate with its economic standing, where Africa 
serves as a key testing ground.592 
 
6.3.1 China’s contributions to UN-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
Although UN peace and security activities include a variety of initiatives, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding are the two which are most obviously informed by 
the security-development nexus and to which China contributes the most, in terms of 
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both its discourse and practice. In the 1960s, China’s attitude towards UN 
peacekeeping operations was one of strong opposition. Chinese representatives 
described such operations as protecting the interests of imperialism and undermining 
people’s efforts to achieving freedom and independence. Yet, after 1971 such 
opposition became more verbal than real. Generally, China’s stance on peacekeeping 
and enforcement questions during those years exhibited some instances of 
contradiction and inconsistency.593 The maxi/mini principle allowed China to “have 
it both ways”: On the one hand, it would not participate in relevant votes, while on the 
other hand it cooperated in the form of non-interference, i.e. by non-vetoing 
resolutions.594 
According to Kim, the change in the country’s policy on PKOs was part of the 
PRC’s renewed identification with Third World countries and the distancing from the 
US. Embarking on Deng’s economic reforms also contributed to a shift that led to 
intensified participation in UN activities, including peacekeeping. 595  The change 
became clearer throughout the 1980s, Pang maintains, reflecting the fact that Chinese 
leaders’ viewed PKOs through a less ideological and a more functional lens. In the 
1990s, its interest in peacekeeping began to expand steadily, although China was 
initially uncomfortable with PKOs using peace enforcement measures with the aim of 
delivering humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians using “all necessary 
measures”.596 From the late 1990s, however, China became an enthusiastic supporter 
of, and contributor to, several kinds of UN-led missions.597 Nowadays, the extent of 
China’s contributions to PKOs reflects its prominent role in international affairs, as 
well as Xi Jinping’s more assertive diplomacy and his aim to elevate China as a major 
actor in promoting international cooperation. It is noticeable that such increased 
commitment is also reflected in China’s stance on PKOs doctrines, Karlsrud suggests, 
as China has started to even distinguish between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ interventions, 
placing UN peacekeeping in the latter category.598 With regards to such change, it is 
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debatable whether this evolution can be explained in terms of utilitarian desire for 
diplomatic capital, processes of socialisation, or both.599 Some scholars see PKOs as 
part of China’s diplomatic “charm offensive” that also include debt relief, high-level 
exchanges, scholarships, and infrastructure development aid.600 It has also been argued 
that participating in peacekeeping missions helps supporting China’s self-
characterisation as a responsible great power.601 
By contrast, China’s approach to peacebuilding is more cautious: While the PRC 
publicly expresses support for post-conflict reconstruction, it has repeatedly offered its 
own views on how such operations should be carried out, stressing that the primary 
task of peacebuilding should be restoring the administrative functions of a state whilst 
respecting the its rights to define its own priorities.602 As I show in the next section, 
statements on peacebuilding tend to remain vague and have not taken an 
institutionalised form yet, thus translating into a limited direct role for China in 
peacebuilding missions, which represent a more controversial policy involvement than 
peacekeeping.603 However, the PRC’s increasing contributions to the Peacebuilding 
Commission and to the Peacebuilding Fund signal the intention to play a greater role 
in this area as well. Moreover, in 2016 China launched the UN Peace and 
Development Trust Fund, following its pledge to contribute USD200 million over a 
period of ten years.604 China’s contribution will be split evenly between supporting 
peace and security and implementing the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. 
To be sure, as the next section argues, China’s contributions in terms of troops 
or equipment is far less impactful or even important than its discursive and normative 
one. 
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6.4 China’s Africa discourse goes global 
Against the backdrop of increased involvement in the activities of the UNSC, 
China has always advocated for extending African countries’ representation in the 
Council (and in the UN system more broadly); it has been supportive of African 
positions on UN resolutions and agendas; and it has sided with the developing world 
in line with South-South cooperation and solidarity. While the China-Africa literature 
has indeed addressed this, to the best of my knowledge no study so far has delved into 
the discursive aspect of China’s Africa policies at the UN level. Do the main 
representations and narratives of its Africa discourse appear here too? Is China 
contributing to shaping international norms on peacekeeping or peacebuilding? What 
is the PRC’s attitude towards changing UN practices? These and other questions guide 
the remainder of this chapter. The relatively narrow focus of the previous chapters is 
somewhat expanded here: On the one hand, most PKOs are deployed in Africa; on 
the other hand, China’s contributions have broader implications for its own 
relationship with the Council. Thus, while I maintain the emphasis on African issues 
in analysing official documents, the interviews expand on China’s broader UN 
diplomacy. 
In Chapter 4, I identified the main representations that populate China’s Africa 
basic discourse, which I called the “South-South cooperation” discourse, as well as its 
second layer. To summarise, these include: the world system is imbalanced because of 
the technological and economic gaps between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’, causing the 
hegemony of Western powers who dominate international affairs; China and African 
countries are all-weather friends; their history dates back to the Ming dynasty and is 
one of shared colonial subjugation at the hands of Western powers; globalisation is a 
challenge for developing countries which are faced with specific policy priorities and 
are exposed to more risks than developed countries; China supports multilateral 
institutions, particularly the UN, as these can help reduce such gaps and promote 
‘democracy’ (in the sense of a more equal participation of all countries in global 
decision-making); and a focus on the security-development nexus as the key to achieve 
international peace and security. These representations are also found in Chinese 
documents and speeches at the UN.605 
For instance, China’s construction of hegemony and democracy is often 
recurring. According to the main discourse, the domination of developed countries in 
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the current world order has led to the exploitation of developing countries, a group to 
which both China and African states belong. In this context, the role of the UN and 
multilateral organisations is essential, since these institutions are central in promoting 
democracy in international relations. China’s permanent membership of the UNSC 
should serve to reassure developing countries that it will exercise its power to advocate 
for their (common) positions. Chinese leaders are not opposed to consultative-
consensual practices as such; what they oppose is rather the tendency of such practices 
to be dominated by a superpower. It follows that the Chinese conceptualisation of 
consensual decision making is one in which participatory democracy means that all 
Council members are involved on an equal footing in the decision-making process.606 
The representation of hegemony vs democracy takes the form of two main 
narratives in the discourse. First, China often expresses gratitude towards African and 
other developing countries for supporting its position in the UN. At the beginning of 
the 2000s, the PRC was still fighting against Western criticism of its human rights 
conditions at home. For instance, it is thanks to the support of Asian, African, and 
Latin American countries that China could fend off some “anti-China proposals” put 
forward by the West in the 1990s.607 More importantly, African votes guaranteed 
China its seat in 1971, an issue which is often acknowledged by Chinese representatives. 
On this matter, in 2001 then foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan stated that 
China will never forget the unremitting efforts made by African friends for China’s 
resumption of its legitimate seat in the UN, nor their support of China on the Taiwan 
and human rights issues. Though China and Africa are separated by far, the hearts are 
close. Since the last decade or so, Africa has always been the first stop of the annual visits 
abroad by Chinese foreign ministers, which is now a tradition for China’s diplomacy. 
China will forever keep this practice.608 
To be sure, such tradition has indeed been maintained throughout the years, as does 
the narrative of the two being geographically far, but spiritually close. Elsewhere we 
read that “[t]he Group of 77 and China is the largest consultation group in the world. 
Our countries may differ in their national conditions, but it is the same historical experience, 
pursuit of justice and fairness and aspiration for common development that have brought 
us closely together. We are united because we share mutual understanding.”609 Second, 
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un.org/eng/zt/rqwt/t28671.htm. 
608  “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Held Banquet for African Foreign Ministers,” 2001, 
http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t27054.htm; emphasis added. 
609 “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin on Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts at the 
Open Debate of the Security Council,” 2007, http://www.china-
un.org/eng/lmbf/WMdsjl/WANGminhuodong/t357122.htm; emphasis added. 
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the PRC strongly advocates for the enlargement of UNSC membership to include 
African countries: 
The democratization of international relations represents the trend of the times, which ought 
to be reflected in the Security Council. Developing countries, which make up over two 
thirds of the UN membership, are obviously underrepresented in the Security Council. 
China stands for an enlarged Security Council based on a broad consensus, and 
increased representation of developing countries, African countries in particular, thus 
giving more countries, especially the small and medium-sized countries greater access 
to its decision making. … we should pay closer attention to African concerns ... listen 
more attentively to the concerns and positions of African countries and take into full 
account their fervent desires for peace, development and cooperation so that the African 
people can truly benefit from the care and support of the international community.610  
Similarly, China’s calls for the UN to further focus its agenda on African countries 
abound. For instance, on the issue of the Council’s reform, Ambassador Wang 
Guangya maintained that “[a]ny formula that does not address the concerns of Africa 
on the Security Council reform can hardly win endorsement of the whole UN 
membership and will not have the backing of China.”611 Ambassador Liu Zhenmin 
further stated that the “[s]tability and development of Africa constitute the pre-
requisite for the establishment of a harmonious world with lasting peace and common 
prosperity. … Effectively assisting African countries to achieve stability, security and 
sustainable development is a common responsibility of the international 
community.”612 In China’s position paper from 2010 the international community is 
encouraged to pay more attention to African development, while the PRC is presented 
as a country that has “always committed to peace and development in Africa.”613  
More in general, China has aligned with the African Union when voting on 
certain resolutions and it has been coherent in supporting the African position when 
conveyed by a unified group. Just to mention a few instances, China voted in favour of 
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Assembly,” 2010, http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/wjb65ga/t753577.htm; “Address by H.E. 
Ambassador Wang Min On Item 62(a), 62(b) and Item 12,” 2010, http://www.china-
un.org/eng/hyyfy/t761225.htm To be sure, this is historically not entirely accurate. In the years 
between 1966 and 1978 domestic turmoil and instability led China to focus mostly on itself, while Africa 
did not occupy a primary position in the PRC’s foreign policy. However, as pointed out earlier in the 
thesis, narratives are important not so much because they provide an accurate description of events, but 
because of how they construct such events as part of a meaningful story.  
 166 
resolution 2046 on Sudan and South Sudan in 2012, which called for an immediate 
halt to fighting.614 In 2013, it voted in favour of resolution 2098 that authorised an 
‘intervention brigade’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo.615 In 2016, they voted in 
favour of resolution 2279 on Burundi, following consensus among the AU and the East 
African Community.616  It then unsurprisingly abstained from voting on resolution 
2304 on United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), complaining that the 
revisions suggested by China and other African countries were not fully incorporated 
in the adopted text. 617  Somewhat related to such emphasis on Africa, the 
representation of globalisation as both an opportunity and a challenge is recurring. As 
the first FOCAC meeting was held in 2000, Ambassador Chen Guofang stated that 
“[g]iven the opportunities and potentials brought about by globalization, it is a shame 
to see that the vast number of African countries have been excluded from globalization, 
marginalized, or even forced to bear the negative impact of the process, something that 
no one can accept with a peace of mind.”618 He then continued by arguing that “[o]n 
the one hand, African countries should bear the responsibility for their own prosperity, 
stability and development. On the other (sic), it is also a common task of the 
international community. The peace- and development-related problems in Africa 
have been inherited from the past, long-existing and deep-rooted.”619 Elsewhere, Vice 
Foreign Minister Wang Guangya affirms:  
Economic globalization is gaining momentum. The vast number of countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America and their people have to, on the one hand, get rid of the 
adverse influence left over from history by racism and colonialism and on the other, take 
up the challenge of the ever-widening “digital divide”. Against this background, the 
international community and the developed countries, in particular, have both the duty 
and obligation to help developing countries get out of their plight.620 
Coherent with the second discursive layer identified in Chapter 4, we find two 
familiar narratives: First, globalisation, which has become an opportunity rather than 
a threat, however presents greater risks for developing countries, some of which have 
been marginalised more than others. Second, and related, problems with African 
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peace and development constitute the inheritance of colonialism, and while Africans 
should be responsible for their own stability and development, the international 
community should take responsibility and act to address those issues through the work 
of the UN, among other IOs. Interestingly, China’s appeals are normally directed to 
developed countries to help developing countries attaining economic and social 
development. And while the PRC self-identifies with the latter group, it also 
contributes generously to the UN budget and to Africa-related activities, thus 
producing some tensions in its self-positioning.621 
Related, another representation often found in UN documents is endorsement 
of the ‘African solutions for African problems’ doctrine. Chinese elites believe that 
“nobody in the world knows better than Africans themselves as to how to seek a 
fundamental solution to African conflicts.”622 Similarly, African ownership is stressed 
while “rigid application of external models” is eschewed.623 Regional organisations 
should take the lead in conflict prevention and resolution since “[a]s an embodiment 
of the will of African countries to achieve unity and self-reliance, [the] African Union 
is endowed with a unique political, moral and geographical advantage in handling 
conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.” 624  Ambassador Li Baodong once 
remarked that “China always supports settlement of African issues in African ways by 
Africa. We stand for solidarity among African countries and appropriate settlement of 
their disputes through dialogue and negotiations. We hope the African Union and 
other regional organizations play a positive role in this regard.” 625  Echoing him, 
Ambassador Liu Jieyi also maintains that  
Regional organizations like the AU, which was established in Africa and is led by 
Africans, have unique regional, historical and cultural advantages in conflict mediation 
and peacekeeping. The United Nations and regional organizations like the AU should 
explore ways of building various kinds of practical coordination and cooperation 
mechanisms on the basis of equal treatment and complementarity so as to strengthen 
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coordination and cooperation in strategic planning, deployment, logistics management 
and support for peacekeeping operations.626 
On a more general level, Chinese leaders believe in the role of the UN in maintaining 
international peace and security. As stated by Ambassador Liu Zhenmin,  
As the centre of our collective security mechanism, the United Nations bears the primary and 
irreplaceable responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. China supports the 
strengthening of peace keeping operations, attaches importance to preventive 
diplomacy, and encourages and supports the settlement of international disputes or 
conflicts through negotiations. We hope that the United Nations, while resolutely 
fighting terrorism, will help further enhance the mutual understanding among nations 
and civilizations, dismantle barriers of understanding, and avoid confrontation due to 
differences in history, social system and development model.627 
As part of the efforts in keeping international peace, preventive diplomacy represents 
a priority area for China and reflects the country’s traditional preference for diplomacy 
over intervention: 
Faced with the new circumstances and new tasks, we need to keep abreast of the times, 
increase input and inject new vigor and vitality into preventive diplomacy to ensure that 
it makes greater contribution to international peace and security. … Experience proves 
repeatedly that emphasizing crisis management while neglecting prevention often gets half the result 
with twice the effort. If we fail to take reasonable and lawful action and seek peaceful 
settlement of disputes through means such as mediation at the early stages of a crisis, we 
may have to spend much more time and energy on remedial measures after the outbreak 
of crisis. In recent years, the UN peacekeeping operations have grown in size, resulting 
in a huge mismatch between demand and supply. If we do a good job in conflict 
prevention, we will not only save peacekeeping resources and improve efficiency, but 
also keep numerous lives away from the scourge of war.628  
Such discourse also reflects consensus among the Council members that the low 
costs of mediation make preventive diplomacy potentially a more powerful tool for 
conflict-management and that it could be more efficient and useful, as well as less risky, 
than military or peacekeeping operations.629 However, China is also ready for more 
forceful interventions, when circumstances require so. In a recent debate over 
peacekeeping reforms, the Chinese representative emphasised that “the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter—as well as the basic principles of 
peacekeeping—must always be obeyed as a sine qua non for their success. Political 
solutions must always retain their primacy, and missions should be given realistic, 
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achievable mandates that can be adjusted in accordance with needs on the ground.”630 
He also endorsed the idea of forming a standing army and a rapid deployment force 
alongside the AU and sub-regional organisations’ bloc, as well as providing more 
support for developing countries to build up their capacity in training and deployment. 
Importantly, China’s support for the UN also goes hand in hand with its 
(contemporary) enthusiasm for multilateralism. In a 2004 position paper we read that  
Multilateralism is an effective way to meet mankind’s common challenges, an important 
means to settle international disputes, a strong guarantee for sound globalization, and 
the best avenue to push for democracy and the rule of law in international relations. To put 
multilateralism on a more effective footing, it is essential to cultivate a global partnership 
based on equality, mutual trust and cooperation under the guidance of a new security and 
development concept. Being the most universal, representative and authoritative 
intergovernmental organization and the best platform for the practice of multilateralism, 
the UN has an indispensable role to play in this regard.631  
The security-development nexus plays a central role in China’s Africa discourse 
at the UN too. And, once more, a change is detectable as we move from the second to 
the third discursive layer, which focuses on the securitisation of development. During 
his speech at the 56th session of the UNGA, Ambassador Wang Yinfan suggested that  
Poverty, backwardness and economic underdevelopment stand as a fundamental cause for 
armed conflict and instability in relevant regions of Africa. It can well be said that the 
issue of Africa, in the final analysis, is a development issue. […] To realize durable peace in 
Africa, attention must be given not only to promoting solutions to hotspot issues but also, 
more fundamentally, to vigorously helping African countries to achieve development. 
[…] The Chinese Government has all along attached importance and given support to 
African countries and peoples in their efforts to realize peace and development.632 
A quasi-causal link is being created between underdevelopment and armed conflicts, 
backwardness, and instability, which thus calls for a more prominent UN role in 
promoting sustainable development across the continent. Furthermore, as a fellow 
developing country, China understands better than others such challenges and 
attaches great importance to the follow-up mechanisms of the FOCAC. Elsewhere, we 
read that “peace and development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Prevention of and solution to the conflicts is an important guarantee for Africa’s 
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development” 633 ; and that “the trend toward a multi-polar world and economic 
globalization keeps growing and the main themes of our times continue to be peace 
and development.”634 A  position paper also states that “[th]e essential solution to the 
conflicts in Africa is development.”635 Or else, “[t]he absence of peace and stability 
means the absence of any safeguard for development”.636 Ambassador Zhan Yishan 
argues that  
The prevention and resolution of conflicts are important guarantees for the 
development of Africa. […] the United Nations should play a bigger role in conflict 
prevention, peace making (sic), peacekeeping, and post-conflict construction and peace. 
[…] We call on national governments to attach more importance to Africa, support the 
African countries in peace seeking efforts, increase assistance to enhance peace process 
and give priority to capacity building of African countries.637  
A 2005 position paper states that “[r]eforms should be all-dimensional and multi-
sectoral, and aim to succeed in both aspects of security and development. Especially, 
reforms should aim at reversing the trend of UN giving priority to security over 
development by increasing inputs in the field of development and facilitating the realization of 
the Millennium Development Goals. […] Development is the common pursuit of people 
from all countries and bedrock for a collective security mechanism and the progress of human 
civilization.”638 In 2008, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin linked peace and development by 
maintaining that “[w]ithout peace, development will be weak; likewise, without 
development, peace will be fragile. To strive for reduction and even elimination of 
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conflict in Africa bears on security and happiness of the African people.”639 In 2011, 
Ambassador Li Baodong started a speech by highlighting that “[s]ecurity and 
development are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Security is a prerequisite for 
development, and development is possible only in a peaceful and stable environment. Development is a 
guarantee of security. Sustainable peace is possible only through the maintenance of development 
momentum.”640 Ambassador Liu Jieyi also said: “peace and stability are the prerequisite 
for development […] poverty and under-development breed conflicts, disasters and 
humanitarian crises.”641 In 2015, Ambassador Wang Min further pointed out that 
“[s]ecurity, development and human rights are the three pillars of the UN, and efforts 
for economic and social development and protection of the environment and security 
are mutually complementary.”642 In 2016, Ambassador Wang Qun maintained that 
“[p]eace and development are the common aspiration of mankind. History has proven 
time and again that without peace, there will be no development, and without stability, 
there will be no prosperity. Today, human society has become an intimate community 
of common destiny with the security interests of all countries intertwined.”643 In the 
same year, Premier Li Keqiang argued that  
Sustainable development is first and foremost about development. Development 
underpins every human achievement. Without development, nothing can be sustainable. 
The lack of development is often at the root of many problems facing the world. Be it 
poverty or the refugee crisis, war, conflicts or terrorism, they all could be attributed to insufficient 
development and none can be addressed properly without development. Only development can guarantee 
people’s fundamental rights. Only development can root out the cause for global challenges. And only 
development can advance human civilization and progress. Development must be 
sustainable. […] Development won’t be sustainable if it is unbalanced, unequal and 
widens the gap between the North and the South and the rich and the poor. […] 
Development won’t be sustainable if economic growth and social progress are not well 
coordinated.644  
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At this point, a certain definition of international security has started to emerge, 
one which is premised on the opposition between hegemony and democracy, the latter 
of which is understood as the equal participation of all countries in security regimes; 
emphasis on the primary role of the UN in maintaining international peace and 
security; preference for preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts over military 
intervention; trust in multilateralism as an effective way of promoting these priorities; 
and the centrality of the security-development nexus. Furthermore, as far as Africa is 
concerned, such definition also includes the need for the international community to 
bear responsibility for promoting peace and development in the continent, while 
recognising African agency in being responsible for their own stability; and the 
endorsement of the African solutions for African problems doctrine. All these elements 
are coherent with the new security concept discussed in Chapter 3, both in its more 
historical formulation and in Xi’s own interpretation of it: Most of the features I just 
outlined match the concept’s common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable 
dimensions. While Xi’s security concept was initially thought in light of the Asian 
region, many Chinese officials have also been utilising it when referring to China’s 
engagement in African security. In 2003, then Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing suggested 
that the international community should maintain security through cooperation, whilst 
disputes be resolved peacefully through dialogue; the use or threat of force should be 
avoided; and building one’s own security at the expense of others should be rejected.645 
In 2009, Ambassador Sha Zukang elicited the promotion of “a new security concept 
featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation so as to bring about a 
win-win situation.”646 In the same year, then President Hu Jintao addressed the UNGA 
and maintained that 
We should view security in a broader perspective and safeguard world peace and 
stability. The security of all countries has never been as closely interconnected as it is 
today, and security now covers more areas than ever before. Traditional and non-
traditional security threats are intertwined, involving political, military, economic, 
cultural and other fields. […] Security is not a zero-sum game, and there is no isolated or absolute 
security. No country can be safe and stable in the absence of world and regional peace 
and stability. We should embrace a new security thinking of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality 
and coordination. While maintaining one’s own national security, we should also respect the security 
concerns of other countries and advance the common security of mankind. We should adhere to the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and seek peaceful solutions 
to regional hotspot issues and international disputes. There should be no willful use or 
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threat of force. We should support the United Nations in continuing to play an 
important role in the field of international security. We should follow the spirit of 
equality, mutual benefit and cooperation to preserve global economic and financial 
stability. And we should oppose terrorism, separatism and extremism in all 
manifestations and deepen international security cooperation.647 
Importantly, the premises of China’s understanding of international security as 
detailed above overlap with some of the latest developments in the UN’s changing 
approaches to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. One expert from the SSRC confirmed 
that, especially since 2015, there has been increasing convergence between China’s 
emphasis on the security-development nexus and shifting UN attitudes towards 
“putting all tools of diplomacy at work for prevention, a focus on the people as opposed 
to politics and governments, and the realisation that development is needed when the 
underlying conditions for peace are weakened”. 648  According to her, the shift in 
conversations at the UN has happened in the last 5-6 years, during which many 
workshops and meetings have been convened between Chinese and UN 
representatives, as well as academics and practitioners, to facilitate and encourage 
China’s expansive approach. The ‘normative agenda’ that emerges from these 
encounters seems to be one centred on the opposition to the use of force and military 
intervention; a ‘soft’ approach to conflict resolution; and the concept of ‘sustaining 
peace’. 649  In 2015, the advisory group of experts conducted a review of the UN 
peacebuilding architecture and proposed using the expression ‘sustaining peace’ to 
refer to the broader understanding that it said was needed of peacebuilding.650 
Not too long afterwards, and following the 2015 report of the High-Level Panel 
on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO), 651  another review was submitted, 
which had a tremendous impact on the UN, according to all my interviewees: the 
Santos Cruz Report on improving the security of peacekeeping forces. Focusing on 
ways to reduce the life-and-death risks increasingly facing peacekeepers, it “calls on 
peacekeeping actors to do more to: change our mindset; ensure that missions have the 
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650 “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace,” Report of the advisory group of experts for the 2015 review 
of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, (June 2015), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/review2015.shtml; Cedric De Coning, “Sustaining Peace: Can 
a New Approach Change the UN?,” Global Governance Spotlight 3 (2018), https://www.sef-
bonn.org/en/publications/global-governance-spotlight/global-governance-spotlight-32018.html. 
651 “Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations,” ReliefWeb, July 16, 2015, 
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/report-high-level-independent-panel-peace-operations. 
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necessary capacity and capabilities; adapt mission footprints; and hold ourselves 
accountable for preventing fatalities.”652 The report was funded by the PRC through 
the new Peace and Development Trust Fund; for many, this is an indicator that while 
China has not come up with a “big normative agenda at the UN”, in a way the decision 
to fund reviewing activities is in itself a feature of such normative agenda; this is even 
more relevant since, apparently, China was not too happy about the report’s 
conclusion (essentially calling for deployed troops not to see the principles of 
peacekeeping as restrictions on the initiative and the use of force, something which 
China has always opposed).653  
Two UN officers noted that extrabudgetary sources to fund ‘quick’ studies and 
reviews are traditionally the realm of middle power, especially the EU and Nordic 
countries. However, China is now increasingly contributing to extrabudgetary funding, 
especially to training, and this is in itself a sign of shifting attitudes and policies.654 China 
is, therefore, trying to carve out a more autonomous role for itself in the Security 
Council to promote its security discourse.655 This said, a consensus emerged from our 
conversations that there does not seem to be anything especially Chinese about their 
engagement with peace and security: Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are the areas 
where the PRC’s approach is most conforming with existing frameworks. Perhaps, one 
suggested, an agenda can be identified in the interest to keep stability. And even if the 
Chinese did not have a normative agenda, is that not an agenda in itself?656 Or, as 
Breslin suggests, “[i]f there is a normative position underpinning China’s official 
approach to reform of global governance, it is perhaps that there should be no 
normative basis. … China is less interested in promoting a clearly articulated grand 
strategy and a new set of universal values than it is in finding pragmatic solutions: 
primarily solutions to problems that it itself faces, but also at times solutions to 
problems facing others.”657  
                                               
652 David Haeri, “Strengthening UN Peacekeeping: Placing the Santos Cruz Report in Context,” IPI 
Global Observatory, February 28, 2018, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/02/strengthening-
peacekeeping-cruz-report-context/. 
653 Interviews with several senior UNDPKO officers, New York, March 2018.  
654 Ibid. 
655 Huotari et al., “China’s Emergence as a Global Security Actor,” 92. 
656 Interview with senior officer 3, UNDPKO, Policy and Best Practices Service, New York, March 
2018. This point reminds me of a China Africa Project podcast where hosts Eric Olander and Cobus 
van Staden discuss potential themes on the agenda for the next FOCAC, and the latter makes a point 
about China setting the G20 agenda during their 2016 presidency, by shifting the focus to Africa. Their 
flagship programme at the time was African industrialisation and it was the first time the G20 was paying 
attention to the continent in so much detail. I wonder if this could also be considered as norm-setting in 
a similar way. See ‘The China in Africa Podcast’. 
657 Breslin, “China and the Global Order,” 633. 
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6.4.1 The view on, and from, peace operations 
As the PRC has considerably stepped up its contributions to PKOs, such 
missions are seen not only as an instrument to achieve desirable peace, but also as a 
way to strengthening multilateralism: “Peacekeeping operations are among the core 
means of the UN Security Council in fulfilling its duty of maintaining international 
peace and security. Intensified effort in this respect can help enhance the authority of 
the UN, give full play to the mechanism of collective security and push forward 
multilateralism.”658 In 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin suggested that the UN should 
“exert greater efforts in the area of preventive diplomacy, make early interventions, 
and do its best to diffuse tension [… and] attach great importance to promoting the 
political dialogue and reconciliation process so that there is peace to keep for the 
peacekeeping operations.”659 He further calls for innovation but also adherence to 
basic principles (referring to the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-
interference). In 2014, Ambassador Wang Min maintained that 
It is very important to ensure the dovetailing of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts 
and to consolidate the fruits of those efforts in order to ensure lasting peace and stability. 
In determining the mandates of peacekeeping operations, the Council should attach 
priority to the urgent need for security and stability, while focusing on long-term 
perspectives by taking into account the current realities of the country in question, 
strengthening coordination between peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and 
strengthening the country’s capacities, while ensuring a smooth transition from 
peacekeeping to peacebuilding through a realistic and practical exit strategy.660  
Furthermore, Ambassador Li Baodong has called for abiding by the principle of 
“objectivity and neutrality” arguing that 
Host countries and regions in which there are peacekeeping operations often find 
themselves in a complicated political environment. Peacekeeping operations should 
abide strictly with the mandates of the Security Council, respect the will and choice of 
                                               
658 “Position Paper of China at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly”; “China’s Position Paper 
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the people of host countries and become promoters and mediators in the political 
process and national reconciliation of host countries. While carrying out their mandate, 
peacekeeping operations should pay great attention to the views of the parties concerned 
in the host countries, respect the local culture and have the trust and support of the 
people of the host countries.661  
Arguably, as contributions to PKOs grow, so does Chinese representatives’ confidence: 
As China started to warm up towards peacekeeping in the early 2000s, the tone used 
in official speeches shifted from extremely cautious to increasingly confident and is now 
in line with the country’s role as a major contributor to UN peace operations. 
As mentioned earlier, while its participation in peacekeeping is increasingly 
aligning with that of more seasoned donors, with regards to peacebuilding, China 
admittedly does not have much experience and it is an area where it is has engaged to 
a limited extent. However, a growing alignment between the West, African countries, 
and China can be found around the goal of stability rather than liberal 
peacebuilding.662 Ambassador Wang Guangya made the following remarks in 2008: 
How to ensure that conflicts do not re-erupt? How to enable the population to enjoy the 
peace dividend? How to transit from fragile peace to a harmonious society by the people 
and for the people? What role can the countries concerned play in peace building? How 
can the international community, the United Nations in particular, provide effective 
and timely assistance? To these questions, we do not have ready answers, nor do we 
have much experience to rely on.663 
He further stresses that focus on African countries should take priority and 
praises “[t]he fact that the agenda of the Peace Building Commission is dominated by 
situations of African countries demonstrates the universal agreement of the 
international community about the special needs of Africa.”664 A position paper from 
the same year discusses peacebuilding as a crucial element of the security operations 
of the UNSC and suggests a focus on both short- and long-term measures, respect for 
the positions and opinions of recipient countries, and calls for the Peacebuilding 
Commission to step up coordination across relevant agencies.665 In 2009, the issues of 
increasing funding for peacebuilding and the need for a comprehensive and systemic 
strategy addressing all aspects of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict 
                                               
661 “Remarks by Ambassador Li Baodong at the Security Council on the United Nations Peacekeeping 
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peacebuilding were also mentioned. 666  The commitment to the Peacebuilding 
Commission and to the Fund continues along the same lines in other position papers 
in following years.667 In 2012, Ambassador Li Baodong listed peacebuilding priorities 
as follows: “[t]he priorities of post-conflict peace building are stabilizing the security 
situation, promoting political reconciliation, and strengthening the development of 
democracy. At the same time, root problems that threaten peace and security, 
particularly issues of social and economic development, should also be tackled.”668 
Unsurprisingly, the security-development nexus appears to inform the narrative on 
peacebuilding too. 
China’s participation in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities is also 
generally framed within another important representation of China in its discourse at 
the UN, which depicts the country as a responsible great power. Hence, in 2010 we 
hear then premier Wen Jiabao say that “[t]he Chinese people love peace, and China 
is a responsible member of the international community. As early as 2,500 years ago, 
the Chinese thinker Confucius said, ‘Peace is the most valuable’. As a nation repeatedly 
plagued by the scourge of war, we fully appreciate the value of peace, and also the 
wisdom of ‘Do not do unto others what you would not have others do unto you’”.669 
This was echoed a year later by foreign minister Yang Jiechi, who maintained that 
“[o]ver the years, China has been dedicated to creating a peaceful international 
environment in which to develop itself. At the same time, it has contributed its share 
to enhancing world peace through its own development.”670 Such statements seem to 
coherently fit into the broader narrative of a “foreign policy of peace” that has been 
advertised widely, especially after the 19th Party Congress in November.671 
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As viewed by UN officers, China’s approach does not do much to challenge the 
current system of peacekeeping. According to one, China is now in a position to 
increase their contributions to PKOs in a very deliberate way, but all within the 
existing frameworks: there is no clear “Chinese way” of sustaining peace that emerges 
from their statements.672 As another officer pointed out, China wants to project its 
image as a responsible actor multilaterally and committing to peacekeeping is a tool 
for achieving that, although they have also used it to signal the rise of its (military) 
reach.673 This does not mean that there is no material for disagreement, and human 
rights do remain a thorny issue—although, as one officer noticed, the “peacekeeping 
package comes with human rights and peacebuilding mandates, so as long as China 
contributes to PKOs, it contributes to all parts of it.”674 Hence, China is currently doing 
more peacekeeping and peacebuilding and it is doing so according to existing (liberal) 
frameworks. After all, as one officer argued, the UN’s liberal concept of peace is not 
devoid of development; rather, the concept entails that the UN intervenes whenever 
and wherever such development has ‘failed’; “what is at stake” he told me, “is the 
absence of the state, not so much a problem with whether either the liberal or illiberal 
model works or not; in other words, it is not the quality and kind of governance that 
prompt UN PKOs, but the absence of such.”675 The consensus among the interviewees 
seemed to be that China has not leveraged its financial influence in the same way as 
other countries have done at the Council; that is, the PRC has more power than what 
it is using if it wanted to further influence the organisation’s course of action. As a 
matter of fact, my interviewees generally though that while there is some alignment 
between China and Russia on certain issues, Russia has a far more “negative and 
aggressive” agenda than China, both in terms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.676 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The analysis of the documents presented in this chapter confirmed the stability 
and coherence of China’s Africa discourse across all three layers at the global level. In 
the Chinese discourse, hegemony and democracy are used in a quasi-oxymoron: So 
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674 Phone interview with senior officer, UNDPKO, Policy and Best Practices Service, April 2018. 
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long as the international system is dominated by developed nations of the ‘North’, 
relations between countries can never be equal.677 At the UN, such representation takes 
mostly two forms: China is grateful to developing countries for having guaranteed its 
accession to international organisations and is in turn supportive of Council’s reforms 
that would grant African nations greater representation. Coherent with this stance, the 
PRC’s policies at the UNSC tend to be aligned to the African position, especially when 
expressed via the AU or other regional blocs. Similarly, the issue of globalisation relates 
to such a systemic imbalance. Globalising economic, social, and political forces present 
developing countries in the continent with both opportunities and challenges. While 
these are often inherited from the colonial era, the international community can and 
should do more to boost their development, while respecting local solutions and 
promoting African ownership. The UN can play a crucial role both for China and for 
Africa: While the former can ‘use’ the organisation to promote its image as a 
responsible power and use its leverage to endorse South-South cooperation (and the 
related discourse), the latter can benefit from greater participation in international 
decision-making. China has become, in this sense, one of the biggest supporters of 
institutional multilateralism. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding have proved to be the 
most relevant UN activities to ‘test’ such assumptions, because both are crucial in 
assessing the success of the security-development nexus in the long term. And it is this 
nexus that is once more the protagonist in China’s Africa discourse at the global level. 
Simultaneously, the UN has seen a transformation of its peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding practices towards the ‘sustaining peace agenda’, which aims to prioritise 
prevention and sustainable development. Thus, the UN’s shift from a reactive to a 
proactive approach to conflicts has converged with China’s aversion to interventionism. 
Such a convergence is the result of both internal debates at the UN and China’s 
increased participation in such debates. 
  
                                               
677 As already mentioned on pages 113-114, the Chinese understanding of ‘democratic’ or ‘equal’ in this 
context indicates democratic negotiations.  
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Chapter 7 – China’s normative power in practice 
 
Power is domination, control, and therefore a very selective form of truth which is a lie. 
(Wole Soyinka) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the findings presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 and discusses 
them in relation to the notions of China’s rise and normative power presented in 
Chapter 2. As mentioned earlier, scholars have claimed that China has never laid out 
an explicit grand strategy: It is often said that it does not have one regarding China-
Africa ties, nor one for its approach to international peace and security.678 Yet, the two 
white papers released in 2013 and 2015, and especially the latter, outline the main 
elements of Sino-African relations, albeit with the typical vague language of Chinese 
policy discourse.679 Similarly, in the white paper on defence released in 2015, the 
Chinese leadership gives indications as to the future of the PLA’s engagement 
abroad.680 More importantly, since Xi Jinping took power in 2013, a series of initiatives 
including the BRI and the AIIB have prompted new debates over the existence of 
explicit foreign policy guidelines. 681  Other scholars hence conclude that while the 
definition of a Chinese grand strategy is ongoing, more prominent features have 
emerged under the rule of President Xi.682 As the country’s foreign policy line has 
become more active globally, so have its Africa policies. While these hardly match a 
US-style grand strategy,683 I argue that it is possible to identify a coherent discourse 
around which China’s long-term strategy is built. China’s discourse on peace and 
security in Africa is structured along three discursive layers: first, are the main 
representations of what I called the “South-South cooperation” discourse; second, is 
China-Africa cooperation on peace and security as revolving around the security-
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development nexus, with a focus on the developmental dimension; third—and where 
change can be detected—is a discourse that adds to the previous two layers and is 
premised upon them, but emphasises the security dimension of the nexus and allows 
for increased securitisation of the relations. China’s Africa discourse is further 
organised horizontally across three institutional levels: first, the FOCAC, an exclusive 
China-Africa platform created with the objective of negotiating, designing, and 
agreeing on common policies. It also provides China with the necessary spotlight to 
announce big and generous funding initiatives, thus strengthening its soft power appeal. 
The platform is the perfect example of China’s attempt to create anti-hegemonic 
institutions with the aim of increasing China’s influence abroad. Second, the African 
Union, a continental organisation originally created upon the desire to promote pan-
Africanism and a common vision for the continent. Structurally modelled upon the 
EU and highly dependent on external funding, the AU still represents ‘unknown’ 
terrain for China to make explicit diplomatic moves. While Western countries, experts, 
and diplomats have been interacting with it for a long time, China only established a 
dedicated diplomatic mission in 2015 and has still much to learn on the organisation’s 
internal dynamics. However, the PRC has signalled its willingness to be more involved 
in the organisation’s activities and provide more funding for its operations. Third, the 
UNSC is China’s global stage for advancing its (supposedly) alternative ideas on peace, 
security, and development and promoting the security-development nexus. There, 
China shares the stage with other major players in international affairs, chiefly the 
other permanent Council members. While African countries are not permanently 
represented, the PRC presents itself as the spokesperson of the developing world and 
a supporter of common African positions. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, these three levels are not consequential. While I 
started from examining recurring narratives at the FOCAC, which was created long 
after China had gained its seat at the UNSC, I did so because a coherent and more 
explicit vision for the country’s engagement in African peace and security only starts 
to emerge as Sino-African ties are being consolidated through the Forum from the year 
2000, as well as, subsequently, through the AU. Thus, the discourse is organised across 
the three institutions not so much according to a temporal sequence, but rather 
through a logical linguistic apparatus that helps China redefine its power relations with 
the other actors involved. Put differently, from the regional, through the continental, 
and to the global arenas, China is carving out normative spaces for its preferred norms 
and practices to be spread. Its normative power potential varies across the three 
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institutions examined here and it is especially outside of Western-dominated platforms 
that we may expect to find a more explicit norms-setting attitude. However, this 
potential can be realised more effectively through the combination of China’s influence 
across all the institutional levels. 
Despite China-Africa ties evolving and going through periods of disengagement 
as well as engagement, the discourse has not changed much internally: It consistently 
paints China and Africa as long-term friends united in an anti-hegemonic struggle 
against the domination of the ‘West’. Simultaneously, the policies guiding Chinese 
involvement have shifted gradually but substantially, especially as regards peace and 
security, ranging from non-interference to growing military presence. The stability and 
coherency of the Chinese discourse aided China immensely, as it contributed to 
creating an image of a reliable partner, one which, according to the basic discourse 
and its narratives, respects Africa and its leaders and conducts relations on equal 
footing. In a way, therefore, China’s increased contributions to the African security 
regime should not come as a surprise, not only because they respond to growing 
economic and geopolitical interests, but also because the discourse was already 
‘predisposed’ for such a policy shift to happen. This is possible mostly thanks to the 
security-development nexus: While China’s contributions so far have mostly focused 
on the developmentalisation of security—whereby development is considered a 
prerequisite for stability—in the last few years more emphasis is being put on the 
securitisation of development—whereby development can only be achieved in a 
peaceful and safe environment.  
Hence, China’s attempts to shape conceptions of peace, security, intervention, 
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, are important not only in and of themselves, but 
also in relation to the broader change in policy which China’s Africa discourse has 
enabled. The discourse and the related policies would not have been so successful, 
however, if they only depended on Chinese leaders’ rhetoric abilities (or their money). 
Most importantly, the stability of the narratives has been maintained thanks to the 
response encountered from African elites. This goes both ways as China has gained 
the latter’s trust thanks to a coherent discourse organised around ideas of South-South 
cooperation, dialogue, equal relations, mutual benefit, and shared destiny. Therefore, 
by presenting itself as a reliable partner and by being acknowledged as such across 
Africa, the Chinese model represents an attractive alternative to Western modes of 
engagement. Importantly, such a coherent set of strategies, goals, and policies are 
slowly being turned into norms. Perhaps the most striking feature is that Beijing seems 
 183 
to be keener on promoting a Chinese vision of world order in which other countries 
can find alternative approaches to traditional external powers’ and in which everyone 
can, and wants to, participate, than it is in branding such norms as a new system of 
international relations entirely. What does this vision entail for Africa? First, a focus on 
the security-development nexus; second, continued assistance in the fields of 
development, infrastructure building, trade, and investment, as well as increased 
militarisation and securitisation of foreign relations; and third, the promotion of 
Chinese preferred norms and practices via both existing organisations and new 
institutional arenas. In terms of practical policies, we are most likely to see an even 
bigger commitment to peacekeeping, increasing contributions to both the UN and the 
AU, and an emphasis on political mediation and diplomacy as the primary means to 
resolving conflicts. Another conclusion I draw is that soft and economic power 
concerns have led the way for China-Africa ties to develop to the point where now 
security occupies a central place in their interactions. In other words, had it not been 
for the successful use of Chinese soft power and the promotion of a model based on 
equal relations, coupled with considerable investments, it would probably be 
impossible to even discuss China in terms of normative power. This chapter addresses 
all parts of this argument by linking the findings to the theory and answering the 
research questions that motivated this study. 
 
7.2 China’s Africa discourse 
The first questions I asked were: How is China’s Africa discourse constructed 
and how have Chinese leaders gradually included increased engagement in peace and 
security within such discourse in the years 2000-2018? Is the shift in policies mirrored 
by a shift in the discourse? How could Chinese leaders justify such growing 
involvement without infringing the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference? 
How has the China-Africa discourse contributed to build China’s image as a legitimate 
norms-maker in the continent? The empirical chapters have addressed these questions 
by exploring both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of China’s Africa discourse 
on peace and security. I argued that it is possible to identify a coherent, basic discourse 
around which China’s diplomatic and security strategy is built. The discourse is 
organised along three vertical discursive layers and three horizontal institutional levels; 
while its deeper layers have remained stable and coherent, it has allowed for a 
substantial shift (i.e. from non-interference to growing security and military 
engagement), thus simultaneously redefining China’s foreign policies. The layered 
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discourse structure allows for explaining change within continuity. China’s Africa 
discourse has been of paramount importance in creating a sense of belonging to the 
same group of developing, anti-hegemonic, Global South countries; consequently, it 
has proved essential in granting China the necessary recognition of its image and role 
as an aspiring norms-shaper. Throughout Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I have provided a 
comprehensive account of the discursive construction of the country’s security policies 
in Africa across the relevant multilateral institutions. While bilateral relations 
undoubtedly still represent an important element in China’s diplomacy, the PRC has 
turned its attention to multilateralism and international cooperation as another way to 
promote its interests and its worldview in Asia and beyond. In Chapter 4, I had two 
aims: first, to map the main representations constituting the discourse since the 
creation of the FOCAC in 2000; second, to unveil the layered structure of the discourse 
which, while first serving the purpose of reintroducing China as a major economic and 
aid player in the continent, has subsequently given way to increased securitisation of 
the ‘developmental peace’. The basic discourse, which I called the “South-South 
cooperation” discourse, articulates China and Africa as fellow members of the Global 
South and fellow developing countries. As such, the discourse goes, China and Africa 
share a common past experience of colonialism and Western encroachment. The 
current international system perpetrates the asymmetry between the developed North 
and the developing South. Based on this, a number of different representations have 
come to define China-Africa relations. For instance, they are friends, brothers, and 
partners. Their friendship is a long-lasting one, dating back to the early Ming dynasty, 
and in the past Chinese and Africans civilisations used to be “splendid’ and 
“distinctive”, whilst in modern times these civilisations have been threatened by 
imperialism and have jointly mobilised against “subjugation”. Since they share a 
history of colonialism, China and African countries are depicted as sympathetic 
members of the same community of developing countries with “common fundamental 
interests” and a “shared destiny”. They are furthermore united in the fight against a 
hegemonic world order. The present world system is unjust, and its unfairness is rooted 
in the economic, scientific, and technological gap between the “North” and the 
“South”. Hegemony, according to the discourse analysed here, consists of the 
domination of developed countries in the current world order, which are also 
responsible for practicing “power politics”. China’s proposal is to promote a “new 
world order” based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the UN Charter. 
Indeed, globalisation represents both a challenge and a risk for developing countries, 
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particularly for Africa’s. As the leaders’ understanding of globalisation evolves, it 
eventually comes to be represented as an opportunity that developing countries need 
to seize and exploit together. As a sign of China’s goodwill, the country does not only 
support the UN and other multilateral organisations, but also, and most importantly, 
Africa’s position and representation in such institutions. Non-interference and respect 
for state sovereignty remain the fundamental pillars of China-Africa ties, as does the 
security-development nexus, which until recently has led to an emphasis on promoting 
development through (mostly) economic assistance and trade. Despite relations going 
through difficult times as much as successes, these two layers of the discourse have 
remained stable and coherent. Sustained by these representations, China-Africa ties 
have substantially expanded since the inception of the Forum, which serves as a 
platform to present and negotiate policies and deals. If the focus has traditionally been 
on trade and investment, infrastructure building, agricultural cooperation, extraction 
of natural resources and energy, and cultural and educational exchanges, peace and 
security have slowly become one of the major aspects of contemporary China-Africa 
ties. While the rhetoric has not remained entirely unchanged, most representations 
have been surprisingly consistent. 
Thus, we now witness the emergence of peace and security as central elements 
to China’s Africa policy without there being any major changes in the discourse; rather, 
existing narratives are being used to legitimise the security-development nexus and, 
more specifically, growing security and military activities in the continent. The 
introduction of the “new security concept”, the emphasis on achieving security in order 
to achieve development, and on pursuing economic development with the aim of 
achieving stability and peace, make increased engagement in security seem reasonable 
and appropriate given a) the ‘critical’ condition of many conflict-ridden or unstable 
countries where China operates; b) Chinese grown interests in the continent; c) the 
need to protect these interests; and d) the benefit African countries will also reap from 
having a safer environment. Since security can only be achieved through development 
and development can only be reached in a secure environment, China is ‘justified’ in 
providing substantial economic aid to African countries as much as they will be 
‘justified’ in scaling up their military presence.684 Hence, an incremental change can be 
                                               
684 I recall what Weldes says about representations that state officials create and that posit well-defined 
relations among diverse objects. The importance of such representations in connecting diverse objects 
lies “not in their accuracy, but in their provision of ‘warranting conditions’ which ‘make a particular 
action or belief more ‘reasonable’, ‘justified’, or ‘appropriate’, given the desires beliefs, and expectations 
of the actors.” Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” 281–83 See also Chapter 1, 24-25. 
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observed as we move to the third layer of discourse, where priority is given to the 
securitisation of development.685 
To summarise, although some elements of the discourse pre-exist the founding 
of the FOCAC, its inception has granted the narrative an institutionalised legitimacy 
and recognition that has no precedence in the history of China-Africa ties. Such a 
discourse pictures the two entities as long-term friends, united in the shared effort to 
redress the imbalances of a Western-centric international order. In constructing the 
discourse, Chinese leaders have mobilised a series of historical and political narratives 
that have contributed to socialise African actors into China’s worldview, by creating a 
sense of belonging and common destiny. Moreover, I have suggested that while the 
policies have gradually shifted, ranging from non-interference to increased military 
and security engagement and financial contributions, the basic discourse has not 
changed. To be sure, while Chinese rhetoric has not remained entirely untouched 
through the ebbs and flows of China-Africa relations and there are still gaps between 
rhetoric and practice, China’s discourse on Africa is consistent and is based on a set of 
logical supporting ideas; in other words, its coherency makes it credible and appealing 
to African elites. 686  Therefore, the success in establishing China’s discourse and 
socialise other actors into it, depends not only on Beijing’s ability, but also, and most 
importantly, on the positive response by African leaders and the recognition and 
respect they grant China. The discourse is reproduced across the three main fora 
examined in the thesis, namely the FOCAC, the AU, and the UNSC. I called this the 
horizontal dimension of China’s Africa discourse and it indicates how the main 
representations informing China-Africa relations have been maintained and cultivated 
outside of the Forum at the continental and global levels. 
Hence, in Chapter 5, I have looked for familiar representations in official 
documents on the China-AU partnership. While the organisation still highly depends 
on external funding, mostly from the EU, it can be considered the main locus of 
African agency on continental peace and security matters. Recent developments signal 
China’s willingness to take on further responsibilities and increase their involvement 
with the AU, such as the establishment of a dedicated diplomatic mission in 2015, the 
promotion of institutional mechanisms to increase coordination, for instance through 
the China-AU Strategic Dialogue, and the creation of a China-Africa Peace and 
                                               
685 For a detailed breakdown of China’s peace and security commitments in the years 2000-2018 see 
Appendix II.  
686 Strauss, ‘The Past in the Present’, 779-780. See also Chapter 3 for more on the coherence of China’s 
rhetoric and Chapter 4 for further arguments and empirical material on the frames of its Africa discourse.  
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Security Fund. Chinese leaders have also shown willingness to learn from, and partner 
with, more experienced partners, especially on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
However, because Western countries’ diplomatic and political presence is older and 
stronger while China’s engagement with the AU is still relatively young, it seems that 
China is playing a marginal role for the time being. Nonetheless, such a role may be 
changing sooner than we think. Although relevant documents are scarce compared to 
FOCAC- or UN-related sources, the representations identified in Chapter 4 can be 
found in China’s AU discourse too. It appears that China’s approach is well received 
by AU officials, an impression that has been confirmed in my fieldwork interviews with 
AU and UNECA officers and diplomats, as well as with researchers from think tanks 
based in Addis Ababa. Perhaps counterintuitively, the recent controversy over the 
alleged data theft at the expense of the AU points to a relation bound to grow. While 
Chinese authorities were quick at denying the bugging of the organisation’s 
headquarters, so was the chairperson of the AU, in a confident show of friendship and 
trust while Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stood by his side during the 7th China-
AU Strategic Dialogue held in Beijing in February 2018.687 Indeed, as one of the AU’s 
major partners, China does have the potential to contribute more not only financially, 
but also normatively. While such contributions remain so far limited and the proposed 
reforms to the organisation are likely to influence partnerships with external actors, I 
argued that the PRC’s self-positioning at the frontline of multilateral diplomacy 
account for an important step in becoming a normative power, especially on issues of 
peace and security. In the words of an International Crisis Group report, “if China’s 
steps are tentative, there is good reason. It is aware of its newcomer status to 
international peace and security efforts, particularly via multilateral institutions, and is 
careful not to overreach [...] But its considerable economic and political influence 
mean that, when it steps in, it inevitably brings leverage to the table that traditional 
mediation efforts […] sometimes lack.”688 
Finally, in Chapter 6, the discussion concerned the global level and I searched 
for the discourse’s main representations in UNSC-related documents. Unlike the 
Forum, the UNSC is not an exclusive China-Africa space; it has a much broader scope 
                                               
687  “China Denies Bugging African Union Headquarters in Ethiopia - CNN,” February 2, 2018, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/30/africa/china-denies-spying-au-building-intl/index.html; 
AfricaNews, “A.U. Has No Secret Files, Nothing for China to Spy on - Faki Mahamat,” Africanews, 
February 9, 2018, http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/09/au-has-no-secret-files-nothing-for-china-
to-spy-on-faki-mahamat/. 
688 “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan,” International Crisis Group, July 10, 2017, ii, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/288-china-s-foreign-policy-experiment-
south-sudan. 
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than the AU; and it represents China’s preferred international platform for promoting 
its worldview. Here, great and rising powers directly compete for the maintenance or 
dismantling of the current world order and for influence on global governance and its 
rules. Hence, China’s Africa discourse is deeply linked to and forms part of a much 
broader international discourse that helps China promote its alternative 
developmental peace model. As it emerges from relevant documents and interviews, 
China’s UN discourse presents a range of familiar elements. These include: the 
promotion of common African positions on Council resolutions, in line with South-
South rhetoric; China’s unique construction of hegemony vs democracy; the 
opportunities and risks associated with globalisation; endorsement of the “African 
solutions to African problems” doctrine; the primary role of the UN and other 
multilateral organisations in maintaining international peace and security; related 
support for multilateralism and international cooperation; and the security-
development nexus. I argued that China’s behaviour in the Council in the last two 
decades has been more system-maintaining than not and has been supported by such 
a stable discourse. To be sure, increased security contributions and military presence, 
ranging from the promised 8,000 peacekeeping troops to be deployed in the next five 
years to the building of the overseas military base in Djibouti, point to a change in 
priorities. Again, however, such a change in policies is not matched by a change in the 
basic discourse, because the discourse is already ‘predisposed’ for change alongside the 
security-development spectrum. Simultaneously, the UN has also witnessed a shift of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding practices towards the “sustaining peace agenda”, 
which prioritises prevention and sustainable development. This shift to a more 
proactive approach to conflicts has converged with a shift in China’s policies and its 
aversion to interventionism. Therefore, if there is anything that looks like a Chinese 
‘normative agenda’ at the UN, it would include opposition to the use of force and 
military intervention; a soft approach to conflict resolution; and support for the concept 
of ‘sustaining peace’. However, no clear ‘Chinese way’ of doing peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding can be identified and while China is increasing its contributions in a 
deliberate way, it does so within the existing normative frameworks. 689  Lanteigne 
suggests that China’s positive view of UN PKOs is motivated by a number of reasons, 
including “training personnel for [military operations other than war] MOOTW, 
furthering Chinese diplomacy in developing regions, and blunting international 
                                               
689  Such frameworks are defined, among others, by the principles and guidelines of peacekeeping 
missions. See “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines,” 2008, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf. 
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perceptions about a ‘China threat’ as its military budget continues to grow and 
concerns about flashpoints such as the South China Sea and Taiwan persist.”690 He 
adds that its increased involvement in PKOs may be motivated by its interest in 
building an image as a “peacebuilder” who is aware of the link between 
underdevelopment and insecurity. I will add that China also aims to soften aspects of 
its international conduct that may be detrimental to achieving its broad aims of 
(peaceful) rise/development, whilst protecting the norms that serve those aims—such 
as state sovereignty—and supporting sufficient flexibility to adjust its practice when 
needed. Such an approach signals that neither China is proposing a whole set of new 
norms, nor it is entirely aligning with the existing order; instead, it aims to reshape it 
to make it a better fit for Chinese interests and policies. 
To summarise, I have argued that it is possible to identify a coherent discourse 
around which China’s diplomatic and security strategy is built. The discourse is 
organised along three vertical discursive layers and three horizontal institutional levels; 
while its deeper layers have remained stable and coherent, it has allowed for some 
substantial shifts (most notably from non-interference to more security and military 
engagement), thus simultaneously redefining China’s foreign policy as well as power 
relations among actors within the three fora. As highlighted in Chapter 1, while the 
deeper structures of discourse are more difficult to change, they still allow for change: 
it remains to be seen “how much pressure is necessary, what degree of political cost 
can be tolerated in breaking a certain code.”691 In short, the more China ‘rises’ within 
one of the three organisations, the bigger the chances of success at socialising other 
actors into its preferred world view; the more it is being recognised as a reliable partner, 
the more likely it is that we will witness norms-making and norms-changing postures. 
The next section addresses these points by providing an answer to the second set of 
research questions. 
 
7.3 What kind of power is China? 
The second set of research questions asked: Can China be considered a 
normative power? Can it shape norms on peace and security in Africa (and beyond)? 
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Does China’s security policy in Africa tell us something about what kind of 
international actor China is, or aspires to, becoming?  In Chapter 2, I have explored 
the literature on both the rise of China and its socialisation into the international 
community of states and institutions. I have then proposed that looking at China as a 
rising normative power better helps us explain its foreign policy and international 
behaviour. After looking at how the discourse takes shape across the three institutions, 
it becomes clear that China’s Africa strategy is a coherent and structured framework 
that guides action in a number of areas. Among these, peace and security have 
developed extraordinarily fast and have come to represent an essential element in 
China’s contributions to the continent. While in the past China arguably lacked the 
confidence and resources to take on a leading role in international security, it has now 
shown willingness to expand on its material and normative power beyond Asia. Its 
position as a rising great power puts China in a more likely position to shape the way 
other countries think about security (among other topics). Since much of its security 
activities abroad is located in Africa and given the recent developments highlighted 
above, Africa occupies a central role in China’s foreign policy strategy. Until recently, 
peace and security were not central in China’s Africa policies, which privileged a focus 
on economic cooperation, trade, and infrastructure investment. However, since 2011-
2012, we have witnessed increased attention to issues related to African peace and 
security, coupled with substantial funding to a range of security activities, including 
contributions to the AU, peacekeeping missions, and military training. We have thus 
witnessed a shift in China’s foreign policies towards the APSA, which reflects a broader 
shift in the country’s general foreign policy behaviour. Yet, such a shift in China-Africa 
relations does not seem to be mirrored by changes in the official basic discourse. The 
following two sections reflect on these issues and, building on the stability of China’s 
Africa discourse, advance the idea that China can be considered a normative power. 
 
7.3.1 Normative power China 
The empirical chapters were aimed to explore whether concrete episodes of 
discourse, socialisation, and norms-setting in the context of China-Africa constitute 
empirical evidence for an analysis of China’s rise in terms of normative power. The 
definition of normative power I use in this thesis is one which understands it as power-
in-context. A normative power is one that is able to shape the “normal” in international 
relations.692 Importantly, it is able to do so only so long as the other actors involved in 
                                               
692 Manners, “Normative Power Europe.” 
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interactions recognise it as such, as long as they recognise its agency as such.693 The 
targeted audience, therefore, is of paramount importance in determining a country’s 
normative power status. In general, according to Breslin, 
The Chinese state frames itself (and its objectives) in different ways to different 
audiences/partners. To the established Western powers, it is a responsible partner in 
international politics and a responsible stakeholder within the existing system. To be 
sure, it is seeking reforms to democratize this system and increase its (and other 
developing countries’) power. … To other emerging powers, it is a key partner in the 
search for such change. To developing countries it is also a key partner, representing 
and promoting their collective interests on a global scale, and acting as a new form of 
‘Great Power’ that will not repeat the sins of previous emerging and Great Powers. And 
perhaps it is here that we see China’s biggest impact on the international order. China’s 
eschewal of political and/or liberalizing conditionalities to accompany economic 
relations might not have sounded the death knell of global liberalism just yet. But it does 
create alternatives for its partners and a political space within which they can 
manoeuvre.694 
China’s self-given identities are thus a fundamental element in the construction 
of its foreign policy narratives. Its engagement in Africa would not have been so 
successful if they had failed at portraying China as an ally and a friend. Similarly, 
should China fall short of the international community’s expectations in organisations 
such as the UN or the AU, its credibility will be affected and with it, its normative 
power potential. In our case, Chinese leaders have gained their African counterparts’ 
trust thanks to the stability of a discourse emphasising South-South cooperation, 
dialogue, equal relations, and mutual benefit. By presenting itself, and being 
recognised as, a reliable partner, China creates a valid alternative for countries in 
Africa that is, at least rhetorically, different from previous powers. China’s self-
positioning at the frontline of diplomatic efforts and multilateralism in the continent 
has proven fundamental in strengthening its reputation and promoting its role as a 
provider of public goods. This reflects the “relationship logic” that Womack suggests 
China applies to international affairs, through which it aims to stabilise beneficial 
relations for all parties involved.695 Normative power is, therefore, “power in context” 
that emerges through interactions, and an actor’s capacity to shape the normal 
depends on the recognition of such agency by target states.696 China’s socialisation 
efforts have been successful thanks to its emphasis on dialogue, which has contributed 
to promoting a vision of China’s unique historical experience as something that should 
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not be imposed on others, but rather inspire them. This is made possible thanks to the 
power of attraction: So long as interactions are based on respect for the other, the 
perception of a win-win situation, and mutual benefits, China’s attempts would most 
likely be successful, thus enhancing its normative power capacity. 
Thus, recognition is the constitutive moment of such interactions: The viability 
of Chinese norms and practices of security and development does not only depend on 
Beijing’s will and decisions, but, most importantly, it is contingent on how other actors 
interpret their agency and legitimacy. Breslin goes as far as arguing that “what makes 
dealing with China attractive is not so much a Chinese ‘model’ as the lack of projection 
of any model. And although it might sound counterintuitive, not being identified as 
the promoter of any specific normative position is in itself a normative position.”697 
One of my interviewees at the UNDPKO expressed a similar idea when he suggested 
that not having a normative agenda is, after all, an agenda itself.698 To be sure, this 
does not mean that China’s approach is devoid of normative contributions. Quite the 
opposite, as argued above, what emerges from the dominant discourse is a rather 
coherent set of strategies and goals that China aims to transform into norms. It seems, 
however, that Beijing is less interested in projecting a clearly articulated grand strategy, 
than in promoting its worldview as an alternative system everyone can embrace and 
be part of—as long as Chinese positions are respected. Hence, together with 
recognition, respect is another essential element in China’s foreign policy. China seems 
to have understood that “respect facilitates cooperation, while disrespect breeds 
conflict.”699  Respect, Wolf suggests, is important especially in light of the implicit 
acceptance it signals for an actor’s rank. By confirming one’s self-ascribed status, it 
promotes sympathy, trust, and cooperation. Respect and recognition are intimately 
related here: respectful behaviour is seen as an appropriate confirmation of one’s status 
and position, while disrespectful behaviour is perceived as disregard for it.700 
Respect has to go both ways, of course: China claims respect from, and gives 
respect to, its African partners and this guarantees the success of interactions. The 
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descriptive (rather than prescriptive) tendency of China’s discourse helps in the process: 
By not imposing any normative agenda or behaviour on other countries’ leaders, 
China grants them the respect they expect from the international community. In order 
to work, this needs to be reciprocated through, for instance, respect for the ‘One China’ 
principle or support for China’s positions at the UN. It remains to be seen whether 
China enjoys the same level of recognition it does among leaders of African countries 
as opposed to leaders elsewhere, especially in the ‘West’. It is generally more likely that 
the former will praise China for its contributions to international affairs more than the 
latter. It is by empowering African leaders and enhancing their perception that they 
are being respected as equals, that “definitions of the ‘normal’ gain their causal 
effects.”701 I reiterate the words of Adaye I mentioned in Chapter 5: China accepts 
Africa as it is and Africans are not choosing which master is better, but rather which 
partner is better. 702  However, if delivering credible commitments is a measure of 
respect, as long as Beijing fulfils its promises, there is a good chance that it would be 
recognised as a reliable partner by other actors too.703 
Related, another distinction needs to me be made as to the extent of recognition 
and respect the country has garnered across the three institutions analysed in the thesis. 
Among Beijing’s normative spaces, the FOCAC is arguably the most successful 
platform for the projection of its normative power. As seen in Chapter 4, not only 
African leaders seem to have bought into China’s vision of peace and security, but 
sharing a vision was possible given the success of a discourse constructing China and 
Africa as friends with a future common destiny. It would be a mistake, however, to 
think that such a shared vision only encompassed a normative agenda: Chinese 
involvement in the continent is also motivated by economic and strategic interests. 
Similarly, African elites are attracted by the prospects of Chinese money and 
investments. Nonetheless, the success of the partnership cannot be explained by 
material interests only. As shown in Chapter 2, China-Africa relations and the rhetoric 
behind them are informed both by the material and the discursive:704 Both these two 
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are important and constitutive of the China-Africa story, which would not be as 
successful if one of the two were missing. 
The UNSC has similarly proven to be a reliable instrument in Beijing’s pursuit 
of its normative agenda. Albeit in a less straightforward way than in the Forum, which 
is exclusively Chinese and African, the Chinese view of peace and security have found 
acceptance in the international organisation too. The simultaneous evolution of the 
Chinese and UN discourses in the last decade is one of the clearest examples of the 
concept of two-way socialisation explained in Chapter 2: Not only has China been 
socialised into the UN framework of rules and norms, but it is increasingly contributing 
to rewriting parts of such framework by actively proposing new norms or reshaping 
existing ones. The convergence between the liberal peace and the developmental peace 
I mentioned in Chapter 6, can be explained by looking at both ongoing debates within 
the Council and the involvement of China in those debates.705 Since the mid-2000s, 
the UN has started to acknowledge that its current approach regarding security as a 
precursor for development has not worked; instead, it has been argued that “engaging 
in development and reconstruction efforts as soon as possible … could contribute 
towards securing peace and obtaining long-term political order and economic 
legitimacy.”706 At the same time, China has been a strong advocate of the security-
development nexus and has repeatedly called attention to the “development issue” as 
the “fundamental cause for armed conflict and instability in relevant regions of Africa.” 
Thus, not only has China become fully integrated into the Council’s procedures, but 
by increasingly participating into its internal debates and sometimes driving the 
conversation, it has now reached a point where it is able to promote its normative 
agenda. While on the one hand China is now ready to securitise and militarise its 
foreign relations more, non-interference and non-intervention do remain central 
pillars of its foreign policy, albeit allowing for a degree of flexibility. In other words, 
although the tension between increased participation in peace and security and 
adherence to such principles remains unresolved, there still are limits to the extent 
China is willing to concede to more robust or unilateral interventionism.  
Some say China’s influence at the UN was obtained through less legitimate 
means. According to a recent report by Synopsis and Jichang Lulu, there is “a 
connection between the corruption cases in the United Nations and the rise of China’s 
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“discursive power”.707 Arguably, the report focuses on human rights issues and China’s 
efforts to embed its practice into “a new global ‘human-rights’ normal.”708 The CCP, 
they argue, “has made it a major goal of its UN work to maximise its ‘discursive power’ 
at the organisation, seeking to redefine ‘human rights’ and get Xi Jinping’s pet 
initiatives institutionally endorsed by an international body. These goals, repeatedly 
stated by authoritative sources, are being pursued through both diplomacy and other 
means.”709 The report’s point about human rights is in line with the findings from my 
my interviews: Of all topics discussed at the Council, human rights do remain the most 
striking issue where UN and Chinese priorities do no align.710 This, however, does not 
prevent consensus on other issues to be reached, as we have seen is the case with the 
security-development nexus. A recent episode during a GA debate is indicative of such 
alignment between Chinese and UN language (and its critics). During the Assembly’s 
72nd session, the Group of 77 and China proposed a draft resolution on NEPAD, which 
contained the phrase ‘win-win’ cooperation. In a not too implicit criticism of China, 
the US representative noted that “since the elaboration of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, multiple parties have attempted to introduce the concept of ‘win-
win’ … the term risks implying that a development partner expects something in return 
for development cooperation. The ‘win-win’ model could lead to the forfeiture of 
national assets that should be aimed at national development projects”; based on this, 
she argued that the US would not vote for the resolution if it included the phrase ‘win-
win’ and proposed changing it to ‘international’ instead.711 In response, the Chinese 
representative maintained that 
upholding win-win cooperation is a solemn pledge made by the entire United Nations 
membership in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It is an important building 
block and a basic principle for implementing goals and reaching targets, and must, therefore, be 
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safeguarded and adhered to, instead of weakened and undermined. … China has always supported 
the efforts of African countries to develop new partnerships with stakeholders.712 
The second resolution presented by the Group of 77 and China (on the causes of 
conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa) 
received equal treatment. Yet again, the US representative challenged the phrases 
“win-win cooperation” and “shared future based upon our common humanity” 
describing them as “ideologically driven and likely to increase conflict rather than 
defuse it.”713 The Austrian representative, speaking on behalf of the EU, similarly 
critiqued both the “slogan” ‘win-win’ for not bringing the goal of sustainable 
development any closer and the resolution for not underscoring the important role 
played by the Peacebuilding Commission. As both resolutions were eventually passed 
without accepting the proposed amendments, a spokesperson from the Chinese MFA 
further remarked that “[t]he substance of the resolutions is consistent with the 
consensus reached during the China-Africa forum which showed clearly that ‘win-win 
cooperation’ and ‘a community with a shared future for mankind’ have won wide 
support from international community.”714 According to a Chinese scholar interviewed 
by the Global Times, this was “a positive response and recognition of China’s 
achievement and idea in development.” 715  Equally telling, and perhaps a more 
interesting sign of how China’s discourse has started to spread at the UN, is the speech 
the UN Secretary-General gave at the opening ceremony of the 7th FOCAC Summit. 
He argued that: 
This Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is an embodiment of two major priorities of 
the United Nations: to pursue fair globalization and to promote development that leaves 
no one behind in the context of a rules-based system of international relations supported 
by strong multilateral institutions. … Together, China and Africa can unite their combined 
potential for peaceful, durable, equitable progress to the benefit of all humankind. … It is important 
that current and future development cooperation contributes to peace, security and to 
building a “community of shared future for mankind.” … The United Nations will continue to 
support the China-Africa Partnership and more broadly, South-South cooperation, so 
that all nations—in Africa and beyond—may enjoy sustainable and inclusive 
development.716  
The convergence highlighted earlier thus seems to happen both at the discursive and 
policy level; it remains to be seen whether it will lead to China being even more 
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socialised into UN practices, or whether the UN and international cooperation will 
increasingly bear “Chinese characteristics”. 
The African Union is, for now, less successful than the other two platforms in 
terms of China’s power-in-context. While it is true that China is not an entirely new 
player in the continent, its experience does not equal that of Western powers that have 
engaged with the organisation and its mechanisms for much longer. While diplomatic 
and institutional links between the AU and some Western donors have existed for some 
time, China only established its dedicated mission in 2015. As argued earlier in the 
thesis, while this is a sign of its eagerness to learn and be engaged more, Beijing is still 
struggling with understanding continental dynamics. 717  China does, however, 
recognise the fundamental role and agency of the organisation in addressing peace and 
security in the continent, as well as aligning continental policies with global priorities. 
Thus, it has been an eager promoter of the AU-UN partnership, which constitutes an 
important link bridging the regional and global levels. While African elites tend to 
share China’s understanding of the security-development nexus and a view of their 
relations as one among fellow members of the Global South, leaders in Beijing and 
diplomats on the ground have more work to do if the objective is to further socialise 
AU officers into shared practices. Furthermore, aware of its position at the 
organisations vis-à-vis Western countries, Beijing has been ‘compensating’ through 
other means, for instance by accepting the AU as a full member of the FOCAC; by 
building the AU’s headquarters; by committing to financially support the African 
Standby Force and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis through 
free military assistance; and by providing training and capacity building programmes. 
All these measures, I argue, are part of China’s strategy to gain more influence and 
leverage through increased institutionalisation of its partnership with the AU. While it 
will take China some time to make up for decades of more structured and systematic 
Western engagement, its soft and economic power can go a long way into 
compensating for the lack of structural power.718 As its position and legitimacy in the 
continent are changing and growing, so will its normative power within the institution, 
to the extent that AU leaders and member states will allow foreign players to explicitly 
participate in the organisation’s decision-making. 
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Hence, to summarise, China’s discourse has contributed to structuring its 
engagement and foreign policy by linking and bridging across different institutional 
levels. From the regional, through the continental, and to the global arenas, China is 
carving out normative spaces for its preferred norms and practices to be spread. These 
are the spaces where we can expect China’s ability to shape the “normal” to play out 
the most, although its potential in this sense varies across the three, as China’s norms-
making has been more successful at the UNSC than at the AU. However, it is especially 
outside of those institutions, and thus, for instance, at the FOCAC, that we should look 
in order to find the most interesting manifestations of Chinese vision(s) of world order. 
Importantly, it is only through a combination of its influence at all levels, that its 
normative power potential can be fully realised. China’s normative peace and security 
agenda may gain enough support only insofar as both its discourse and strategy remain 
coherent across all levels of engagement. It is not my intention to assign intentionality 
to China’s approaches to security norms, nor to suggest that the country is following a 
pre-established path to attaining more power globally. However, based on my 
fieldwork interviews and the analysis of official documents, it is possible to identify a 
coherent strategy including both Africa and the rest of the world. Such a strategy 
entails: a focus on the security-development nexus, informed by China’s domestic 
experience in the past three decades, which indicates continued development 
assistance, infrastructure building, trade, and investment, as well as increased 
securitisation and militarisation of foreign relations; and the promotion of Chinese 
preferred norms and practices both via already existing organisations and through the 
creation of new institutions ‘controlled’ by China. As regards security, on the one hand 
we are likely to see an even bigger commitment to peacekeeping and more 
contributions to the UN and the AU, both financially and in kind; furthermore, 
China’s preference for diplomacy and mediation is already translating in a very active 
brokering agenda.719  Peacebuilding, on the other hand, is potentially the area for 
multilateral international cooperation where China’s agenda will differ more 
substantially from liberal states. It is true that as China adheres to UN principles, these 
include commitment to human rights and peacebuilding, as one of my interviewees 
suggested.720 However, Beijing has long been pushing for a different understanding of 
human rights, which it sees first and foremost as economic rights. For instance, in 
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March 2018, China, together with Russia, successfully lobbied to cut funding for the 
Human Rights Up Front Initiative, a group created in 2014 by the Secretary-General 
to ensure continued attention to human rights in the organisation’s daily operations.721 
A few months later, to the side of the 38th session of the UN Human Rights Council in 
July 2018, the Chinese special representative for African affairs Xu Jinghu explicitly 
linked the “improvement of people’s livelihood and sustainable development in 
African countries” with the “overall development of the human rights cause”, as a 
result of China-Africa cooperation.722  
In the past, the tributary system worked as a measure of success in spreading the 
‘Chinese model’. According to Ringmar, it was through that system that “the validity 
of their worldview was internationally recognized.”723 It would seem that nowadays, 
such function is performed by adherence to Chinese-led initiatives and Forums, 
including, but not limited to, the BRI and the FOCAC. The quid pro quo is slightly 
different, though. While rulers of tributary states became sovereign in their respective 
countries only upon presenting tributes to the Emperor, today’s relations between 
China and its partners are based (at least in theory) on a more equal footing, as opposed 
to the tributary system. And, if anything, China does not grant sovereignty, but rather 
investments, infrastructure, and aid. I am not suggesting that we should look for a 
parallel between the tributary system and contemporary Chinese foreign policy; the 
scholarly debate on the issue is rich and it is beyond the purposes of this chapter to 
discuss it.724 What I am suggesting, instead, is that if we are looking for any empirical 
‘sign’ of a coherent, alternative Chinese worldview today, it would be useful to start 
from near-equivalent Chinese initiatives such as those just mentioned. To be sure, such 
a China model or worldview are not static, as much as the liberal order is not.725 
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China’s position on, and attitudes towards, its own institutions adjust to changing 
circumstances and preferences. For instance, Chinese leaders recently started to be 
more cautious on the Belt and Road, raising concerns on lending to related projects 
and potential backlash.726 Similarly, Made in China 2025 is now being downplayed by 
Beijing, if nothing else to push back on accusations that it represents a threat to WTO 
rules.727 Hence, if a “Beijing Consensus” ever existed, it would be constantly changing 
and adapting. Or, as Breslin puts it, “what the China model is—what it actually 
entails—is less important than what it is not.”728 
 
7.3.2 The swinging pendulum of power 
Lastly, I consider the interplay between military, economic, and soft power. In 
Chapter 2, I mentioned that normative and soft power are sometimes confused. Diez 
and Manners however argue that the two notions differ since the former is a theoretical 
concept, while the latter is an empirical one. Simultaneously, normative power may 
itself be underpinned by other forms of power, notably military and economic. 
Although the question of whether soft power can be considered a mechanism of 
normative power would be interesting to explore, I here only look at how China has 
used a combination of soft, economic, and military power to ensure the success of its 
narratives and discourse. 
Debates over China’s role in Africa have often focused on its use of soft versus 
hard power. On the one hand, China has a vast arsenal of powerful tools to attract 
others, including Confucius Institutes, training programmes, public diplomacy, 
technology transfers, health initiatives, and capacity building. 729  However, as also 
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highlighted earlier in the thesis, some scholars seem to think that China is rather 
“uncool”. 730 This is especially the case in the West, where many are concerned over 
China’s global expansion. On the other hand, the Chinese model is more popular 
across the developing world. In particular, China’s economic and development model, 
its rising prosperity, and its stability are attractive to many leaders and people in Africa. 
According to d’Hooge, “China’s overall diplomacy and public diplomacy in Africa are 
intimately intertwined, as China’s Africa policies can be considered a resource of soft 
power in Africa.”731 Is it thus also possible to view the security-development nexus, 
which the PRC is eagerly promoting abroad, as a soft power tool? Or does Beijing’s 
attractiveness operate outside of the ‘usual’ confines of the concept?732 As a matter of 
fact, according to Li Mingjiang, by and large Chinese leaders conceptualise soft power 
in a way similar to Nye’s original formulation.733 Yet, he points out, such a discussion 
within China has a wider scope too and encompasses not only the more traditional 
elements of culture, political values, and foreign policy, but also others including 
capability and effectiveness in mass communication; institutional power; the power of 
political institutions, norms, and  credibility; the international community’s acceptance 
of a nation’s policies; and overseas assistance programmes. Kurlantzick similarly 
suggests that in the context of China the idea of soft power is usually fairly broad: It 
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includes “not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive 
economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in 
multilateral organizations—Nye’s carrots and sticks.”734 There is also a rich debate 
within Chinese policy circles and academia discussing the extent to which China 
should develop “its own independent theoretical discourse on soft power that reflects 
its values, national conditions, and long-term interests.”735 In particular, since 2005, 
when China began a transition towards a more active international role, Chinese 
intellectuals have started to ask how can the country convert its economic power into 
more enduring political and cultural influence and, starting in 2006, Chinese leaders 
have started to use the term soft power themselves. Their interests in soft power indeed 
constitutes an important foreign policy shift: Not only does China need to “do more 
than develop the institutional soft power of the Confucius Institutes that teach Chinese 
language and culture around the world; it also needs to develop normative soft power 
in order to create and export its understandings of the world  … that conceptualize 
globalization in new and different ways.”736 Therefore, I would argue against those 
scholars who do not see China as having ‘enough’ soft power and instead maintain 
that, because China’s understanding of soft power is broader than traditional 
definitions and thus incorporates more tools and strategies, it has helped to pave the 
way for China into Africa, couple with equally attractive economic incentives. To be 
sure, sales of military equipment and training were part of China’s support for Africa’s 
liberation movements already in the 1950s throughout the 1970s. However, at the time, 
military ties were mostly based on ideology and the desire to counter first Western and, 
second, Soviet influence.737 Thus, soft and economic power concerns seem to have led 
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the way for China-Africa ties to develop to the point where, today, security occupies a 
central place in their interactions. 
As Ngangom suggests, therefore, and unlike other major powers which have 
traditionally used military might and economic coercion to pursue their geopolitical 
ambitions, until now China has mostly relied on skillful public diplomacy, development 
assistance, and education programmes, among other tools, to ‘secure’ its way to stable 
relationships.738 It is thus through soft and, to an extent, economic power, that Beijing 
has advanced its interests abroad. This was mainly due to lack of experience, 
unwillingness to be involved in foreign conflicts, and a cautious attitude in the security 
realm as compared to other major powers. However, this is possibly changing. Given 
its recent commitments to step up its global security and military footprint, it remains 
to be seen whether such ‘inverted’ soft-to-hard power path will last. For instance, the 
2015 defence white paper sets out ambitious goals for the country’s military 
modernisation and expansion, and a growing role is envisioned for the PLA abroad.739 
In the continent, the most obvious sign of these aims is represented by the Djibouti 
military base, which is also connected to a free-trade zone and to the BRI more broadly. 
In general, China is now upgrading its security diplomacy to complement its 
international presence in other spheres; leaders have reoriented foreign and security 
policy “with a new sense of confidence and mission that builds on new capabilities and 
responds to new threats as well as domestic and international expectations.” 740 
Similarly, economic statecraft has always been enmeshed with its foreign and security 
policy calculus.741 However, this has become more the case recently than it has been in 
the past. One scholar even argues that China “has converted big credits into political 
influence and even a military presence”, while others are discussing how China is the 
leading practitioner of geo-economics.742 In this sense, China may thus be considered 
the perfect example of successful use of “smart” power, understood as the ability to 
combine hard- and soft-power resources into effective strategies.743 Could its normative 
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power also consist in the ability to (re)shape traditional understandings (or standards) 
of foreign policy tools as being utilised by countries other than the US or the EU? As 
Diez and Manners suggest,  
the more normative power builds on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable 
from traditional forms of power, because it no longer relies on the power of norms itself. Indeed, 
the imposition of norms through military force cannot be equated with changing the 
behaviour of other actors, which relies primarily on socialisation processes. Thus, in 
contrast to Nye’s arguments about combining soft and hard power, normative power 
invariably diminishes in the presence of military force.744  
Hence, that remains an open question and the following chapter outlines further 
research ideas on the interplay between normative and other forms of power. 
 
7.4 What kind of international actor is China rising into? 
It is arguably too early to answer the question of what kind of actor China is 
rising into with any degree of certainty. But the risk of sliding into hegemonic 
behaviour is real. If China pursues its policies of military and security expansion, it 
may still be able to set international norms, but its credibility and image as a reliable, 
peaceful partner would be in peril. The effects of China’s rise on its engagement in 
Africa and, in turn, the effects of its presence in the continent on its rise could not be 
more relevant for understanding its global role. As a matter of fact, I argue that if China 
had not grown so confident on the world stage, its engagement in the continent would 
not have developed so fast. Similarly, its perceived success in cultivating win-win 
partnerships in most countries in Africa contributed to strengthening its global image 
in important ways. A number of ‘roles’ emerge from the empirical analysis. 
First, China wants to be both more active and more responsible in international 
affairs, although perhaps not in the way analysts in the ‘West’ would consider 
responsible. This implies that, in order to retain its legitimacy in the medium- to long-
term, China is likely to continue to abide by the rules of the international game. 
Importantly, as Lanteigne notes,  
The ‘maxi-mini’ idea can arguably imply that China’s approach to international 
regimes is distinct to the Chinese case. In reality, a strong case can be made that any 
given state approaches an international institution first with the question of how the 
regime can benefit the state, and only secondly vice versa, if at all. Differences in state 
approaches to international institutions can be found in the degree to which each state 
maximises the benefits of cooperation while minimising the costs. China, being a great 
power and developing global one, is in a better position to do so than many other 
nations.745 
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Therefore, in pursuit of more control and influence of international processes, Beijing 
will continue to push for new institutions and initiatives that directly respond to its 
preferences and interests. Therefore, if we are looking for an explicit and outward 
challenge coming from the PRC to the existing system, we may indeed not find it. In 
a memorable speech at the World Economic Forum in 2017, Xi elevated himself and 
the country as protectors of free trade and investment liberalisation.746 To quote China 
historian Gewirtz, “Xi envisions China becoming a superpower with the Party firmly 
in control over all aspects of life. If he succeeds, China will be the world’s largest 
economy, a global leader in technological innovation with a modernized military, and 
the major force in Asia and beyond. He sees this as restoring its historic stature, ‘the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ that only the CCP can produce.”747 And 
again, in his speech at the 2018 BRICS Summit, Xi argued that “[The BRICS] must 
work together at the United Nations, the Group of 20, and the World Trade 
Organization to safeguard the rule-based multilateral trading regime, promote trade 
and investment liberalization and facilitation, and reject protectionism outright.”748 
Second, however, the analysis of China’s Africa discourse across multilateral 
institutions shows that China is competing with existing great powers for influence over 
global norms, economy, and security. Whether this ambition is always targeted at 
challenging/threatening the US or the ‘West’ directly matters less than the ambition 
in itself. Initiatives such as the BRI, the Made in China 2025, and the China’s 2050 
Plan are all examples of what a world order with Chinese characteristics may look like. 
Of course, successfully realising and implementing these initiatives is easier said than 
done. In order for such plans to be successful, they need to be premised not only on 
solid economics calculus and sustainability, but also on China’s legitimacy and 
normative power—meaning that China needs to keep delivering on its promises, both 
at home and abroad. As far as Africa is concerned, its leaders generally hold a 
favourable view of China and have been eager to share the profits and benefits of 
Chinese-sponsored initiatives, money, and projects. The 2016 Afrobarometer survey 
conducted in 36 African countries, which enquired into people’s attitudes towards 
                                               
746  “Full Text of Xi Jinping Keynote at the World Economic Forum,” January 17, 2018, 
https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum. 
747  Bill Bishop, “The Big Picture: China’s Reform and Opening Turns 40,” Axios, July 27, 2018, 
https://www.axios.com/china-40-year-anniversary-of-opening-and-reform-6a8f8da2-9c3e-4b5e-
aa55-26d83934ca3c.html. 
748 “Full Text of Chinese President’s Speech at Plenary Session of BRICS Johannesburg Summit,” July 
26, 2018, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xgswfcxjxgjmlqs/t1580849.shtml?utm_source=n
ewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axioschina&stream=top-stories. 
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China, found that 63 percent of respondents held positive views of China’s economic 
and political influence, mostly due to investments in infrastructure and business 
development.749 Civil society and researchers educated in the ‘West’ instead tend to be 
more critical of Chinese influence.750 Moreover, Bräutigam argues, “[i]n Washington, 
Republicans and Democrats generally look at China as a new imperial power in Africa: 
bad news for Africans. … But researchers who have explored China’s role in Africa 
suggest that many of the things our politicians believe about Chinese engagement are 
not actually true.”751 Hruby further identifies three common misconceptions that often 
cloud Western analyses and opinions of China’s engagement in Africa.752 First, many 
believe that infrastructure financing is the only “game in town”; instead, China’s 
commercial engagement with African countries has significantly broadened and 
deepened in scope. Second, the notion that all BRI projects in the continent are 
carefully orchestrated by top party officials in Beijing should be weighed up against the 
evidence that leaders do not even keep a central information repository on the loans 
extended as part of the BRI. And third, it is common to think that African governments 
are passive in negotiating contracts with the Chinese, whereas many have refined their 
tactics to better serve their interests in time.753 To be sure, this does not mean that there 
are no negative episodes, incidents, misperceptions, or problems.754 Nor does it mean 
that China should not strive to improve its standards and practices. But it means that 
perceptions matter: The continued success of Chinese diplomacy in the continent and 
elsewhere does not only depend on how well Beijing behaves, but also on how the 
actors involved perceive and understand China, and how these perceptions are 
managed. 
                                               
749  Yi Dionne Kim, “Here’s What Africans Think about China’s Influence in Their Countries,” 
Washington Post, October 28, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/10/28/heres-what-africans-think-about-chinas-influence-in-their-countries/ To be 
sure, they also found that positive assessments of China do not mean that the “West” has been displaced 
entirely. Many still see the US as being the most popular model for development in their country; many 
also saw former colonial powers as having the greatest influence compared to both China and the US. 
See also page 32-33. 
750 Interview with researchers in Addis Ababa, January-February 2018.  
751 Deborah Bräutigam, “U.S. Politicians Get China in Africa All Wrong,” Washington Post, April 12, 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/04/12/china-africa/. 
752 Aubrey Hruby, “Dispelling the Dominant Myths of China in Africa,” Atlantic Council, September 3, 
2018, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dispelling-the-dominant-myths-of-china-
in-africa?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+new-atlanticist-
blog+(New+Atlanticist). 
753 This also reflects what my interviewee from the EU delegation to Ethiopia said about the Ethiopian 
government. See Chapter 5. 
754 For one of the latest instances of tensions, see for instance a recent report from The Standard in 
Kenya: Paul Wafula, “Revealed: SGR Workers Treated Badly by Chinese Masters,” The Standard, July 
8, 2018, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001287179/revealed-sgr-workers-treated-badly-
by-chinese-masters. 
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Third, unlike other countries nowadays, what emerges from the empirical 
chapters is a long-term vision: The international community may not like what a world 
with Chinese characteristics looks like, but it is undeniable that Beijing is projected into 
the future and such a vision encompasses more than just Asia. As Axios’ VandeHei 
puts it, “China is thinking long-term—and acting now, everywhere.”755 The current 
pace of China’s engagement with international affairs thus suggests that Beijing has all 
the intentions to leave its mark on international relations in the decades to come. 
Fourth, it becomes clear that as much as China constructs itself as a responsible 
great power in its discourse and narratives, its identity as a developing country is 
equally, if not more, important to retain, if friendly relations with others in the Global 
South are to be maintained successfully. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that 
Chinese leaders, in this case the President himself, claim that “China will stay as a 
developing country no matter how it develops, staunchly support the development of 
developing countries and be committed to building close partnerships.”756 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings of the empirical analysis and discussed them 
in light of the theoretical framework and the conceptualisation of normative power 
outlined in Chapter 2. I have argued that China can be considered a normative power 
if we take normative power to mean power-in-context: The extent of China’s norms-
setting and norms-making potential depends on the different institutions and the 
country’s position within such institutions vis-à-vis other players. Importantly, the 
success at establishing a stable and coherent discourse was possible not only thanks to 
the country’s soft power, coupled with generous investments, but most importantly 
thanks to the response it encountered from African elites. By being seen as a 
trustworthy and respectful partner, China has promoted its model of security-
development and made it attractive to developing countries as an alternative to 
traditional Western forms of engagement. 
Such normative power has implications both for China’s global rise as a security 
actor (and beyond) and for China-Africa relations. On the one hand, the Chinese 
                                               
755  Jim VandeHei, “China Is the Greatest, Growing Threat to America,” Axios, May 21, 2018, 
https://www.axios.com/china-united-states-future-2025-2050-infrastructure-trade-d7091849-235f-
4aa1-b63c-e86477e9cfe6.html. 
756 Xuequan Mu, “Xi Calls for Expanding ‘BRICS Plus’ Cooperation to Address Common Challenges,” 
July 28, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/28/c_137352893.htm; For the Chinese 
version, see “ ,  J  I ‘  n +’  @  ?   - T ' | ,” July 27, 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-07/27/c_1123188035.htm; emphasis added. 
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vision of world order entails, among other features, a focus on the security-
development nexus; continued assistance to developing countries in the fields of 
development, infrastructure building, trade, and investment, as well as increased 
securitisation and militarisation of foreign relations; and the promotion of Chinese 
preferred norms and practices via both existing organisations and new institutional 
arenas. In terms of China-Africa relations specifically, an even bigger engagement in 
the continent’s security regime is envisioned, not only bilaterally but also through 
multilateralism and growing contributions to institutions such as the UN and the AU, 
as well as a focus on political mediation and diplomacy as the primary means to 
manage and resolve conflicts. 
I have further stressed how China’s skilful use of foreign policy means such as 
diplomacy and propaganda, which have promoted a model of partnership based on 
equal relations, have been fundamental in cementing relations with leaders in 
developing countries and I have argued that Chinese soft power has been effective and 
attractive in cementing relations with African countries.757 Its normative power also 
translates into a series of foreign policy postures which we are likely to see more often: 
China wants to be more active and more responsible in international relations, but it 
also wants to compete for influence over global norms, economy, and security more or 
less directly. Far from being exhaustive, these conclusions prompt new questions on 
both China’s rise and China-in-Africa, and the concluding chapter aims to suggest 
what the future research agenda on such topics may look like.   
                                               
757 For a discussion of diplomacy and propaganda as soft power means, see for instance Christopher 
Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
But their history can be exemplary for us because it permits us to reflect upon ourselves, 
to discover resemblances as well as differences:  
once again self-knowledge develops through knowledge of the Other 
(Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other) 
 
8.1 Summary of the argument and main findings 
This thesis was motivated by what I identified as two different but interrelated 
problems with the literature on China’s rise and on China-Africa. First, while the rise 
of China now occupies a great part of ongoing debates in IR, these still tend to view 
the issue through unproductive binaries, such as revisionism versus status quo, or 
peaceful rise versus threat. Furthermore, these debates are often the product of 
anxieties and concerns in the ‘West’ and especially the US, where scholars and analysts 
worry that the country’s rise will challenge the current liberal order. Questions over 
China’s rising power have become increasingly relevant these days, especially given its 
active participation in multilateralism, its contributions to existing international 
institutions, and the promotion of new institutions with Chinese characteristics. Second, 
the study of China-Africa relations has proved to be one of the most prolific fields 
across a range of disciplines, including IR, international political economy, 
development studies, and anthropology. Yet, micro-analyses, while valuable, often 
miss the wider context and the comparative dimension of Chinese engagement in the 
continent. In addition to these, we also find macro-analyses, which are useful to get a 
sense of the breadth of China’s footprint, but often fail to contextualise these relations 
into broader developments in both the country’s foreign policy and international affairs. 
In particular, peace and security are still underexplored aspects of China-Africa ties in 
the literature, although they have slowly come to occupy the centre stage of their 
interactions. Thus, I have argued for the need to understand China’s rise as a security 
actor globally and in Africa as two sides of the same coin. 
In order to address these gaps, I proposed an argument that is both theoretical 
and empirical. Theoretically, I have argued that the concept of normative power, 
understood as the power to shape the normal in international relations, gives us more 
nuanced insights into China’s preferred norms and practices, as well as the 
mechanisms through which the country is promoting its vision of world order. Given 
that Chinese leaders are actively promoting their strategies and policy preferences as 
alternative norms to existing standards, the concept of normative power promises to 
reveal much more of China’s attempts to socialise others into its vision of world order. 
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Normative power is here understood as power in context—in other words, it is given 
by the contingent context of interactions between actors. The Chinese tend to 
understand normative actions as resting on the idea of sovereignty and collective rights 
based on equality and mutual respect; hence, they seem to focus on a ‘logic of 
relationship’, which is aimed to optimize relations that are not necessarily symmetrical 
or equal, but which require reciprocity. In such a process, recognition from the other 
actors involved in the relation becomes fundamental: An actor’s capacity to shape the 
normal depends on whether it is recognised as such by the target audience(s). In the 
case of China-Africa, it is thanks to years of intense and skilful ‘diplomacy of respect’ 
that China has gained from African elites the respect and recognition that are 
necessary to become norms-shapers. In this sense, therefore, a normative power is able 
to shape the normal only so long as the other actors involved in the interactions 
recognise its power as such. To be sure, China’s economic clout and its attractive 
investments are important components of its policies in Africa. However, it is 
important to also look at how the discourse has contributed to the progress of Sino-
African relations and to building an image for China of a friendly and trustworthy ally. 
Empirically, I have claimed that not only is China being socialised into the 
international system, but it also actively contributes to shaping it—what scholars have 
called a two-way socialisation. In particular, it acts as a security norms-shaper in Africa 
and does so by: 1) proposing new norms and concepts that are based on its history and 
domestic experiences, or re-elaborating on existing norms and concepts by adding 
‘Chinese characteristics’; 2) simultaneously acting inside and outside of typically 
Western-dominated institutions; 3) creating or co-constituting regional forums in the 
developing world; and 4) framing these efforts into a broader foreign policy strategy 
that acts at the regional, the continental, and the global levels. I have thus made two 
related claims. First, China increasingly acts as a security norms-shaper in the 
continent as African elites recognise it as such: The stability of what I called the “South-
South cooperation” discourse granted China the reputation of a trustworthy friend 
and partner, one that delivers on its promises and commitments and acts in pursuit of 
win-win cooperation. This discourse articulates China and Africa as long-term friends 
united in an anti-hegemonic struggle against the domination of the ‘West’. These 
narratives have remained stable throughout a long period of engagement mostly 
thanks to such positive response encountered from African leaders, who have been 
hailed into China’s vision of world order, and to the security-development nexus. As 
the concept entails a close link between the promotion of economic growth and social 
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development and the achievement of stability and peace, growing security and military 
commitments appear legitimate and reasonable. China’s Africa discourse is structured 
into three layers, which gradually make space for peace and security. Starting from the 
basic “South-South cooperation” discourse, the second layer allows for a number of 
representations to develop, such as China and Africa as friends, brothers, and partners, 
and focuses on the developmental aspect of the security-development nexus, whereby 
development is considered a prerequisite for stability. The third layer introduces a new 
aspect of China’s engagement—the securitisation of development—which 
understands the latter as necessarily premised on a peaceful and secure environment. 
This change produced a shift in policies, ranging from non-interference to growing 
military presence—which now align with the country’s broader grand strategy—but 
not a change in the first and second layers of discourse, which remains stable and 
coherent. 
The second and related claim I have made is that, as China-Africa security 
cooperation develops predominantly through multilateral institutions, its normative 
power potential varies depending on the contingent institution. China’s Africa 
discourse is organised horizontally across three multilateral platforms through which 
peace and security matters are negotiated, namely the FOCAC, the AU, and the 
UNSC, and China promotes its vision of world order and its normative security agenda 
across all three platforms. Such efforts have, in turn, encountered responses from 
regions of the Global South. While the coherency of dominant representations of 
China and Africa is maintained across the three organisations, it seems that China 
tends to conform to existing norms and maintain the normative status quo when it 
operates within existing normative frameworks (the UN and the AU); while it shows a 
more active norms-making approach when it operates within the framework of 
Chinese-led or co-constituted regional organisations (the FOCAC). However, the 
Chinese discourse and diplomatic language are increasingly appearing and are 
becoming naturalised in the context of the UN as well. Therefore, depending on the 
country’s role in each of these institutions, the potential for China to effectively 
promote its preferred security and development norms varies greatly. Hence, analysing 
Chinese-led forums and agreements reveals more of the country’s distinctive normative 
practices than exclusively focusing on the country’s behaviour in already established 
institutions. In other words, China is carving normative spaces for its preferred norms 
and practices to be spread across all levels of engagement, showing pragmatism but 
 212 
also a long-term vision that sees China at the centre-stage of international affairs in the 
decades to come. 
The empirical chapters have thus mapped China’s Africa discourse in official 
policy documents. Through this process, I have identified a coherent set of 
representations of China and China-Africa that articulate China’s long-term strategy 
in the continent and that sustain its foreign policy strategy. Such representations are 
supported by a series of political and historical narratives, such as the China-Africa 
friendship, a shared history of colonialism and Western encroachment, and the need 
to address the imbalance of a world dominated by the industrialised and developed 
‘North’ through strengthened South-South cooperation. Through increased 
promotion of the security-development nexus as an essential element of China’s 
discourse, peace and security have gradually found their space in the China-Africa 
story, to the point of becoming a key component of their contemporary relations. The 
discourse is structured along three layers: Starting from the basic “South-South 
cooperation” discourse, the second layer allows for a number of representations to 
develop, such as China and Africa as friends, brothers, and partners, and focuses on 
the developmental aspect of the security-development nexus. The third layer 
eventually introduces a new aspect of China’s engagement—the securitisation of 
development—which understands the latter as necessarily premised on a peaceful and 
secure environment. This change produced a shift in the relevant policies, ranging 
from non-interference to growing military presence, but not in the first and second 
layers of discourse, which remains stable and coherent. Since the security-development 
nexus entails a close link between the promotion of economic growth and social 
development and the achievement of stability and peace, growing security and military 
commitments appear legitimate and reasonable. By presenting itself as a reliable 
partner and by being acknowledged as such across Africa, the Chinese model thus 
represents an attractive alternative to Western modes of engagement. 
The Chinese ‘vision’ that emerges from the empirical chapters is one which 
entails, among other elements, a focus on the security-development nexus; continued 
assistance in the fields of development, infrastructure building, trade, and investment; 
increased militarisation and securitisation of foreign relations; and the promotion of 
Chinese preferred norms and practices via both existing organisations and new 
institutional arenas. In terms of China-Africa relations specifically, we are likely to 
witness an even bigger commitment to peacekeeping, increasing contributions to both 
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the UN and the AU, and an emphasis on political mediation and diplomacy as the 
primary means to manage and resolving conflicts. 
 
8.2 Implications for IR and beyond 
These conclusions have three main implications for IR. First, one of the 
objectives of this thesis was to advance a more nuanced understanding of China’s rise 
and its relations with Africa. As I have argued, most analyses tend to sound the alarm 
bell over China’s ascent to great power status, but few explore how such a rise is playing 
out besides the peaceful versus threatening binary. Yet, by employing less dichotomous 
lenses, it is possible to capture more elements of the country’s changing foreign policy. 
This does not mean giving up a critical approach which should be the foundation of 
any research effort. It means exploring the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of 
China’s rise with the aim to obtain a more thorough understanding of how the 
country’s foreign policy evolves, both domestically and internationally. 
Second, IR and IR theory should commit to a more serious study of Africa and 
its countries’ foreign policies. Admittedly, because of the specific focus of this thesis, I 
failed myself at giving the continent the space it deserves. Since my focus was on China, 
Africa only played a secondary, albeit fundamental role as a case study to understand 
how Chinese normative power works. I remain aware that African politics does not 
only bear importance in light of China’s engagement, but also, and more importantly, 
because African agency has an impact on world politics in a way that perhaps the IR 
discipline does not fully appreciate yet.758 As much as Chinese leaders promote their 
own understanding of peace and security, so do Africans, and it is time for their agency 
and voices to be recovered in future theoretical and empirical research alike. 
Third, and related, one way to improve on the study of Africa in world politics 
would be to draw upon insights that other disciplines have to offer. As noted by 
Ashworth, on the one hand, IR has always been interdisciplinary and combined a rich 
variety of disciplines throughout its development; on the other hand, it has not been 
interdisciplinary enough and it has started to absorb new ideas from other approaches 
only late.759 By now, scholars doing IR also draw on history, sociology, anthropology, 
                                               
758 On IR’s neglect of Africa see for instance: Stephen Wright, ed., African Foreign Policies (Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press, 1999); A. J. Dietz et al., African Engagements: On Whose Terms? Africa Negotiating an Emerging 
Multipolar World (Brill, 2011), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/21982; Kevin C. Dunn 
and Timothy M. Shaw, Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2001); Tom Young, ed., Readings in the International Relations of Africa, 
Readings in African Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). 
759 Lucian M Ashworth, “Interdisciplinarity and International Relations,” European Political Science 8, no. 
1 (2009): 16–25, doi:10.1057/eps.2008.11. 
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geography, area studies, and more, but further work is needed in order for each of the 
disciplines to be fully enriched by the others. The topic of China-Africa is an especially 
good starting point for pursuing such cross-pollination: As the field grows, so do 
multidisciplinary approaches to it, and the challenge is to produce a less fragmented 
and more accurately theorised body of works.760 
 
8.3 Future research agenda 
While I have offered some tentative answers to the questions that motivated this 
dissertation, more inevitably arise from my conclusions. Whether the rise of China 
would eventually lead to a different and new international order altogether, or whether 
China, and its normative power, are rising more within or outside of Western-led 
institutions, are prescient and urgent questions. Since it is unrealistic to address them 
all here, I conclude by suggesting ideas for future research on both China’s rise and 
China-Africa. 
 
8.3.1 Whither Chinese power? 
I have argued that China can be considered a normative power if we understand 
it as power in context and that the degree to which the country is able to shape the 
normal in international relations varies across regions and organisations. The first 
question that stems from this is whether China can become a normative power beyond 
Asia and Africa. In a way, its growing influence in the UNSC is a proof that its norms-
shaping and norms-setting potential is expanding outside of the developing world. It 
remains to be seen whether other major powers will be comfortable with a system 
increasingly shaped according to Chinese visions of world order. China’s normative 
power rests on a successful and stable discourse that constructs relationships with 
partners as equal and mutually beneficial; most importantly, it also rests on the fact 
that the targeted audience recognises China as such. Thus, new questions should be 
asked on the extent to which Western countries will allow China to further push for its 
preferred norms at the global level. Moreover, while I limited my analysis to the 
ontological dimension of China’s normative power, it would be interesting to ask 
                                               
760 Alden and Large, New Directions in Africa-China Studies; Reports from a recent conference of the 
Chinese in Africa and Africans in China Group held in Belgium highlight how scholars working on the 
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whether Chinese leaders have a prescriptive, normative view of China’s vision of world 
order and its preferred norms, and how much this is reflected in the gap between 
theorising about China and its foreign policy practices. I have also discussed the 
dangers of linking normative power to military power: While these two are not 
incompatible, they are indeed in tension. 761  Yet, as we have seen, China’s 
contemporary foreign policy is coming with increasing securitisation and militarisation 
of its international practices; this begs interesting questions on how will its (normative) 
power evolve in light of these developments and what is the likelihood of the PRC 
sliding into a “pure self-interested hegemony”.762 At least in its relations with Africa, 
China has so far mostly relied on a combination of economic instruments and soft 
power tools to gain respect and recognition as a reliable partner to the continent; it 
remains to be seen whether this will change as China starts projecting its military power 
beyond Asia. According to Hughes, whether one interprets Chinese domestic 
dynamics as pushing the country towards hegemony or empire in the long run, 
depends to a large extent on how one understands these concepts. For him, 
It seems safe to say that 19th-century-style colonization is unlikely at the start of the 21st 
century. Yet much of the expansion of European and American power has involved the 
building of informal empires. In the most aggressive cases, these have often been driven 
by the need to put in place counter- cyclical measures to alleviate the domestic political 
pressure that arises from economic imbalances, rather than by the economic 
fundamentals of international trade and investment. It is not hard to see how China’s 
policies of subsidizing export offensives, creating ‘reserve markets’ to absorb excess 
production, tying down natural resources, and ensuring that the nation has sufficient 
hard power at its disposal to protect overseas assets and supply lines fi t this pattern.763 
In this respect, Lanteigne maintains that the PRC’s foreign policy behaviour so 
far suggests unwillingness to engage in revisionist behaviour; although the country has 
indeed moved towards a more “extroverted” foreign policy and upgraded its military 
power and the projection of such power abroad, it has equally shown unwillingness to 
use force—unless its core interests, especially state sovereignty, were threatened.764 
Good steps in this sense have been taken by a number of scholars recently. For instance, 
Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf argue that existing theories predicting the rise of China to be 
either peaceful or violent overlook the important questions of how strong and resilient 
the current Western hegemonic system is and how likely it is that China will lead a 
                                               
761  See for instance Diez on the US, where military force is considered legitimate because it is 
underpinned by the belief that American norms (or the norms America wants to propagate) are 
universally valid: Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others,” 623. 
762 Manners and Diez, “Reflecting on Normative Power Europe,” 174. 
763 Hughes, “China as a Leading State in the International System,” 294. 
764 Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power, 145; for him, problems may 
arise in the future when China’s core interests, including Taiwan, access to the Pacific, and a larger 
share of global resources and markets, overlap with other countries’ interests, particularly the US. 
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successful counterhegemonic challenge.765 They identify two paths to hegemony, both 
of which would be difficult for China to pursue, and they call for the need to do more 
empirical research on the history of hegemony, on the processes and mechanisms an 
aspiring hegemon may use to form a counterhegemonic bloc, and on how an aspiring 
hegemon might cultivate a favourable distribution of identity in the international order. 
Andersen, Coleey, and Nexon have also enquired into challenges to hegemony by 
looking at how public-goods substitution may undermine the liberal order’s rules and 
norms without directly challenging the power-position of the hegemon, and 
contributions to their volume examine China’s potential at undermining hegemony.766 
 
8.3.2 In search of an identity 
Another aspect which I neglected in this thesis is the construction of China’s 
identity through its foreign policy discourse. While I have looked at representations of 
China and China-Africa, I have not lingered much on the ways in which Chinese 
identity is being (re)defined in the process of articulating foreign policies. In its relations 
with the continent, China’s identity as a developing country and fellow member of the 
Global South has proved essential to its normative power. However, China presents 
itself in different guises to different audiences and partners.767 According to Wei and 
Fu, China can be said to hold four identities simultaneously.768 First, as a developing 
country, with residual socio-economic problems domestically and victim of Western 
colonisation: This identity plays out in alliances such as the FOCAC. Second, as an 
emerging power, it seeks alliances with other ‘dissatisfied’ powers, such as the BRICS 
and the SCO, which are built on shared perceptions of marginalisation and under-
representation in the current world order. Third, as a member of the UNSC, not only 
does it have the power and responsibility to deal with global issues, but it also decides 
on the norms and principles regulating such issues. Fourth, some see China as a quasi-
superpower, which creates expectations that are not placed on other countries. Breslin 
adds a fifth identity to the list, as a regional power.769 Thus, questions should be asked 
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on how do these identities and the related discourses change; against which Other(s) 
does China picture itself depending on the different context; how are these identities 
constructed in the official discourse; which identity will prevail in the future—that of a 
great power or a member of the Global South. 
 
8.3.3 Human rights: The thorny issue 
It was highlighted by most of my interviewees at the UN how human rights is 
the main issue which they see as remaining highly contentious in the years to come. 
Recent reports from scholars and journalists on the situation in Xinjiang have sparked 
the debate once again. As many as 1 million Uyghurs have been reported to disappear 
in “re-education camps” as part of the government’s re-education campaign aimed to 
silence “dissent” and exert pressure on China’s Muslim population.770 These prompted 
a UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) hearing in 
August 2018. Its vice-chair Gay McDougall said the Committee believed the reports 
were credible and invited China to answer questions on the matter.771 Not surprisingly, 
the Chinese delegation denied such concerns and instead highlighted the improved 
living standards reached in China thanks to growing economic prosperity across all its 
provinces and regions. 772  A Global Times editorial also rebuked accusations and 
argued that the government had achieved peace and stability in Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) and that such an achievement “has come at a price that 
is being shouldered by people of all ethnicities in Xinjiang.”773 The Ministry further 
rebuked criticism by arguing that “the UN Human Rights High Commissioner and 
her office should abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, respect 
China’s sovereignty, fairly and objectively fulfill its duties, and not listen to and believe 
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one-sided information.”774 The Chinese also claim that Xinjiang enjoys social stability, 
sound economic development, and “harmonious coexistence of different ethnic 
groups … The series of measures implemented in Xinjiang are meant to improve 
stability, development, solidarity and people’s livelihood, crack down on ethnic 
separatist activities and violent and terrorist crimes, safeguard national security, and 
protect people’s life and property.”775 
Hence, the top ‘human rights’ priority for China in Xinjiang is to protect stability 
through the securitisation of people’s daily lives. While it is yet to be seen whether there 
will be any follow-up actions on these reports and whether the Chinese government 
will change and adapt their narratives accordingly, there is momentum among both 
the institutional and academic communities for the discussion to continue, as tensions 
over diverging understanding of rights will likely remain central in relations between 
China and the West in the years to come. More research is thus needed in the field, 
although it is increasingly hard for journalists and scholars to freely report on the issue 
and many have been denied visas or expelled from China following critical essays.776 
 
8.3.4 China in Africa: future trends 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the field of China-Africa studies is 
growing fast and so is the relevant academic literature. Detailing all the potential 
avenues for future studies of the entire field would require a PhD of its own; however, 
a number of questions arise in direct relation with the conclusions I advanced. First, 
some in the community of China-Africa experts and analysts have started to wonder 
whether we have reached “peak China-Africa” and argued that the Chinese model is 
“failing Africa.” 777  They seem to believe that the outcome of the FOCAC 2018 
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demonstrates that Africa now plays a diminished role in China’s global agenda. 
However, based on the conclusions I offer in this thesis, Chinese engagement is more 
likely to becoming more diverse and span a wider range of sectors and countries, rather 
than diminish altogether, and we are yet to see how such diversification will impact 
Sino-African relations in the long-term. Thus, rather than unsubstantiated predictions, 
the field would benefit from more empirical and field analysis that explores the 
different patterns of Chinese engagement and how they vary in time and across 
countries. And second, the literature would benefit from more research on the effects 
of Chinese engagement on autocratic and corrupt regimes in Africa. While many have 
argued that China may be responsible for propping up autocracies, with a few 
exceptions there have not been many empirical studies in this sense yet.778 During the 
7th FOCAC, Chinese officials were asked about corruption in African countries and 
Chen Tao, former head of the MFA’s Africa division and former ambassador of China 
in Mali and Morocco commented that it was unfair to blame China for supporting 
corrupt governments, as those governments were elected by the people in the first 
place.779 While this rhetoric ignores the reality of the many cases of undemocratic 
elections across the continent, it fits into the broader shift in narrative identified earlier, 
with Chinese media and representatives now more eager than ever to defend China’s 
conduct abroad and respond to criticism over loaning and financing practices. 780 
Questions thus need to be asked as to whether China’s illiberal politics may make it 
easier for corrupt leaders to hold on to power; how we can best measure such effects; 
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if and how China is having any negative effect on democratisation trends across the 
continent; and how are these accusations dealt with in the official foreign policy 
discourse in China. 
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Annex I – List of Interviews 
1. Interview with Professor, Peking University, Beijing, 01/06/2016  
2. Interview with Professor 2, Peking University, Beijing, 02/06/2016 
3. Phone interview with Former Special Representative for African Affairs at the 
MFA, 02/06/2016 
4. Interview with senior researcher, SIIS, Shanghai, 06/06/2016 
5. Interview with diplomat from Botswana, Shanghai, 06/06/2016 
6. Interview with diplomat from Nigeria, Shanghai, 06/06/2016 
7. Interview with diplomat from Liberia, Shanghai, 06/06/2016 
8. Interview with senior researcher, CIIS, Beijing, 14/06/2016 
9. Interview with diplomat from Somalia, Beijing, 15/06/2016 
10. Interview with former Head of Policy on Peace Support Operations, AUC, 
London, 10/01/2017 
11. Interview with senior researcher and Associate Academic Director, IPSS, 
Addis Ababa, 20/01/2017 
12. Interview with, Professor, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, 31/01/2017 
13. Interview with senior researcher 1, ISS, Addis Ababa, 02/02/2017 
14. Interview with senior officer, UNECA, Addis Ababa, 03/02/2017 
15. Interview with senior officer, AUC Peace and Security Department, Addis 
Ababa, 08/02/2017 
16. Interview with diplomat, EU delegation to Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 
08/02/2017 
17. Interview with senior British military officer, UN Peacekeeping training centre, 
Addis Ababa, 09/02/2017 
18. Interview with senior officer, UNECA, Addis Ababa, 09/02/2017 
19. Interview with diplomat, EU delegation to the AU, Addis Ababa, 10/02/2017 
20. Interview with officer, AUC Peace and Security Department, Addis Ababa, 
13/02/2017 
21. Interview with senior officer, AUC Peace and Security Department, Addis 
Ababa, 13/02/2017 
22. Interview with Ambassador, Head of conflict prevention and early warning 
division, AUC, Addis Ababa, 14/02/2017 
23. Interview with senior researcher 2, ISS, Addis Ababa, 15/02/2017 
24. Interview with former diplomat, MFA, Beijing, 14/04/2017 
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25. Phone interview with Former Special Representative for African Affairs at the 
MFA, 27/04/2017 
26. Interview with senior researcher, CICIR, 03/05/2017 
27. Interview with senior officer, UNDP, Beijing, 05/05/2017 
28. Interview with Ambassador for FOCAC Affairs, MFA, Beijing, 01/06/2017 
29. Interview with senior researcher, Understanding Violent Conflict Group, 
SSRC, New York, 27/03/2018 
30. Interview with senior officer 1, UNDPKO, New York, 29/03/2018 
31. Interview with officer 2, UNDPKO, New York, 29/03/2018 
32. Interview with senior officer 3, UNDPKO, New York, 29/03/2018 
33. Phone interview with senior policy officer 4, UNDPKO, New York, 
18/04/2018 
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Annex II – Summary of FOCAC Peace and Security Commitments, 2000-2018 
 
 FOCAC 2000 FOCAC 2003 FOCAC 2006 FOCAC 2009 FOCAC 2012 FOCAC 2015 FOCAC 2018 
Pe
ac
e 
an
d 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 ($
)  
    - RMB600 
million free 
assistance to the 
AU within three 
years starting 
from 2012 
- USD60 million 
of free military 
assistance to the 
AU over the 
next three years; 
- support 
operationalizati
on of the APSA 
- support 
operationalizati
on of the 
African 
Capacity for the 
Immediate 
Response to 
Crisis and the 
African Standby 
Force 
 
- USD100 
million in 
military 
assistance to 
support the 
African 
Standby 
Force and 
African 
Capacity for 
Immediate 
Response to 
Crisis 
- China-Africa 
Peace and 
Security Fund 
(but no 
indication of 
$) 
Pe
ac
ek
e
ep
in
g 
 - China 
considers 
intensifying 
participation 
- Support the 
AU's leading 
role in 
resolving 
- Intensified 
cooperation 
with African 
countries in 
peacekeeping 
- Continued 
support to UN 
PKOs 
- Continued 
support and 
participation in 
PKOs & 
- Continued 
active role in 
PKOs 
- Considers 
sending more 
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- Strengthen 
the capacity 
of African 
States to 
undertake 
PKOs  
- Logistical 
support 
African 
issues 
- Take an 
active part 
in UN 
PKOs in 
Africa 
theory 
research, 
peacekeeping 
training and 
exchanges 
and in 
supporting 
the building 
of 
peacekeeping 
capacity in 
Africa. 
peacekeeping 
training 
 
peacekeepers 
to Africa at 
the request of 
the UN 
- Support 
Africa’s 
capacity-
building for 
independent 
PKOs 
- Provide 
peacekeeping 
and police 
training 
- Support 
PKOs with 
force 
multipliers 
and enablers 
- Actively 
implement 
the US$100 
million 
military 
assistance in 
support of the 
African 
Standby 
Force and 
African 
Capacity for 
Immediate 
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Response to 
Crisis 
- Deployment 
of the first 
helicopter 
squad to UN 
PKOs in 
Africa 
- Appropriatio
n of China-
UN Peace 
and 
Development 
Fund to UN 
peacekeeping 
missions in 
Africa 
Pe
ac
eb
ui
ld
in
g 
   - Strengthened 
cooperation 
with 
countries 
concerned in 
the UN 
Peace 
Building 
Commission 
- Support 
countries in 
their post-
war 
reconstructio
n processes 
- Personnel 
exchanges and 
training in 
peace and 
security and 
Africa’s conflict 
prevention, 
management 
and resolution 
and post-
conflict 
reconstruction 
and 
development 
 
- Intensify 
communication 
and 
coordination 
with Africa in 
the UNSC 
- Strengthen 
capacity of 
regional and 
sub-regional 
organizations, 
in particular the 
African Union, 
in conflict 
prevention and 
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crisis 
management, 
and in post-
conflict 
stabilization 
An
ti-
pi
ra
cy
 a
nd
 a
nt
i-t
er
ro
ri
sm
 
- Work 
together 
with Africa 
to improve 
cooperation 
in the fight 
against 
terrorism 
- Supports of 
Africa’s 
efforts to 
prevent and 
combat 
terrorism 
- Agree to 
strengthen 
counter-
terrorism 
cooperation 
- Explore 
ways of 
counter-
terrorism 
cooperation 
with African 
countries 
- Counter-
piracy efforts 
in the Gulf of 
Aden and off 
the coast of 
Somalia 
 
- Counter-piracy 
efforts in the 
Gulf of Aden 
and in waters 
off the coast of 
Somalia  
- China is ready 
to strengthen 
cooperation 
with Somalia, 
the African 
Union and 
relevant African 
sub-regional 
organizations in 
this field. 
- Strengthen 
communication 
and cooperation 
on fighting all 
forms of 
terrorism 
- Holistic 
approach: 
addressing both 
the symptoms 
- Strengthen 
information and 
intelligence 
exchanges and 
experience 
sharing on 
security 
- Share this 
information 
timeously to 
support mutual 
efforts in the 
prevention and 
fight against 
terrorism, in 
particular its 
symptoms and 
underlying 
causes. 
- Counter-piracy 
efforts in the 
Gulf of Aden, 
the Gulf of 
Guinea and in 
waters off the 
coast of Somalia 
- Continued 
military aid to 
the AU 
- Support 
countries in 
the Sahel 
region and 
those 
bordering the 
Gulf of Aden 
and the Gulf 
of Guinea in 
upholding 
security and 
combating 
terrorism 
- Establish 
dialogue and 
cooperation 
with Afripol 
- Step up 
intelligence 
sharing and 
coordination 
of actions in 
fighting 
terrorism and 
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and root causes 
of terrorism 
- Strengthen 
cooperation on 
safeguarding the 
security of 
shipping routes 
in the waters 
concerned and 
peace and 
stability in the 
region 
 
cross-border 
crimes 
- Work 
together to 
carry out 
training 
sessions 
R
ol
e 
of
 th
e 
U
N
 
- Highlight 
the primary 
role of the 
UNSC in 
safeguardin
g world 
peace and 
security 
- Efforts to 
push 
forward the 
reform of 
the UN and 
internation
al financial 
institutions 
 
- Step up 
cooperation 
to support 
an even 
greater role 
of the UN in 
preventing, 
mediating 
and 
resolving 
conflicts in 
Africa 
- Increase the 
authority 
and 
efficiency of 
the UN 
through 
reform 
- Continued 
support to 
the UNSC in 
playing a 
constructive 
role in 
solving 
conflicts in 
Africa 
- Uphold the 
central role of 
the United 
Nations in 
international 
affairs and 
promote 
multilateralism 
and democracy 
in international 
relations 
 
- Continued 
support the UN 
in its efforts to 
play a 
constructive role 
in helping 
resolve regional 
conflicts in 
Africa 
- Intensify 
communication 
and 
coordination 
with the UNSC 
 
- Commitment 
to mutual 
support in 
international 
affairs, and to 
the purposes 
and principles 
of the UN 
Charter, 
multilateralis
m, the 
authority of 
the United 
Nations, and 
the important 
role of the 
UN in 
international 
affairs 
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Su
pp
or
t f
or
 A
fr
ic
a 
at
 U
N
 
- Developing 
countries 
should be 
more 
adequately 
represented 
in the 
UNSC and 
internation
al economic 
and 
financial 
institutions 
- Call for the 
recognition 
of the 
legitimate 
place due to 
Africa in 
the SC and 
other 
agencies 
- China’s 
commitment 
to stand by 
the African 
countries at 
the United 
Nations and 
other 
international 
fora and 
support 
proposals 
and 
positions of 
the African 
Union 
 
- Reforming 
the UN SC 
to increasing 
the 
representati
on of 
developing 
countries, 
African 
countries in 
particular 
- Build a 
conference 
centre for 
the African 
Union 
- Need for 
strengthening 
the role of 
the United 
Nations 
through its 
reform and, 
as a matter of 
priority, 
increasing the 
representatio
n of African 
countries in 
the Security 
Council and 
other UN 
agencies 
- Need for 
necessary 
reforms of the 
United Nations 
- Historical 
injustice against 
African 
countries should 
be redressed 
and priority 
should be given 
to increasing the 
representation 
of African 
countries in the 
UNSC and 
other 
institutions 
 
- Strengthen 
coordination 
and cooperation 
on regional and 
international 
issues of 
common 
interests, 
- Safeguard the 
common 
interests of 
China, Africa 
and other 
developing 
countries 
- Work with 
Africa to raise 
the voice and 
influence of 
developing 
countries in 
the field of 
UN 
peacekeeping 
Se
cu
ri
ty
-
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t N
ex
us
 
&
 B
R
I  
- The 
injustice 
and 
inequality 
in the 
current 
internation
al system 
are 
incompatibl
- Destabilizing 
factors 
against 
world peace 
and security 
are on the 
rise, while 
the unfair 
and 
inequitable 
- Imbalance 
in global 
development
, widening 
gap between 
North and 
South, the 
combination 
of 
traditional 
- A 
harmonious 
world of 
enduring 
peace and 
common 
prosperity 
would not be 
possible 
without 
- We should 
promote peace 
and stability in 
Africa and 
create a secure 
environment for 
Africa’s 
development 
- Jointly promote 
peace and 
- Actively explore 
the linkages 
between 
China’s 
initiatives of 
building the 
Silk Road 
Economic 
Belt and 21st 
Century 
- Step up 
“Belt and 
Road” 
security 
cooperation 
with 
particular 
focus on 
railway, 
industrial 
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e with the 
trend of the 
times 
towards 
world peace 
and 
developmen
t, hinder 
the 
developmen
t of the 
countries of 
the South 
and pose 
threats to 
internation
al peace 
and security 
- The 
establishme
nt of a just 
and 
equitable 
new 
internation
al political 
and 
economic 
order is 
indispensab
le for the 
democratisa
international 
order has 
not seen 
fundamental 
changes 
- Economic 
globalization
, on the 
other hand, 
has 
reinforced 
interdepend
ence among 
countries 
and regions, 
while at the 
same time 
bringing 
more 
challenges 
than 
opportunitie
s to 
developing 
countries. 
and non-
traditional 
security 
threats as 
well as 
increasing 
factors of 
instability 
and 
uncertainty 
standing in 
the way of 
peace and 
development 
all pose a 
daunting 
challenge to 
developing 
countries in 
their pursuit 
of 
sustainable 
development
. 
- Without 
peace and 
development 
in China 
and Africa, 
there will be 
no global 
peace and 
development 
in Africa. We 
believe that 
developme
nt is the 
foundation 
for peace in 
Africa.  
- Conflict and 
poverty often 
come hand in 
hand and 
form a 
vicious cycle. 
If Africa is to 
achieve 
durable 
peace and 
stability, it 
needs to 
speed up 
economic 
and social 
development 
and let all the 
people share 
the benefits 
of 
development 
  
development in 
the continent.  
 
Maritime Silk 
Road and 
Africa’s 
economic 
integration 
and 
sustainable 
development 
agenda 
- Seek more 
opportunities to 
promote 
common 
development 
and realize our 
common 
dreams 
parks and 
major events 
- Step up the 
sharing of 
intelligence, 
technologies 
and 
experience 
- Increase joint 
exercise and 
training to 
improve 
African law 
enforcers’ 
ability to 
safeguard 
the security 
of major 
domestic 
economic 
projects 
and protect 
the safety 
of Chinese 
nationals, 
Chinese 
companies 
and major 
projects.  
- Strong 
synergy 
between the 
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tion of 
internation
al relations 
and for the 
effective 
participatio
n of 
developing 
countries in 
the 
internation
al process 
of decision-
making. 
peace and 
development 
BRI and the 
2030 Agenda 
for 
Sustainable 
Development 
of the United 
Nations, 
Agenda 2063 
of the African 
Union (AU), 
as well as the 
development 
strategies of 
African 
countries.  
 
 
Ar
m
s 
C
on
tr
ol
 
- Pledge to 
fully 
cooperate 
at 
internation
al fora to 
prevent and 
combat the 
problem of 
illicit 
proliferatio
n, 
circulation 
and 
trafficking 
 - Pledge to 
continue to 
support and 
take part in 
the 
humanitaria
n de-mining 
operations 
in Africa 
and the 
effort to 
combat 
illicit trade 
in small 
arms and 
 - Continued 
support to 
African 
countries’ effort 
to combat illegal 
trade and 
circulation of 
small arms and 
light weapons 
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of small 
arms and 
light 
weapons 
light 
weapons 
N
on
- T
ra
di
tio
na
l S
ec
ur
ity
 
 - Non-
traditional 
security 
issues such 
as terrorism, 
small arms 
trafficking, 
drug 
trafficking, 
illegal 
migration, 
transnational 
economic 
crimes, 
infectious 
diseases and 
natural 
disasters 
have become 
new 
variables 
affecting 
international 
and regional 
security, 
posing new 
challenges to 
international 
- New 
challenge to 
global peace 
and security 
posed by 
non-
traditional 
security 
issues such 
as natural 
disasters, 
refugees and 
displaced 
persons, 
illegal 
migration, 
transnationa
l crimes, 
drug 
smuggling 
and 
communica
ble diseases 
- New 
security 
concept with 
mutual trust, 
mutual 
  - Jointly manage 
non-traditional 
security issues 
and global 
challenges such 
as food security, 
energy security, 
cyber security, 
climate change, 
biodiversity 
conservation, 
major 
communicable 
diseases and 
transnational 
crimes 
 
- Coordinated 
efforts to deal 
with both 
traditional 
and non-
traditional 
security 
threats 
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and regional 
peace and 
stability 
benefit, 
equality and 
coordination 
at its core 
- Strengthen 
exchanges 
and 
cooperation 
in the non-
traditional 
security field 
C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 A
U
 &
 S
ub
-r
eg
io
na
l 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 
- Step up 
cooperation 
to support 
an even 
greater role 
of the UN, 
the AU, 
and other 
sub-
regional 
African 
organizatio
ns in 
preventing, 
mediating 
and 
resolving 
conflicts in 
Africa 
- Continued 
attention to 
- Continued 
active 
participation 
in the 
peacekeepin
g operations 
and de-
mining 
process in 
Africa 
- Provide 
financial and 
material 
assistance as 
well as 
relevant 
training to 
the Peace 
and Security 
Council of 
- Continue to 
strengthen 
cooperation 
with the AU 
and sub-
regional 
organization
s and 
institutions 
in Africa 
- Support the 
AU'’s 
leading role 
in resolving 
African 
issues 
- Take an 
active part 
in UN 
peace-
keeping 
- China 
expressed 
welcome to 
the 
establishment 
of an AU 
representativ
e office in 
Beijing at an 
appropriate 
time 
 
- China welcomes 
the African 
Union to 
establish a 
representative 
office in Beijing 
at an 
appropriate 
time 
- Launch the 
“Initiative on 
China-Africa 
Cooperative 
Partnership for 
Peace and 
Security” 
- Provide 
financial and 
technical 
support to the 
African Union 
- Important role 
of the AU in 
safeguarding 
peace and 
stability in 
Africa, 
promoting the 
development of 
Africa, and 
advancing the 
integration 
process of 
Africa 
- Efforts and 
contributions 
made by China 
to support 
Africa's peaceful 
and stable 
development 
and integration 
- Consolidate 
and 
strengthen 
the 
momentum of 
friendly 
exchanges 
between 
China and 
the AU and 
Africa’s sub-
regional 
organizations 
to enhance 
strategic trust 
and practical 
cooperation 
- China will 
continue to 
engage with 
the AU and 
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the issue of 
African 
refugees 
and 
displaced 
persons 
- Continued 
active 
participatio
n in the 
peacekeepi
ng 
operations 
and de-
mining 
process in 
Africa 
- Provide 
financial 
and 
material 
assistance 
as well as 
relevant 
training to 
the Peace 
and 
Security 
Council of 
the African 
Union 
the African 
Union 
operations 
in Africa 
- Build the 
AU 
convention 
centre in 
Addis 
Ababa 
for its peace-
support 
operations, the 
development of 
the APSA 
sub-regional 
organizations 
of Africa 
through 
various 
consultations 
and dialogues 
to strengthen 
communicati
on over the 
economic 
development 
of Africa and 
its sub-regions 
and 
important 
regional 
issues 
- China will 
continue to 
support the 
capacity 
building of 
the AU and 
Africa’s sub-
regional 
organizations 
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M
ili
ta
ry
 &
 O
th
er
 R
el
ev
an
t T
ra
in
in
g  
  - China will 
provide 
financial 
and material 
assistance 
and related 
training for 
African 
countries 
within its 
capacity 
 - Personnel 
exchanges and 
training in the 
field of peace 
and security and 
Africa’s conflict 
prevention, 
management 
and resolution 
and post-
conflict 
reconstruction 
and 
development 
 
- Deepen 
exchanges on 
technologies 
and expand 
personnel 
training and 
joint trainings 
and exercises 
 
- 50 security 
assistance 
programs to 
advance 
China-Africa 
cooperation 
under the 
BRI, and in 
areas of law 
and order, 
UN PKOs, 
fighting 
piracy and 
combating 
terrorism 
- Expand 
defense and 
military 
personnel 
training 
- Deepen 
academic 
exchanges 
and 
cooperation 
among 
military 
academies 
and research 
institutes 
- Enhance 
cooperation 
 288 
 
on military 
medical 
science 
- One training 
session every 
year 2019 to 
2021 to train 
100 African 
anti-
corruption 
officials  
- Establishment 
of China-
Africa Law 
Enforceme
nt and 
Security 
Forum  
- In the next 
three years, 
provision of 
police 
equipment, 
and short-
term law 
enforcement 
training 
courses 
